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


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PAST TIMES AND PASTIMES



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THE EARL OF DUNRAVEN, K.P.

PAST TIMES

AND

PASTIMES

BY THE

EARL OF DUNRAVEN

K.P., C.M.G.

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. II

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I

IRELAND

THE LAND WAR AND LAND PURCHASE

SCRIBBLING in this year of disgrace 1921, it is a little difficult to give a fair, unbiassed description of my feelings towards my native land. Ireland is of all the countries that I know of the most delightful to live in. To me it has always had an indescribable fascination, and this fascination is not in its effects peculiar to me. Exceptions there are among men who have settled in Ireland; but I cannot recall an instance of a woman who, by marriage or some other fate, came to live in Ireland who has not become devoted to its people.

I love Ireland for the pathetic tragedy of its history; and its people for their tenacious fortitude, innate chivalry and kindness of heart, sadness and keen sense of humour—characteristics which, though they are in abeyance at present, are racial and will survive. And so, after the conclusion of the Boer War, I devoted the very precious years since middle age in endeavouring to do what I could for my country.

Ireland is a hard mistress, and those who try to serve her must be content to suffer. The Irish character has some defects—one natural, and many acquired. Irishmen are liable to be actuated too much by personal attachment to a leader, too little

by adherence to some definite principle. They are apt to follow a man for what he is rather than for what he does or tries to do. Centuries of misgovernment, generations of struggle, have warped and twisted the natural character. England has never understood, nor even until recently has honestly tried to understand, the root causes of discontent in Ireland. Ireland has yet to learn that unity in action is necessary for success, and that hatred of England as a motive power is bound to fail.

I have to the best of my ability tried in speech and writing to enlighten England as to the historic causes of Irish discontent. I have tried to persuade Irishmen to believe in themselves and Ireland, to think together and act together, to rely upon peace within her borders and unity,—perhaps I have not altogether failed. At any rate, I did what I could according to my lights, and no man can do more. I set before myself a fairly definite programme. Ireland in the distant days of which I am thinking was in the throes of a bitter agrarian struggle. Various Acts interfering with the relations between landlord and tenant had reduced the principal industry of the country to chaos, and agrarian agitation and political agitation were inextricably mixed up together.

The abolition of landlordism, and, in natural connection with it, the reinstatement, so far as was possible, of evicted tenants—the wounded soldiers of the land war—a fair chance for labourers, a just readjustment of taxation, higher education, the obtaining for Ireland of such an extension of self-governing power as would give the Irish people full control of all purely Irish affairs—these were the principal items in the programme which I made up my mind to advocate; and I determined to pursue them through the one method by which, as I believed,

success could be attained—conciliation, peace at home, and good-will towards our neighbours. That seemed to me to constitute a sane, sound, and truly national policy.

In December 1902 and January 1903 the historic Land Conference was held, and, in view of its importance—marking, as it did, the dawn of a new era in Irish affairs—I deal with it, and with my own share in it, at some length.

THE LAND CONFERENCE

The story of the Irish Land Conference of 1902–1903 may be said to begin with the Land Bill, introduced by George Wyndham, the best Chief Secretary Ireland had had for many years, in the spring of 1902. This Bill was not a very great advance upon earlier Land Purchase Acts. It did not provide for the completion of purchase on anything like an adequate scale, nor did it afford any remedy for the sufferings of evicted tenants. It did not recognise the pressing problems of the Irish Land system, and it was condemned by the United Irish League and the great majority of the people.

Mr. William O'Brien, writing of this abortive attempt at settlement some years later, remarked that, if the 1902 Bill had become law, "it must either have deprived the tenants of all freewill and forced purchase upon them on the landlords' own terms, or restricted purchase transactions to insolvent estates and maintained landlordism practically intact for generations to come." The Bill was withdrawn on June 10, and another and more comprehensive measure was promised for the following year.

During the summer of 1902 a great deal of agitation and violent disturbance took place in Ireland.

Large portions of the country, including the cities of Dublin, Cork, and Limerick, were proclaimed under the Crimes Act, public meetings were suppressed, and a number of Members of Parliament were imprisoned.

But, in spite of this storm and stress and all the violent passions aroused, a certain vague, half-unconscious movement of public opinion towards a different solution of the problem than "a fight to the finish" began to manifest itself. The idea of a conference between landlords and tenants was not absolutely new; but it never began to take anything like a tangible form until in the summer of 1902 some such arrangement was advocated by Mr. Lindsay Talbot-Crosbie and others in a series of letters that were favourably received by the Nationalist Press.

On August 27 the annual meeting of the Landowners' Convention was held, and in the private business which preceded the public meeting Mr. Talbot-Crosbie submitted a resolution expressing the view that a Conference would be conducive of good results and was worthy of the Convention's support. But after some discussion the resolution was withdrawn, and was not submitted at the public meeting of the Convention.

It is probable that the Conference idea was saved from an untimely death by a bold appeal in a letter from Captain Shawe-Taylor, which appeared in several of the leading Irish newspapers on September 3, and which, after deploring the 200-year-long "land war," with its resulting paralysis of commercial enterprise, and its hatred and bitterness, and warning against the impending renewed conflict between the United Irish League and the Irish Land Trust, put forth a strong plea for the convening of an early Conference

in Dublin, to which the Duke of Abercorn, Mr. John Redmond, M.P., Lord Barrymore, Colonel Saunderson, M.P., the Lord Mayor of Dublin, The O'Connor Don, Mr. William O'Brien, M.P., and Mr. T. W. Russell, M.P., should be invited, and at which an "honest, simple, and practical solution"—likely to prove acceptable to both landlord and tenant—would be submitted.

This appeal received added significance through a statement authorised by the Chief Secretary, which appeared in the Press, approving the suggested meeting of the parties concerned, upon "their own responsibility and initiative."

"No Government," it ran, "can 'settle' the Irish Land Question; it must be settled by the parties interested. The extent of useful action on the part of any Government is limited to providing facilities, in so far as may be possible, for giving effect to any 'settlement' arrived at by the parties. It is not for the Government to express an opinion either on the opportuneness of the moment chosen for holding a Conference or on the selection of persons invited to attend. Those persons who come together naturally do so on their own initiative and responsibility. Any Conference is a step in the right direction if it brings the prospect of a settlement between the parties nearer, and in so far as it enlarges the probable scope of operations in such a settlement."

The Government was evidently anxious to do all in its power to encourage a peaceful and amicable settlement, a desire which was subsequently emphasised by the appointment of Sir Antony (now Lord) MacDonnell to the Under-Secretaryship, a position which he accepted at great self-sacrifice, as it involved losing a seat on the India Council and the reversion of the Governorship of Bombay.

The views of the various political leaders upon the Conference, as suggested in Captain Shawe-Taylor's letter, were anxiously awaited by the public. The Lord Mayor of Dublin (Mr. T. Harrington, M.P.) had already expressed his willingness to take part. Mr. T. W. Russell wrote that he could not, in the face of the reasonable attitude of a section of the landlord body, take the responsibility of declining—the choice was “really between peace and civil war.” Mr. Redmond and Mr. O'Brien took longer to make up their minds; but, on September 22, Mr. Redmond wrote that, while he was ignorant of the proposals which Captain Shawe-Taylor intended to submit, he could not “refuse to confer with genuine representatives of the landlords.” Mr. O'Brien wrote in a similar sense.

The landlords gave the proposal a very different reception. My brother-in-law, Arthur Smith-Barry (Lord Barrymore), wrote denouncing a Conference as practically capitulating to the enemy; so also did the Duke of Abercorn, Colonel Saunderson, and others. I wrote one or two letters to the *Irish Times*, urging that while a Conference might do good, it could not possibly make matters worse than they were; and that at any rate it showed that we landlords had confidence in our case. Shawe-Taylor telegraphed to me begging me “to come up and help us,” and I went to Dublin.

Shawe-Taylor thought that the best results would be arrived at by the meeting of extremists on both sides. But, whatever may be the abstract justification for this plan, it was obviously impracticable. A Conference became impossible when the representatives of one side absolutely refused to confer. The Irish newspapers, however, pressed more strongly than ever for a Conference, and on September 22, at a meeting of the Deputy-Lieutenants of Queen's

County, a resolution was passed in favour of a Conference, an event which Mr. Healy termed "the most significant that has taken place on the Land Question since 1881." The example was followed at meetings of Deputy-Lieutenants in several other counties. County Councils also passed resolutions in favour of a Conference. A poll of the Lieutenants and Deputy-Lieutenants of Ireland was taken by the *Independent and Nation*, the result being 103 for a Conference and 33 against. A similar poll of the County Councillors resulted in 358 for and only 3 against.

On October 4 the Archbishop of Dublin published a statement giving his hearty approval to the project, and referred to a proposal on somewhat similar lines which he had himself made some years before; and three days later, at a meeting of the Roman Catholic Hierarchy at Maynooth, a resolution was unanimously adopted expressing the "earnest sympathy" of the meeting with the project of a Land Conference. "We earnestly trust," the resolution concluded, "that all those on whose co-operation the success of this most important movement depends may approach the consideration of it in the spirit of conciliation in which it has been initiated."

On October 8, at a meeting of the Irish Party in Dublin, a resolution (moved by Mr. Dillon and carried unanimously) was passed to the effect that while approving the action of Mr. Redmond, Mr. O'Brien, and Mr. Harrington, they agreed with them that any Conference with unacknowledged or unrepresentative persons must either prove wholly abortive or be aimed against the unity and interests of the people's organisations.

It was very evident that the idea had taken a deep hold on the popular mind. It was supported

by resolutions of local bodies, by meetings of Deputy-Lieutenants, by the most important Irish newspapers, and by nearly the entire English Press—irrespective of party—with the exception of the *Times*. But all these striking manifestations of public opinion had no effect whatever on the dominant party in the Landowners' Convention—or, if it had any effect, it served merely to stiffen their resistance; and at a meeting of the Convention on October 10 a resolution proposed by Lord Mayo and seconded by Mr. Lindsey Talbot-Crosbie, in favour of a Conference, was rejected by 77 to 14—a decision which was received with a chorus of regret and disappointment from the larger part of the Irish and English Press.

The minority in the Convention were not disposed to acquiesce tamely in their defeat. They challenged the right of the Convention to represent the views of landowners on that particular point, and on October 18 they published a circular stating that, as the question of a Conference had not been mooted when the delegates were elected, it was doubtful whether the vote represented the general feeling of the landlords, and that they would endeavour to ascertain the opinion of landowners by means of a poll. For that purpose a Provisional Committee was formed, and a copy of the circular and a voting paper were sent to all the landowners of Ireland.

During the next month the members of the Provisional Committee took steps to keep the project before the public. Colonel (now Sir) Huteson-Poë, Lord Mayo, myself, and others took up the cudgels for a Conference in letters to the Press, pointing out the unrepresentative character of the Landowners' Convention, and denying its right to speak with authority for the whole body of landlords. At Limerick I addressed a meeting of landlords, urging

the desirability of ending the system of dual ownership, which had proved "a disastrous failure," and establishing single ownership through some "fair and equitable" measure of purchase by which the landlords could be bought out; and in a speech at Dover, on October 31, the Chief Secretary compared his position to that of "an honest broker" between landlords, tenants, and the Imperial Exchequer, and implied that his task would be much easier if some sort of agreement were arrived at between the two former with regard to the terms which they could accept.

The result of the poll was announced on November 18. Some 4000 landlords had been approached, and of these 1706 recorded their vote; 1128 voted in favour of a Conference and 578 against a Conference. The result was a great encouragement, and we decided to proceed. The Committee appointed to take the poll was at once dissolved, and a new Committee was formed for the purpose of arranging for a Conference. This Committee consisted of myself as Chairman, the Earl of Meath, the Earl of Mayo, Viscount Powerscourt, Lord Castletown of Upper Ossory, Sir Algernon Coote, Colonel (now Sir) Nugent Everard, Colonel (now Sir) Hutcheson-Poë, Mr. Lindsay Talbot-Crosbie, Mr. George Taaffe, Mr. William Daly, and Captain Shawe-Taylor. Other members were added to the Committee later.

Our first act was to address a communication to the Secretary of the Landowners' Convention, asking the Executive Committee to co-operate with us in arranging the details of a Conference. The reply which our Secretary (the Earl of Mayo) received declined all co-operation. The Committee adhered to the statement adopted by the Convention on October 10; they regretted the action taken as

“tending to create an impression that Irish landowners are divided,” and thought that any terms agreed on by such a Conference “would inevitably involve the exclusion and sacrifice of many of the smaller resident landowners.” The letter from the Secretary of the Landowners’ Convention concluded : “If such a Conference as your Lordship (Lord Mayo) suggests takes place, it must be on the responsibility of those who are promoting it ; but my Committee thinks it unfortunate that a body so generally and deservedly discredited as the Irish Parliamentary Party, representing the United Irish League, should be to any extent reinstated in public opinion by an invitation from a body of Irish noblemen and gentlemen to nominate representatives to a joint Conference.”

We were not deterred by this refusal nor intimidated by its rebuke. Having expressed regret at the action of the Executive Committee, we passed a resolution deciding upon immediate steps for carrying out the necessary arrangements for the holding of a Conference.

We were much encouraged at this juncture by the attitude of the Irish Government. On November 24, Lord Dudley (the Lord-Lieutenant) expressed strong approval of the project, and pointed out that, as the question was mainly one of finance, it was most important that representatives of both sides should meet and try to come to an agreement on certain points, which could then be pressed upon the Government with the united support of both owners and occupiers.

We immediately took another poll of the landlords for the selection of their four representatives at the Land Conference ; and the Irish Parliamentary

Party selected as tenants' representatives the four suggested by Mr. Redmond. In a speech at Dundalk on December 14, Mr. Redmond referred to the forthcoming Conference as "one of the strangest and most hopeful episodes that had ever occurred in the whole of their history." The final responsibility for drafting a scheme must rest on the shoulders of the Government, and both sides must be left by the Conference perfectly free to criticise it, but none the less "the mere holding of such a Conference was in itself taken alone an event of enormous significance and of most hopeful augury."

On December 18 it was announced in the Press that the arrangements for the Conference were complete, and that it would meet immediately in Dublin. The landlords' representatives were the Earl of Mayo, Colonel Hutcheson-Poë, Colonel Nugent Everard, and myself. The tenants' representatives were Mr. John Redmond, Mr. William O'Brien, the Lord Mayor of Dublin (Mr. T. Harrington), and Mr. T. W. Russell.

Mr. Redmond and I had had many unofficial conversations in London; and they were very necessary, for feelings on both sides were very bitter. The representatives of both parties had come straight out of the firing-line. Mr. O'Brien especially had taken a very active part in the land war. After all, we met rather prematurely. I heard from Mr. Redmond that Mr. Dillon and Mr. Davitt had sailed from New York, and that it was desirable for the Conference to be in session before they arrived. In that case they would not be likely to interfere; but otherwise, would certainly object to a Conference. So we hurried over to Dublin.

The first meeting took place at the Mansion House on December 20, kindly placed at our dis-

posal by the Lord Mayor (Mr. T. Harrington, M.P.). A resolution, moved by Mr. Redmond and seconded by Colonel Everard, asking me to preside, was carried unanimously, and Captain Shawe-Taylor was appointed Honorary Secretary, a well-deserved recognition of his services to the movement. Subsequent sittings took place on December 22, 23, 24, and 31, and on January 3, 1903. All these meetings were in private, and practically no information was given to the Press.

As Chairman I prepared a draft Report, which was accepted as a basis for discussion. I assumed that a satisfactory settlement of the Land Question could be arrived at only by the substitution of an occupying proprietary in lieu of a system of dual ownership: that the transfer must be by purchase on equitable terms: that, as it was very desirable to avoid delay, settlement should be made, as far as possible, between owner and occupier without the interference of the State: that owners of land should not, as a result of a settlement, be expatriated: that purchase price should be based upon income, and that income should be second-term rents or their fair equivalent: and that the State might reasonably be asked to bridge the gap, if any, between the price that owners could afford to take and the price that tenants could afford to give.

A draft enumerating the points which the tenants' representatives considered absolutely essential to a settlement was also furnished by, I think, Mr. William O'Brien, who has, with pardonable pride, pointed out in his book that most of the requirements made by himself and his colleagues were, after discussion, accepted by the whole Conference.

Considering that feeling ran very high throughout the country, and that the representatives at the

Conference fairly reflected that feeling, our discussions were amicable. Conciliation won, as it always will if given a fair chance ; and it had a fair chance for the following reasons :

Both sides agreed on one point—that a system of periodic settlement of rent was rapidly ruining agriculture. Tenants looking forward to revision by inspection inevitably let their farms run down in order to show them in a deplorable condition : uncertainty put a stop to all improvements : a continuation of the system meant ruin, and a complete transfer of ownership was obviously the only alternative. The real question at issue was the terms on which that could be brought about. The tenants' representatives, however bitterly they hated landlordism, had no particular animosity against landlords. They wanted to keep them, and their money, in Ireland. They agreed with Parnell that Ireland wanted every Irishman, and they wished for terms that would induce landowners to continue to reside in Ireland. And, above all, the Conference was small—only eight. A large Conference, set speeches, and all the rest of it, would not have had the ghost of a chance, and would have failed to do what eight men sitting round a table succeeded in accomplishing.

We were all agreed that some assistance in the shape of a grant in aid was necessary, and the tenants' representatives put it as high as £20,000,000 ; but I was obliged to announce that, having been in communication with persons in authority, I was convinced that such a bonus was out of the question. After debate, it was determined not to define the amount. In that case, and in some others, difficulties were met with, but were easily overcome.

The real crisis arose over the question of what the tenants should pay. Their representatives held that

this should be as definitely fixed, in reference to rent, as the price which the landlords were to receive. They wanted (to quote Mr. O'Brien's words) "to safeguard the respective rights of the landlords and the tenants, so to say, in separate, water-tight compartments, independent of one another," and to make it the "common interest" (of both sides) to combine in pressing the State, in a no less substantial interest of its own, to reconcile the two sets of terms, of course within rational and moderate limits."

The landlords' representatives, on the other hand, argued that value was not accurately determined by rent, and that high-rented good land might be cheaper than low-rented bad land; and they were afraid that, if they assented to a minimum of 20 per cent. reduction of second-term rents, the advantage to the tenants would be gained entirely at the landlords' expense.

On this point we very nearly broke up; but, after some private and unofficial conversations, the Conference agreed to a compromise—the 20 per cent. reduction was to be an average instead of a minimum.

On January 4 we published a unanimous Report,¹ having on the day before resolved that the Conference should *not* be formally dissolved.

A unanimous Report was certainly a great triumph for the forces of peace and conciliation. The two classes which had been divided and hostile for so many years had now combined to accomplish a common purpose and to realise a common ideal. A spirit and a temper all over the country were created that enabled any Irishman, whatever his creed or class might be, to help his country. Would to God that that patriotic spirit had prevailed in subsequent years. Had it done so, Ireland might have satisfied

¹ The Report is printed verbatim in Appendix 2.

all her legitimate ambitions without passing through tribulations that have left deep, though not indelible, marks upon her.

Our Report was received by the people of the country as a whole with immense approbation. The landlords, too, were well satisfied with the result. At a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Landowners' Convention on January 7, a resolution, moved by the Duke of Abercorn, and seconded by The O'Connor Don, was unanimously adopted, recognising the Report as "a valuable addition to the various suggestions that have been made for removing the grave difficulties of the Irish Land Question by bringing the Land Purchase Acts into more general operation on the voluntary principle," and it expressed a hope that, in spite of certain points which invited criticism, "the whole Report will receive the serious consideration of the Government." The O'Connor Don also wrote to the *Irish Times* that, as one who had doubted the utility of holding a Conference, he rejoiced that his doubts had not been substantiated, and he defended the financial proposals of the Report.

It also received the blessing of the Church, the Standing Committee of the Catholic Hierarchy passing a resolution expressing the view that the Conference was an event of the best augury for the future welfare of both classes.

A speech made by the Lord-Lieutenant gave us exceptional gratification. He said :

"In years to come our successors will look on Lord Dunraven's Conference as setting an example in the treatment of Irish affairs of incalculable value to the peace, prosperity, and contentment of this country. Regarding the Land Conference, it was a

Conference of toleration, moderation, and co-operation, and, as long as Ireland proceeds on those principles, there is nothing in the world which she cannot do—no height to which she cannot attain. But so long as she ignores them, so long will the experience of the past be repeated, and she will sink back into a state of helpless impotence, and waste all the energies and abilities of her manhood in fruitless internecine strife.”

And the Chief Secretary wrote to me offering me his “warmest congratulations on the Conference.”

“The Report,” he said, “is instinct with good sense and good feeling. It reflects great credit on all the signatories—above all on the Chairman.” And he went on to say that “if the two parties represented at the Conference will approach the third party interested, viz., the tax-payer, in the same spirit of sweet ‘reasoning,’ giving him time to digest a problem which, to him, is both novel and large, and refraining from threats and objurgations, I feel fairly confident—nay, sanguine—that 1903 will mark an epoch in Irish history.”

He also expressed the view, in a subsequent letter to me, that “whatever befalls, your Conference has its place in history and its permanent effect on life in Ireland.”

Three days after the Lord-Lieutenant’s speech, Sir Antony MacDonnell referred to the Report of the Conference as “the most important document that has seen the light in Ireland for a generation—a document which no one who wisely loves Ireland should ever distort and belittle.”

The warning implied in the speeches made by the Lord-Lieutenant and Sir Antony MacDonnell was fully justified, for from the very day of the publication of the Report a torrent of carping and destructive criticism was let loose upon it. This

current of abuse found an outlet in the two leading Nationalist papers, the *Freeman's Journal* and the *Independent and Nation*, which, up to that time, strange as it may seem, had vied with each other in zealously supporting the Conference movement. They now vied with each other in the bitterness with which they attacked the Report.

Mr. Davitt denounced the Report in a series of letters in the *Freeman*. He seems to have sincerely believed that the price of land would be greatly raised (ten or twelve years' purchase), and that a huge bonus of fifty millions, which the Treasury would be quite unwilling to supply, would be required to make the financial arrangements work. Mr. Davitt's language was very strong, and his references to the landlords' representatives were far from conciliatory in tone. In a speech in February he said that he for one placed "fifty times more hope in a thoroughly united Ireland, including Ulster, fighting a righteous battle on the lines of compulsory purchase, on the lines of the official programme of the United Irish League, than on fifty such Conferences." His attitude I can well understand, for he hated individual ownership, and was a consistent advocate of ownership by the State. But the attitude of fierce hostility eventually adopted by Mr. Dillon to the Land Act I have never been able to understand. That the terms were fair cannot, I think, be disputed now. On the one side, Redmond's suggestion at the last meeting of the Conference that the landlords ought to give me a statue of solid gold was symbolically correct. On the other hand, any one who knows the number of years' purchase that farms bought under the Act have since fetched must admit that tenants purchased very cheap.

Mr. Redmond was placed in a position of some

difficulty. During the interval which had to elapse before the proposals of the Report could possibly be translated into legislation, he naturally did not wish to enter into a controversy with his critics over points of detail ; but he was obliged, however, to repudiate some of the more outrageous statements. In a speech on February 1st he declared that, on the proposals, Irish opinion, as voiced by all representative public bodies in the country and the branches of the United Irish League, was practically unanimous, and he added that the danger was not that the people would repudiate the scheme, but that the Government might be misled by the statements in the papers. That was indeed a very real danger : it was probably owing to the outcry raised against the Report that the question of incorporating a grant-in-aid of the Bill hung in the balance during a part of February. It was stated in the Press that the Government had made up its mind to refuse any bonus. Fortunately, Sir Antony MacDonnell was able to reassure Mr. Redmond and Mr. O'Brien on that point on the day the announcement was made.

Within the Parliamentary Party Mr. Redmond had to reckon with the passive resistance of Mr. Dillon, who refused to express any opinion on the Report. It was, however, clear that in his case silence did not mean consent.

When the Party met in Dublin on February 16, Mr. Dillon was not present, and the only member there who was not in sympathy with the Report left before the vote was taken. A resolution was passed unanimously returning thanks to the Party's delegates to the Land Conference, and endorsing in the fullest manner the agreement arrived at.

At a meeting of the Directory of the United Irish League a similar resolution to the same effect was

also passed (unanimously). It concluded by "trusting that no apprehensions as to the state of Irish Nationalist feeling, which can accept frank peace as well as wage frank war, will prevent those responsible for the government of Ireland from taking advantage of their present unique and auspicious opportunity of bringing about agrarian peace in the country, by giving prompt and complete effect to the Land Conference terms." These resolutions and other evidence go to show that hostility to the Report, though violent and noisy, was not widespread, and did not represent the real feeling of the country.

The only other event of importance before the introduction of the Land Bill was the amendment to the Address moved by Mr. Redmond on February 25, that "It is in the highest interests of the State that advantage should be taken of the unexampled opportunity created by the Land Conference Agreement for putting an end to agrarian troubles and conflicts between classes in Ireland by giving the fullest and most generous effect to the Land Conference Report in the land purchase proposals announced in the Speech from the Throne."

This statesmanlike move on the part of Mr. Redmond brought about a most remarkable debate. Mr. Redmond himself in a fine speech emphasised the fact that the Agreement was impossible of fulfilment without State aid, but that administrative economies would result and balance it, and that, after all, a "great national policy of appeasement" had a value which could not be appraised in terms of pounds, shillings, and pence.

Mr. Wyndham replied sympathetically. But the most striking feature of the debate was the anxiety shown by the Liberal Opposition, as expressed in the speeches of its leaders, Mr. Morley, Mr. Haldane,

Sir Edward Grey, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and others, to co-operate with the Government in putting through a settlement on the broadest and most generous lines. The whole House showed itself unanimous on that point. Mr. O'Brien mentions the very interesting fact that Mr. Wyndham told Mr. Redmond a few days later that the Cabinet was so much impressed by the debate that the proposed bonus was raised from ten to twelve millions.

IRISH LAND ACT, 1903

On March 25 Mr. Wyndham introduced the Irish Land Bill, described by a leading Irishman as "the boldest and most comprehensive attempt ever made in the direction of land legislation in the world's history."

The Bill differed from the proposals in the Report on a few points, such as decadal reductions, the "status" of judicial tenants, the retention by the State of a lien, and the reinstatement of the evicted tenants. But in all its main provisions the Bill was based on the recommendations of the Land Conference.

On April 16 a National Convention was held in Dublin. In spite of the hostility—in some cases secret, in others avowed—of a few prominent Nationalists to the Bill, the Convention, with practical unanimity and with great enthusiasm, pledged itself to accept the Bill (subject to certain necessary amendments), and gave full powers to the Irish Party to decide "the attitude to be adopted towards the measure in its subsequent stages." The Conference Landlords appointed a Committee, of which I was nominated Chairman, to watch the passage of the Bill. During the passage of the Bill numerous amendments had

to be moved or opposed, and it was an anxious time : but the two Committees—the Nationalist Committee and the Conference Landlords' Committee—worked on the whole harmoniously. We were able to support them in nearly all the amendments they moved.

The most serious crisis arose over what came to be called the "zones."¹ The representatives of the Landowners' Convention were determined to retain the "zones." The tenants' representatives feared that the zones would act unfairly on the tenants, and insisted on abolishing them. Finally, my Committee (Conference Landlords') and the Nationalists' were prepared to agree upon a compromise that the adoption of the zones should be optional ; and Mr. Duke, K.C., who was acting as our representative in the House, put down an amendment enabling judicial tenants, like all the rest, to bargain outside "zone" prices, subject to an official inspection by the Estates Commissioners. A serious crisis occurred over this amendment, and Mr. Redmond sent a Memorandum to Mr. Wyndham on June 19, stating that unless it were accepted by the Government the Bill would in all probability be lost. The following evening the Landowners' Convention held a meeting at the Westminster Palace Hotel to consider the amendment. I spoke urging the landowners to listen to counsels of moderation ; but the opposition was very strong. The Duke of Abercorn, who was the President of the Convention, was absent at a Levée or Drawing-room. Fortunately, he arrived opportunely, straight from

¹ The Report was strongly in favour (in order to avoid delay) of allowing sales to go through by agreement between landlord and tenant without further investigation by the State, provided that the annuities payable to the State represented a reduction of between 20 to 40 per cent in the case of first-term rents and from 10 to 30 per cent in the case of second-term rents. These limits came to be called "zones."

the Palace, and also counselled acceptance of the compromise. The Convention withdrew their opposition to the amendment.

Thus, in spite of certain elements of friction and hostility within the Irish Party, the spirit of reconciliation and good-feeling which had characterised the Conference was preserved during the passage of the Bill, and the measure received the Royal Assent on August 14.

The Irish Land Act of 1903 is a lasting monument of what that spirit can accomplish for Ireland. It changed the face of the country: improvement was almost miraculous. In five years it enabled 228,938 occupying tenants to buy their holdings: seventy-seven millions' worth of property changed hands on terms recommended as fair by both sides, accepted as fair by the whole Irish people through their representatives in Parliament, their National Convention, their local bodies, and by every means through which the opinion of a community can be made articulate, and endorsed as fair by all parties in both branches of the Imperial Legislature. But the beneficent operations of the Act were put an end to by Mr. Birrell's Act in 1909, to which I subsequently refer.

Unfortunately, as has so often happened in Irish history, no sooner was the ship's head pointing towards peaceful settlement than mutiny broke out. Sharp differences between Ireland's representatives arose upon questions of policy: and an agitation, sedulously and bitterly pursued, carried in its train evils which bore the worst possible fruit. Mr. Sexton led a determined and hostile campaign, and was supported by Mr. Dillon and Mr. Davitt. A meeting of the National Directory (the governing body of the United Irish League) was summoned to meet in Dublin

to devise practical plans for the working of the Act ; but, shortly before the meeting, Mr. Dillon, addressing his constituents at Swinford, made a most violent and scathing speech, and denounced in the most wholesale and implacable manner the Act, the landlords, and the Irish leaders who were responsible for the Act. In a further speech at Swinford he did everything possible to stir up and foment a national panic, and to persuade the people that the Act was a "landlord swindle" and would lead to national bankruptcy.

So strong was the current of public opinion turned against Mr. Redmond that in November Mr. O'Brien resigned his seat in Parliament and withdrew from the Directory of the United Irish League, in order, as he thought, to relieve the situation and save the party from division.

He evidently did not come to this decision rashly. Nevertheless, his resignation was a mistake. Party discipline is good when displayed in furtherance of a definite principle ; but to sacrifice principle to unity is to abandon substance for shadow. Mr. Redmond fell into the same error when, at the Convention in 1918, he denied his better judgment to save the Party, with the result that the Party was annihilated at the next election.

Mr. O'Brien's resignation was viewed with deep regret by those who knew the value of his efforts. Mr. John Redmond wrote to me on November 14, 1903, that he considered the resignation deplorable ; that though his own position was a most difficult one he had no idea of following Mr. O'Brien's example ; that he was convinced the Act would work all right ; that what was worrying him was the destruction, for the time being at any rate, of the chance of bringing classes together and really uniting Ireland.

George Wyndham also deeply deplored the resignation :

“ I am grieved,” he wrote me, “ by W. O’Brien’s resignation and its cause. You know how much I have admired his courage—I might say chivalry—ever since the Land Conference. It is tragic that jealous journalistic and village wiseacres should defeat his attempt to make Ireland a nation by burying ancient feuds. I wonder if they know how disastrous an effect they produce on English opinion, and, I believe, also on Colonial and American opinion.”

The Chief Secretary began to despair of being able to carry out his intentions towards Ireland. He foresaw difficulty in financing the Act unless it was accepted in Ireland as a great act of reconciliation. He complained bitterly in a letter to me of the impossibility of his carrying out his views as regards the Evicted Tenants and the Congested Districts Board ; and of the uselessness of his appealing to land-owners unless, in the view of the great majority of the people, the Act was an act of appeasement, and put an end to class animosity. “ It makes my heart heavy,” he said, “ to see the Irish whom I love, and wish to serve, giving their enemies cause to blaspheme and gloat over their incapacity to sink personal jealousies for a national cause.” He was deeply disappointed, but determined not to give up the struggle. “ I have stuck,” he wrote me, “ to my post, and I trust you will persist in your efforts. For issues far greater than ‘ the land ’ are at stake. An Ireland that had said ‘ Good-bye ’ to Faction could win almost anything. We live in an age of transformation. Irish Education, Irish Industry, Irish Nationality, her pride of Place, all hang in the balance, and must all be lost if she alone will not change with the changing years.”

In a former letter he told me that he was coming to see me at Adare, for, he said, "I have much to say to you. I stay here, in Ireland, whatever happens, and at all costs. I have insisted on this. I have sketched out all the work before me, and shall be very glad to submit all my views to you. We can then select and work up to something definite for next session."

I have referred to this letter at length because it shows what a high-souled Chief Secretary George Wyndham was, and how his whole heart and soul were filled with a desire to serve the Ireland he loved.

DEVOLUTION

The success of the Land Conference in dealing with the vexed and thorny question of land tenure set our Land Committee thinking whether the political problem—at that time far less difficult—might not be solved by the same means; and a circular advocating that course was issued in March 1903 by five members of the Committee. No action could be taken by the Committee till it was discharged; but when in August 1904 the Committee was dissolved, it was reconstituted as the Irish Reform Association, with myself as President. A Provisional Organising Committee was appointed, consisting of Sir Algernon Coote, Colonel (now Sir William) Hutcheson-Poë, Mr. Lindsay Talbot-Crosbie, and Colonel (now Sir Nugent) Everard; and on August 31 we issued a Preliminary Report.

The objects of the Association were (1) to encourage co-operation amongst all Irishmen, irrespective of creed or class, for the development of the country's resources, and for the promotion of the

welfare of the people ; (2) to secure for Ireland such effective control of purely Irish affairs as might be compatible with the maintenance of the Legislative Union between Great Britain and Ireland and with the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament. Our platform was a modest one, but the planks were sound.

It became necessary, of course, to develop this Preliminary Report into a more definite scheme. During the Land Conference and the passage of the 1903 Bill through Parliament I naturally became very intimate with the Chief Secretary and Under-Secretary, and often discussed Irish affairs, political and financial, as well as agrarian, with them. Naturally, also, I talked with them, but more especially with Sir Antony MacDonnell, about the ideals, schemes, and hopes of the Irish Reform Association, and sought advice as to a definite programme.

During August I had several conversations with the Chief Secretary and Sir Antony MacDonnell. On August 26 we formally reconstituted ourselves as the Irish Reform Association, and, after discussion, decided upon our Preliminary Report. In September Sir Antony MacDonnell paid me two visits on board my yacht *Cariad*, lying snug in the little harbour of Sneem, in Kenmare Bay. We talked over the Irish Reform Association from A to Z, and, in fact, agreed upon the draft of a scheme in conformity with the Preliminary Report. On September 23 I had a conversation with Sir Antony at the Chief Secretary's Lodge, and on the 27th I had a long talk on the subject with the Chief Secretary.

My general impression was that Dudley (the Lord-Lieutenant), and George Wyndham (Chief Secretary), approved of the draft of the scheme agreed upon between Antony MacDonnell (the Under-Secretary)

and myself. It really looked as though at last a settlement satisfactory to all parties, though, of course, capable of development—as all such instruments must be—would be arrived at.

On September 26 the Irish Reform Association published a programme indicating the lines on which devolution might proceed. We recommended that the control over purely Irish expenditure, amounting to about £6,000,000 annually, should be transferred from the Treasury to an Irish Financial Council, which would have an interest in making economies for the benefit of Ireland, and whose decisions should only be reversible by the House of Commons by not less than a one-fourth majority of votes. It was suggested :

(1) That the Lord-Lieutenant should be President of the Council, the Chief Secretary Vice-President, while twelve members should be elected by groups of county and borough council and Parliamentary Constituencies, and eleven nominated by the Crown in order to secure the due representation of commercial interests and of important minorities :

(2) that one-third should retire in rotation at the end of the third year, but be eligible for re-election and re-appointment : and

(3) that the Financial Council might be placed in possession of funds in one of three ways : (a) the entire revenue contributed by Ireland might be assigned to her, subject to payment to the Treasury of a fixed contribution, or of a contribution regulated by a fixed principle ; or (b) the estimates for an average of years might be taken as the standard contribution from the Imperial Exchequer towards Irish expenditure for the year, or for a fixed period of years ; and that contribution, with the addition of savings effected by the Irish Government in a preceding year of the period, might be voted and allocated in accordance with the Budget annually submitted by the

Council to Parliament; or (c) certain heads of revenue and the income derived from them, supplemented, if necessary, by a grant from general revenues, might be assigned to Ireland either annually or for a period of years. Suggestions were made as to the extent of control to be exercised by the new body over the spending departments in Ireland. The system of Irish Private Bill Procedure was to be reformed, and much of the business with which Parliament was unable to deal was to be delegated to a statutory body composed of Irish Representative Peers, members of the House of Commons representing Irish Constituencies, and past and present members of the Financial Council. This Statutory Body was to have authority to promote Bills for purely Irish purposes and to deal with such other business as might be delegated to it by Parliament. The programme concluded by recommending that the Association should endeavour to have the whole subject investigated by a Royal Commission.

The scheme was a modest one. It gave Ireland some control over finance, some incentive to economy and wise and frugal administration: and it gave her some delegated legislative powers. The grants were small and very strictly limited, but held the promise of larger concessions—of development on sound and safe lines. My hope was that a Bill would be introduced and passed on the lines indicated; that the moderate sections of Nationalists and Unionists would accept it and work it successfully; and that Parliament, seeing it working well and anxious to divest itself as much as possible of Irish business, would transfer more and more legislative and administrative functions to Ireland, until by degrees Ireland would have full control of her own affairs.

The scheme was vehemently attacked by the extreme wings of both Unionists and Nationalists. The Irish Unionists, especially those of Ulster, opposed

the plan very fervently. They saw in the "Dunraven project" little, if anything, better than a substantial and dangerous advance towards the Home Rule which they hated. The Irish Unionist Alliance declared that it was "attended with the gravest danger to the Unionist cause, and that legislation to confer further powers of local government on Ireland in excess of those granted to other portions of the United Kingdom must inevitably tend to the establishment of an Irish Parliament." The Ulster Liberal Unionist Association unreservedly condemned the proposals, and declared that it would fight them as determinedly as it did those of Mr. Gladstone. Some ascribed them to the instigation of Mr. Chamberlain, who authorised a disclaimer. Sir West Ridgway (a former Under-Secretary for Ireland) commended and defended the project, stating that his views had been conceived during the period of his service as Under-Secretary. It was, however, bitterly opposed in the *Times* by Lord Londonderry and by the Attorney-General for Ireland (Mr. Atkinson—now Lord Atkinson), the latter denouncing it as a "gross betrayal of the Unionist cause," and making the scandalous insinuation that the Irish Reform scheme was part of an "understanding" whereby the adherence of the Nationalist Leaders had been secured to the Purchase proposals of the Land Convention! In spite of the fact that the scheme was denounced by Unionists because it was certain to result in the establishment of an Irish Parliament, it was strongly opposed by members of the Nationalist Party, who desired the creation of an Irish Parliament. Mr. Michael Davitt, in a speech at Clonmacnoise, said: "If we are foolish enough to be wiled by Lord Dunraven and Mr. George Wyndham, who is possibly behind this wooden-horse stratagem(!) we will richly merit

the contempt of our race and friends everywhere for so abject a surrender of the National Movement."

In some Nationalist quarters, however, the project excited a certain amount of gratified interest. John Redmond, always wise in judgment, though sometimes weak in action, cabled a benediction from the United States declaring that "the announcement is of the utmost importance. It is simply a declaration for Home Rule, and is quite a wonderful thing. With these men (the members of the Association) with us, Home Rule may come at any moment." And the United Irish League of America characterised our proceedings as "a victory unparalleled in the whole history of moral warfare."

But our well-meant effort was effectively damped down by a letter from the Chief Secretary to the *Times* of September 27, in which, on behalf of the "Unionist Government," he stated that the Report tended to confuse three distinct subjects—(1) economy in Irish expenditure; (2) amendment of Irish Private Bill Legislation; (3) the institution of a Statutory Legislature for Ireland.

"I have to say (wrote the Chief Secretary), without reserve or qualification, that the Unionist Government is opposed to the multiplication of legislative bodies within the United Kingdom, whether in pursuance of the policy generally known as 'Home Rule for Ireland,' or in pursuance of the policy generally known as 'Home Rule all round.'"

He criticised the proposals for dealing with Private Bill Legislation and with Irish Finance, and added:

"I do not for a moment question the sincerity of the Irish Reform Association's intention to avoid any course which might impair the Parliamentary Union of Great Britain and Ireland. I am convinced of their devotion to the Imperial ideal. I welcome their

desire to stimulate energy and foster collaboration among their countrymen for the promotion of education, commerce, and industry. These aspirations are unimpeachable. But the chances of their realisation are prejudiced, and not enhanced, when they are confused with any plan, however tentative, for the multiplication of Legislative Assemblies within the limits of the United Kingdom. To any such plan, however contracted in scope and vague in feature, the Unionist Party is opposed."

A good deal of ill-feeling arising mainly from misunderstanding of the action of the Irish Government arose. It became known that Sir Antony MacDonnell had assisted me (in September) in preparing the draft of a scheme and that the Lord-Lieutenant (Lord Dudley) was aware of it. The Irish Unionists became very angry; and the *Times* (on Jan. 28) declared that Irish Unionists were convinced, rightly or wrongly, that the aim of Sir Antony MacDonnell's policy was to favour and strengthen the Clericalist and Nationalist elements in the country, to the disadvantage of those who were loyal to the British Constitution.

Sir Edward Carson, speaking at Manchester, referred to the scheme as "fatuous, ridiculous, unworkable, and impracticable," and declared that he "preferred the repeal of the Union to any such tampering with constitutional government as set up in the Act of Union." The grievance of the Irish Unionists appeared to be that a permanent official—the Under-Secretary—had originated a scheme without acquainting his Chief with it, and had evolved a policy immediately disavowed by the Chief Secretary.

In their desire to force the Under-Secretary out of office, Unionist speakers and the Unionist Press showed themselves utterly blind to the ordinary

canons of good taste and veracity. The Unionist Press and Unionist speakers persistently represented MacDonnell as a criminally unscrupulous conspirator whose aim was to destroy the Empire which he had so brilliantly served, and, under instruction from the Roman Catholic Hierarchy, to force Protestants and Protestantism out of Ireland. MacDonnell felt the injustice of the accusations levelled against him very acutely ; and no wonder. He had, in accepting the post of Under-Secretary, made great personal sacrifices. He had never done, or dreamt of doing, any of the things of which he was accused, and he was in danger of being kicked out of office on a preposterous charge. That he would have been turned out is certain had he not received powerful support.

Parliament met in February, and the whole question was raised in both Houses. In reply to questions in the House of Commons, the Chief Secretary said that MacDonnell, in response to a request from Lord Dunraven, had assisted Lord Dunraven in discussing and formulating the proposals known as the Dunraven Devolution Scheme, erroneously, but honestly, believing them to be within Unionist principles, but that the Government held that such proposals, embracing, as they did, the creation of a Financial Board and the delegation of legislative powers other than for private Bills, were altogether inadmissible ; that he himself saw those proposals for the first time in the *Times* of September 26, and immediately expressed his total dissent from them ; that thereupon the Under-Secretary had at once written to Lord Dunraven stating that he could have no further communications with him in connection with the programme of the Irish

Reform Association; and that the Government were thoroughly satisfied that the Under-Secretary's conduct was not open to the imputation of disloyalty.

The next day I spoke upon the subject in the House of Lords, making special reference to a speech made by the Solicitor-General (Sir Edward Carson) referring to the charge by Irish Unionists that a permanent Civil Servant had himself evolved a policy which had been disavowed by the Prime Minister and by the Chief Secretary, which charge, if true, he stated, was a "public scandal" and against all the best traditions of our Public Service. I traced the origin of the Devolution Scheme to the Irish Land Conference Committee, and accepted responsibility for it. I showed that for practical purposes the policy had originated in a circular issued in March 1904 signed by five members of that Committee; that it was not thought opportune to proceed with its advocacy while the Land Question was before Parliament, but that subsequently, in August, when the primary work of the Committee had been discharged, it was decided to reconstitute the Committee as the Irish Reform Association, and to proceed. I stated that in developing the details of the policy of the Report published by the Association on September 26, I had received "much valuable help and assistance" from MacDonnell. I also mentioned that in informal conversations with the Chief Secretary and MacDonnell we had often discussed the desirableness and the possibility of creating something like a moderate Central Party in Ireland; that I agreed with that, but felt sure that, in order to bring it about, such a Party must be animated by a positive, constructive policy; and that I regarded the Devolution Scheme as furnishing such a policy. I concluded by contending that I was justified in going to the man whom I thought best

qualified to advise me, and that no idea of concealment had entered my mind.

The debate which followed was remarkable for a speech by Lord Lansdowne, in which he pointed out that it was quite clear that MacDonnell was not the originator of the Devolution Scheme, and drew attention in eulogistic terms to the fact that in order to serve as Under-Secretary for Ireland, Sir Antony MacDonnell had "sacrificed a place in the Council of the Secretary for India, and later forwent the Governorship of Bombay, which was within his reach." Further, when MacDonnell took up the appointment it was understood that he was to have greater freedom of action than had he merely been a candidate promoted in the ordinary way. It was also understood between MacDonnell and the Chief Secretary that one of the subjects to which their efforts were to be addressed was the co-ordination of the many detached and semi-detached forms into which the government of Ireland was divided. The passing of the Land Act of 1903 had resulted from this policy. Nevertheless, while MacDonnell's high reputation was absolutely untarnished by what had passed, he (Lord Lansdowne) still thought that when proposals for a partly elective financial body and a statutory delegated legislature were suggested Sir Antony might well have asked himself whether any instructions or authority he had received covered such proposals. Lord Lansdowne made the important additional statement that the Lord-Lieutenant (the Earl of Dudley) had authorised him to say that he was "aware that Sir Antony MacDonnell was helping Lord Dunraven, and that he discussed the reforms suggested in that nobleman's scheme on several occasions with the Under-Secretary."

The question came up again in the House of

Commons on an Amendment to the Address. The Chief Secretary replied, assuring the House that he had never spoken or written to MacDonnell in favour of the two main proposals of my scheme, that they had not been before him, and that he objected to them strongly. The Prime Minister (Mr. Balfour) in a subsequent speech indignantly repudiated statements reflecting on the Chief Secretary's *bonâ fides*, which, he said, was proved by his prompt denunciation of the scheme as soon as it came to his notice. As to the Lord-Lieutenant, he no doubt, said Mr. Balfour, did discuss with the Under-Secretary what was going on, and he understood from the Under-Secretary that the Chief Secretary also knew what was proceeding; but the Under-Secretary was mistaken, and it was in consequence of this mistake that the Lord-Lieutenant thought that the Chief Secretary was aware of the project. Mr. Balfour deplored the misunderstanding, but held that the honour of neither of the gentlemen concerned was in any way affected.

On February 22 Mr. Redmond moved the adjournment of the House to raise the question of the "present conditions" of the Under-Secretary's appointment, and demanded the production of the letters which led to his appointment. The letters were read by the Chief Secretary, who stated that there was nothing in his letter to Sir Antony of which he was ashamed, that no doubt a misunderstanding had occurred, but that no charge could lie against Sir Antony's good faith. The Prime Minister also spoke, stating that he thought that there had been a great deal of unnecessary feeling and exaggeration about the whole business, that the Government did not agree with my scheme, and that they had made their position clear both as to the terms of Sir Antony's appointment and as to the policy to which, in an unfortunate

moment, he had committed himself, though not the Government.

On March 6 Mr. Balfour announced the resignation of the Chief Secretary, with the deepest regret. He admitted frankly that the main reason for his resignation was not ill-health, although he believed that he was not then in a condition to cope with the anxious labours of a great administrative office. The main reason was that he felt that the controversy which had taken place had greatly impaired, if not wholly destroyed, his power of doing valuable work in the office which he had held so long.

It was not until May 9, however, that the Chief Secretary made his statement in the House of Commons. He declared that he did not differ from his late colleagues on any issue of policy. He was still of the opinion that the maintenance of the Union must be the fundamental principle of any sound Irish policy, and that plans for devolution were, from some points of view, more open to criticism even than Home Rule. Circumstances, partly political and partly personal, had convinced him that he could best assist the Government and the Unionist Party as an independent Member. Referring to the misunderstandings which had occurred, he admitted that he had been in a measure to blame. While he had always desired that Unionists should take an active part in promoting social reforms in Ireland, he had never put forward any proposals for the establishment of a financial board for that country, nor had he ever approved, or even contemplated, any delegation of large legislative powers. He had not been sufficiently alive to the probability that a body of Unionists might advance into a region of constitutional controversy which he could not enter, and consequently he failed to give

adequate attention to the earlier proceedings of the Irish Reform Association. At the end of the session of 1904 he did not know that the Land Conference was to take a new name and a new lease of life, and he did not pay sufficient heed to the document published by the Irish Reform Association on August 31. He was away at the time, and no copy of the document was sent to him; but the Under-Secretary wrote him a letter, which he could not produce because he had not got it, and he could not recall its contents. He affirmed emphatically that he did not expect the reform proposals which were made, and to which he took exception. The Under-Secretary, however, was sincerely, though erroneously, under the belief that he would not object to those proposals. Thus there were misunderstandings and misconceptions, and he came to the conclusion that his power to do useful work in Ireland had ended. He therefore tendered his resignation to the Prime Minister with an assurance of his unwavering support as an unofficial Member.

MacDonnell felt very acutely the imputations made against him, and on February 8 wrote an able Memorandum on the whole question, in which he indignantly repudiated the allegations that he exceeded his functions in giving me any assistance; that he failed to inform his official superiors of what he was doing; and that generally his participation in such a scheme was inconsistent with his duty to the then Government. Having obtained his permission, I print the Memorandum in full in the Appendix,¹ because it not only clearly explains his position and meets all the charges which were levelled against him, but also further elucidates my own position in the controversy.

Although the Lord-Lieutenant and Under-Secretary

¹ See Appendix III.

remained, the resignation of George Wyndham put an end to our hopes.

George Wyndham was the soul of honour, and he acted as he thought right; but I think he sacrificed his personal convictions, and I wish to Heaven that he had found it possible to stick to his guns. The concessions asked were small, it is true, and were denounced by extreme Nationalists as quite inadequate. But the temper of the country was favourable. The people, satisfied with the Land Act, were anxious to escape from political agitation, and to be free to devote themselves to the land which had become their own. Their instinct was for peace and moderation. Whether the Prime Minister (Mr. Balfour) would have faced the resignation of the whole Irish Administration on a point which that Administration thought essential for the peace, contentment, and good government of Ireland, I of course cannot surmise. But I am convinced that if what I do believe was George Wyndham's real will had prevailed, foundation would have been laid then and there upon which a permanent settlement could be built, and all the accumulating misery of the last sixteen years might have been avoided.

II

IRELAND

(Continued)

I DEALT somewhat fully with the Land Conference and the political events which followed close upon it, because the history of that period is instructive, as showing what could be done by Irishmen acting together in unison, and how easy it was for them, acting in disunion, to destroy much of the good work that had been accomplished. Also because, though wilfully impeded in its action, a peaceful revolution was accomplished by the Act of 1903, which made all things possible in Ireland; and also because an opportunity then occurred of making a clean settlement of the Irish political question which, unfortunately, successive Governments failed to seize and utilise. It is, of course, impossible for me in jotting down personal reminiscences to continue an investigation of Irish affairs during the years which have elapsed since then: that would practically involve the writing of a modern history of Ireland, and I have no intention of embarking on that. I must content myself with a very brief review of events and of the general line that I adopted towards them.

The Land Act of 1903 was an important landmark. Though vigorously opposed by Mr. John Dillon, and with some success in Mayo, it settled the agrarian

question, and settled it amicably ; it materially changed the whole face of the country ; and it gave the landed gentry a chance of taking part in the government of their country. The policy of conciliation, however, failed in other respects—to my great regret, disappointment, and grief. What I felt about it is, I think, expressed in the following letter which I wrote to a friend and colleague in 1907 :

“ Five years ago Ireland rode on the crest of opportunity. Acting in a spirit of mutual goodwill, actuated by a sincere desire for the general public welfare, the antagonists in a centuries-old struggle came to terms of agreement, universally accepted as honourable and fair. A spirit of conciliation was evoked, capable of solving all the social questions in dispute, capable of healing all sectarian and sectional wounds. Ireland was within an ace of becoming able to voice her just demands with the force of a united people. It was not to be. A violent agitation was set on foot against the whole conception of unity, against the whole spirit of conciliation, and with fatal results. . . . Conciliation was thrust aside as an accursed thing, with the consequence that reinstatement of evicted tenants was delayed and accomplished only with infinite difficulty ; that a sound patriotic movement for social and economical improvement in the west has largely degenerated into a selfish scramble for land, involving outrage and bloodshed, adding infinitely to the difficulty of an already most difficult task ; that capital has been scared out of investment in Irish Land Stock, and the Land Act is hopelessly blocked for want of money ; and that we have not moved one step towards the settlement of the University question. The fact stands naked before the people of Great Britain that organised Nationalism, the Press, the purse, the ‘ Machine,’ would not permit Ireland to be at peace ; would not allow her wounds to be staunches, however grievously they bled, lest she should weaken

in her political demands. . . . Ireland has a hard task before her.”

In 1907 the Government introduced the Irish Council Bill—a small measure; but it gave Ireland an incentive to economy and some control of her own administration. Mr. Redmond voted for it after saying that he never felt his responsibility so great before. But Ireland, as always—impetuous, wanted to run before she could walk, and at a Nationalist Convention held in Dublin shortly after, Mr. Redmond was induced to move the rejection of the Bill. Ireland kicked from under her feet the ladder up which she might easily have climbed.

A solution of the Irish University question was one of the items in the programme arrived at between Mr. George Wyndham and Sir Antony MacDonnell.

I did what I could to assist them, and addressed a long letter to leading Irish newspapers, pleading for a settlement, and setting forth the lines on which I thought a settlement might be arrived at. My proposals were well received; but three weeks afterwards Lord Londonderry (Lord President of the Council) stated that the Government had no intention of creating a Roman Catholic University; and, subsequently, Mr. George Wyndham declared in the House of Commons that in any expression of opinion which he had given in favour of any such scheme he had spoken “only for himself.” This was a blow to my hopes; but soon afterwards a fairly satisfactory solution was arrived at by the passage of the Irish Universities Act.

In the same year the Treasury complained of difficulties of providing money for land purchase at $2\frac{3}{4}$ per cent, and issued a Report containing proposals for amending the Land Act of 1903. At a

meeting of the Irish Party Mr. William O'Brien moved, that the demands of the Treasury should be met with a united and resolute Irish opposition, and that the Party was prepared to appoint representatives to confer with landlord representatives. Mr. Dillon proposed an amendment that the whole matter should be referred to a Committee of the Irish Party exclusively. This amendment was carried by 45 votes to 15, and thus commenced the destruction of the great Act of 1903.

Some of us did our best to try and explain to our countrymen the evil consequences of the Bill which the Government proposed to introduce upon the subject. I very vividly remember a most remarkable meeting held at Cork—summoned by a joint committee drawn from both Unionist and Nationalist ranks. The Lieutenant of the County (the Earl of Bandon) was moved to the Chair by the Lord Mayor of the democratic Corporation of Cork,¹ and the motion was seconded by the Chairman of the most democratic County Council in the island. Old and fierce antagonists in the agrarian wars of the previous twenty-five years met on the same platform; and, most remarkable of all, among them were Lord Barrymore and Mr. William O'Brien, than whom there had been no more resolute opponents, joining hands in a noble effort to obliterate the past and to redeem the future. I remember the pleasure it gave me to introduce William O'Brien to Lord Barrymore and to address so significant a gathering. A deputation consisting of six peers (of which I was one), eleven Members of Parliament, and some of

¹ A short time previously a deputation of the foremost landed men and representative bodies of Cork had saved Ireland from the importation of Canadian cattle into Britain, and it was therefore decided to organise a still more powerful deputation from that province of Munster to warn the Government of the fatal effects of the proposed Bill.

the leading public men in Munster, was appointed to submit the views of the meeting to the Government; but, to our utter astonishment, the Prime Minister refused us a hearing—a most insane blunder.

In November 1908 Mr. Birrell (the then Chief Secretary) introduced—apparently for demonstration purposes only—a Bill embodying the Treasury proposals; but it was not proceeded with. The Bill was again brought forward in the following March (1909), in substantially the same form, but proposing that the bonus should be graduated inversely according to the price paid for the land—the lesser the price the higher the bonus; and it was proposed to convert the bonus into a Treasury debt against Ireland instead of a free gift.

My main objections, as summarised in a letter which I addressed to the Press, were that, by instituting an unstable for a stable medium, and consequently of unstable for stable terms of purchase, constant quarrelling about price would be caused; that the proposal to increase the annuity rate would cause discontent by placing one-half of the purchasing occupiers at a disadvantage compared with the other half; and that the alteration in the terms of the bonus would destroy, with disastrous consequences, the range of prices under which £77,000,000 worth of property had been purchased by the occupying tenants, and would put an end to land purchase, as was evidenced by the fact that since November 24 only thirty-nine originating notices had been lodged. The combined effect of these propositions must, I said, be to throw land purchase into the melting-pot; to make inevitable a long and disastrous struggle between classes, and to destroy the Treaty of Peace entered into in 1902-3 and the whole policy of conciliation—which was, of course, exactly

what the political supporters of disorder desired to see. The majority of the Irish representatives in Parliament, led by Mr. Dillon, supported the Bill, and, in face of that, our efforts against it were all in vain.

During the whole of the year the veto of the House of Lords had become a burning issue. The Government spared no effort in fanning the agitation against the Lords, and hypnotised the Irish Parliamentary Party into believing that the veto of the House of Lords was the only obstacle to a perfectly satisfactory Home Rule measure. The Party hated the land taxes but were persuaded or persuaded themselves that, if only they supported the Government in all its measures, Home Rule was a certainty. I did not think so. History shows that the House of Lords gives way in deference to the clear expression of well-considered public opinion. The veto of the Upper House was not the real obstacle in the way, and in my opinion it was deceiving the people to claim that it was the only obstacle, and that to obtain its removal by surrendering everything of material importance to Ireland was justifiable. I doubted the ability of the Government to deliver the goods, and felt that holding up land purchase, acceptance of increased taxation, and the consequent abandonment of the claim that Ireland was already overtaxed,¹ was too heavy a price to pay for a nebulous promise of some sort of Home Rule after a great constitutional revolution had been accomplished in Great Britain.

¹ The Irish representatives had enabled the Finance Bill of 1909 to be passed. I and others held that the result would mean to Ireland an increased taxation of some two millions per annum. But, after all, it was not the exact amount of increased taxation that was an essential matter. It was the principle of the acceptance of any additional taxation of Ireland that I protested against. Ireland was overtaxed by £2,500,000 per year, and acceptance of additional taxation seemed to me to give away the whole case as regards "unjust or intolerable taxation of Ireland."

Mr. Birrell's Bill had been introduced in March, 1909, but did not pass its third reading until September 17, on which occasion Mr. John Redmond declared it to be a "great and wide-reaching measure of reform." When the Bill came before the House of Lords I moved its rejection, but the Bill was read a second time. The Lords introduced several amendments, some of which were accepted by the Commons; and on December 3 the Bill received the Royal Assent.

In 1909 Mr. William O'Brien commenced a renewed effort to preach the creed of brotherhood and reconciliation among all Irishmen, and to this he gave the fitting title of the All-for-Ireland League. Whatever may be thought about the efficiency of other methods in former times, he had the statesmanship to see that in the principle of conciliation lay the future fate of Ireland, and, having put his hand to the plough, he drove a straight furrow in his advocacy of the policy of the League. It was set forth in the inaugural resolution, which stated

"That, inasmuch as we regard self-government in purely Irish affairs, the transfer of the soil of Ireland to the cultivators upon just terms, and the relief of Ireland from intolerable over-taxation, as essential conditions of happiness and prosperity for our country, and, further, inasmuch as we believe the surest means of effecting these objects to be a combination of all the elements of the Irish population in a spirit of mutual tolerance and patriotic good-will, such as will guarantee to the Protestant minority of our fellow-countrymen inviolable security for all their rights and liberties, and win the friendship of the entire people of Great Britain—this representative meeting of the City and County of Cork hereby establishes an association to be called the All-for-Ireland League, whose primary object shall be the union and active co-operation in every department of our National life of

all Irish men and women who believe in the principle of domestic self-government for Ireland."

Unhappily for Ireland, a body of seceders from the American Ancient Order of Hibernians was set up under the official title of "Board of Erin" Hibernians, but better known as "The Mollies,"¹ with the object of opposing the whole policy of conciliation and unity advocated by the All-for-Ireland League. It was a secret society, bound together by its own signs and passwords, rigidly confined in its membership to Roman Catholics, and, naturally, it caused great irritation to the Orangemen in Ulster. Mr. Devlin, who was Secretary of the United Irish League, became President of the "Board of Erin," and under his gifts of organisation it soon achieved success, and not only eventually acquired an actual majority on the Standing Committee that controlled the organisation and funds of the United Irish League, but established complete mastery over the Irish Parliamentary Party. Unfortunately, the Government gave every encouragement to the "Board of Erin," which became a source of public and official patronage, and when in 1912 it was recognised as a Benefit Society under the National Insurance Act it was able to provide its followers with a large number of offices and emoluments.

In March 1909 Mr. O'Brien went abroad very ill, but promising his friends to return if ever the occasion arose. The campaign of opposition to his policy and to the supporters of it continued,—and with such increased vehemence that in December he decided to return and put the issue clearly before the people. He emerged from the contest victorious, and won

¹ "The Mollies" were so called from the fact that the "Ribbonmen" used to meet in a shebeen owned by one Molly Maguire. At first called "Molly Maguires," they soon became known, for short, as "The Mollies."

North-East Cork in the Parliamentary Election. During the Election he had established a campaign sheet called "The Cork Accent,"¹ which he and his supporters decided to continue in a permanent form as a daily journal under the title of *The Cork Free Press*.

The All-for-Ireland League made a very gallant, and for some time a very successful, effort to carry on the work of conciliation. I supported it to the best of my ability, and have very vivid recollections of meetings which, in company with Mr. William O'Brien and Mr. Healy, I addressed at Limerick and Cork.

Especially clear in my memory is the occasion on which I addressed a great assemblage on "The Force of National Sentiment." I was honoured by what the *Cork Free Press* described—and quite accurately—as "a crowded and enthusiastic audience." . . . "Long before the time fixed for the lecture, not only the hall itself, but the galleries, were thronged with as fine an audience of the people of Cork as has ever honoured a lecturer in the Athens of Ireland . . . not a square foot of the hall was unoccupied."

This great assembly certainly bore testimony to the change which had come over Ireland. Thousands had gathered together under the presidency of the Lord Mayor, not to have their hearts stirred by a recitation on Ireland's woes and the wrongs done to her in the past, not to be regaled by demagogic and exciting diatribes against the "bloody Saxon" or "Orange dogs," but to listen to remarks in support of a policy of conciliation advocated in

¹ The "Cork Accent" was so named as a sort of reminder of a Convention held in Dublin in February, at which the order was given to the stewards, with box-wood batons concealed up their sleeves, that any one with a Cork accent, being presumably a supporter of Mr. O'Brien, should not be allowed near the platform.

Cork, of all cities in Ireland, and advocated amid cheers.

And then when the lecture was over—when the cause of conciliation had been pleaded—what happened? The *Cork Free Press* gave the following description of a scene which I shall never forget—a scene testifying to the new spirit in Ireland:

“When the proceedings at the City Hall came to a close, a crowd consisting of many thousand people assembled outside with torches, tar barrels, and four bands, to escort the Members of Parliament and the Earl of Dunraven to the All-for-Ireland Club, where other speeches were to be delivered. When the Earl of Dunraven, accompanied by Mr. O’Brien and Mr. Maurice Healy, made their appearance on the steps of the City Hall, they were greeted with a storm of cheering, which lasted for a long time. A move was then made for the Club, the route being *via* South Mall, Pembroke Street, Wintrop Street, Patrick Street, and Academy Street. The proceedings along the route were enthusiastic; handkerchiefs and All-for-Ireland favours were waved from the windows, while all along the line the crowds kept up a continuous cheer. A large and enthusiastic gathering assembled at Emmet Place outside the Club, and cheers were again and again given for the visitors.”

But the machinations of the Board of Erin were too widespread, its opposition too determined. The progress of the League was held up, and it came to an end when in 1918 Mr. O’Brien withdrew from Parliament.

HOME RULE BILL, 1912

In 1912 the Home Rule Bill was introduced, and was violently opposed in the north-east of Ulster; and in the autumn of that year the people there

entered into a solemn League and Covenant, pledging themselves to resist a Home Rule Act: in other words, to resist King and Parliament—by armed force if necessary. Without going into the rights and wrongs of the case, it is obvious that these potential rebels set a very bad example—an example which was followed later on by the Roman Catholic Hierarchy, who told the people that they had a moral right to resist the King and Parliament in the matter of military service; and it has been followed also by Trades Unions, in advocating “direct action.” When a class, or a creed, or a minority, of any kind take up arms to resist an Act of Parliament assented to by the King, there is an end of constitutional representative government.

In January of 1913 Sir Edward Carson moved in the House of Commons for the exclusion of Ulster: but this was rejected, and later in the month the Home Rule Bill passed the Commons, but was rejected by the Lords on the second reading. In May the Government re-introduced their Bill, which again passed the House of Commons, but was again rejected by the Lords (on a motion by Lord Lansdowne), who declined to proceed with it until it had been submitted to the judgment of the country. I spoke in that debate, stating that I was unable to support the amendment; but I pleaded for an honest and sincere effort for settlement of the question by consent through a Conference before the Bill came up to the House of Lords for the third and last time. Lord Lansdowne’s amendment was put as a substantive motion, and agreed to.

In the following March (1914) the Bill was introduced into the House of Commons for the third time, and the Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith) laid before the House proposals to meet the Ulster difficulty, by

allowing each county, and the county boroughs of Belfast and Londonderry, to decide by vote for exclusion from, or inclusion in, the Home Rule scheme for six years, after which period each was automatically to come into the scheme. On behalf of the Opposition, Mr. Bonar Law moved a vote of censure on the Government for refusing to give complete details of their exclusion proposals before proceeding with the general Bill. But this was rejected, and on April 6 the Home Rule Bill again passed its second reading. On May 25 Mr. Asquith announced that an Amending Bill would be introduced to provide for the exclusion of Ulster, and to come into force simultaneously with the Home Rule Bill. The Home Rule Bill passed its third reading on May 25; and the promised Amending Bill was introduced in the House of Lords on June 23.

I spoke in the debate on the second reading of that Bill, advocating the summoning of a Conference of Irishmen to suggest a reasonable settlement; and on the third reading (on July 14) I moved a clause to enable the operation of the Home Rule Bill to be suspended until a Commission had reported on the constitutional relations of Ireland to the other parts of the United Kingdom. This amendment was agreed to, and, with some other amendments largely altering the character of the measure, the Bill went to the House of Commons on July 14. On July 20 a Conference was summoned at Buckingham Palace, consisting of two leaders from each of the parties interested. The Speaker presided, and the leaders chosen were Mr. Asquith and Mr. Lloyd George; Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Bonar Law; Mr. Redmond and Mr. Dillon; and Sir Edward Carson and Captain Craig. The Conference sat for four days, but failed to come to any agreement either in principle or in detail.

On July 30 the Amending Bill was due for second reading in the House of Commons, but the Prime Minister stated that while the issues of peace and war for Europe were hanging in the balance the House would not proceed with it or any other controversial measures.

The Great War, of course, changed the complexion of everything. The Amending Bill had been deferred; but difficulties arose—how was the suspended legislation to be taken up again? Lord Lansdowne introduced a Bill to suspend proceeding with certain controversial legislation during the continuance of the War. The Government did not, however, adopt this course, and introduced a Bill to suspend for a year, or later if the War continued, the coming into force of the Home Rule Bill and other Bills passed under the Parliament Act; and this measure passed both Houses. I could not take any part in these discussions, for at the commencement of hostilities I had fitted out a hospital ship, and was serving in her.

On September 18 the Home Rule Bill received the Royal Assent and became an Act, subject, of course, to an Amending Bill, as promised by Mr. Asquith on May 25.

IRELAND AND THE GREAT WAR

The handling of Ireland at the outbreak of the War was indescribably foolish. Ireland was aflame with enthusiasm; but the Government and the War Office quenched the flames and stamped out the embers. Mr. Redmond did what he could to control the Irish Volunteers and to persuade Ireland that the wisest course for her to pursue was to "pull her weight" during the War, and show that, when Great

Britain was fighting for her life, Ireland could be depended upon. I did my best to awaken Ireland to a consciousness of the vast mistake she was making; and I published an "Open Letter" to my fellow-countrymen, entitled "Ireland, Awake! and Save Yourself," appealing to Irishmen to enlist and fight—to fight alongside Americans or Frenchmen if they would not enlist in British regiments, and would not even fill the Irish regiments, but to at least "fight," "for the honour of their country, and in the most righteous cause for which men had ever fought." Irishmen would have volunteered to a man if it had not been for the buckets of cold water that were thrown over them. Had the Military Service Act been applied to Ireland when it was applied to Great Britain, it would have met with no serious opposition. People expected it, and were, in fact, bitterly disappointed that they were exempted. It may be difficult for the average Englishman to understand, but the truth is that the way in which Irish enthusiasm for the War and the desire of her people to enlist were treated by the War Office and by the Government completely soured the whole temper of the nation. Irishmen honestly came to the conclusion that they were not considered good fighting material and were not wanted; "had we been wanted," they said, "surely we would have been taken." I spoke strongly in the House of Lords in favour of the application of the Military Service Act to Ireland, and in consequence the Limerick Corporation struck my name off the Roll of Freemen of the City—a proceeding of doubtful legality. I am unrepentant. That leaders in Ireland should have trusted in the gratitude and sense of justice of Governments is perhaps too much to expect; but, nevertheless, had their vision been clearer, had they realised that the rights of small

nations depended on the issue of the War, I believe that, if Ireland had put herself aside in favour of so great a cause and had done her best, sentiment throughout the Empire, in the United States, and among all the Allies would have been so strongly in favour of her just demands that we might have been spared the tragedy of the last few years.

That the position of Ireland during the War was peculiar must be admitted. Great Britain, in alliance with France and Belgium, found herself engaged in a life-and-death struggle, the principal object of which was, or was said to be, to restrain rule by force, and to maintain the right of small nations—in this case specifically Belgium—to enjoy what has since been called “self-determination.” Ireland was a small and weak nation, and was, and had been for many centuries, kept in subjection by Great Britain. Had Ireland been treated wisely at the inception of the War, and if a word had been said to the effect that after the War Ireland’s rights as a small and weak nation would be respected, all would have been well. But nothing was said. Ireland was grievously mishandled, with the inevitable result that the young and ardent men broke away from the Constitutional Party, joined the Sinn Fein organisation, adopted the line that “England’s difficulty was Ireland’s opportunity,” and that the opportunity should be made the most of.

Nevertheless, Ireland—all Ireland—played an important part during the War. The “Ulster” propaganda has been so persistent and unfair that the people of Great Britain have come to believe that Ulster men alone volunteered for the War. The six counties never cease appealing for support in their political views on the ground of the splendid service of the

36th Division. It did render splendid service : but it should not be forgotten that the 16th (the Southern) Division fought and died shoulder to shoulder beside them. It is impossible to estimate the number of Irish that fought and perished, for they were scattered throughout the whole Army. In the Irish regiments about 2000 officers and 32,000 men of other ranks lost their lives. Taking the average of fatal casualties to combatants during the War, and judging by the number of names sent in for war memorials in Dublin and elsewhere, considerably more than half a million of Irishmen must have served, not including those serving in the Navy and Flying Corps. Amidst all the heroism displayed in the War, I doubt if anything can compare with the action of those Irish prisoners in Germany who refused to desert. To suffer torture and misery for months and months demands a sense of duty perhaps superior to that displayed by one who in hot blood performs an action that merits and, if he is lucky, gives him the Victoria Cross. Those Irishmen were subjected to all the horrors experienced by prisoners of war ; and in their case those horrors were intensified by their refusal to desert to the enemy. They were offered freedom, good treatment, and good pay, and everything that could contrast most strongly with the horrible position in which they found themselves. But with only, I think, five or six exceptions, they preferred to suffer and remain true to their Colours.

THE SINN FEIN MOVEMENT

Sinn Fein as a political organisation commenced its career in 1905, when the Intellectuals began to make themselves felt. The originator of the movement, Mr. Arthur Griffith, had established in Dublin

in 1899 a weekly paper called *The United Irishman*. It appealed mainly to the young and to the Intellectuals who were not in harmony with the moderate demands of the Parliamentary Party. The development of Irish industries was one of the foremost objects of its programme. "Sinn Fein" is, I think, literally translated "Ourselves," but it was held to mean "self-help"—"self-dependence." As applied to a nation, that connotes mutual help and mutual trust, and in its inception Sinn Fein appealed strongly to me. In 1902 Mr. Griffith took a further step, and outlined what came to be known as the Hungarian policy—in effect a demand that members for Irish constituencies should abstain from attendance at Westminster, which was "useless, degrading, and demoralising," and that they should adopt the policy of the Hungarian deputies of 1861, and, "refusing to attend the British Parliament or to recognise its right to legislate for Ireland, remain at home to help in promoting Ireland's interests, and to aid in guarding its national rights." He published in book form a series of articles which he had contributed to *The United Irishman*, entitled *The Resurrection of Hungary*, expounding the details of the new policy. Finally, Sinn Fein was formally inaugurated in Dublin in November 1905 as a distinct Party, with a definite policy of its own. *The United Irishman* ceased to exist, and a new organ was established called *Sinn Fein*.

The new organisation, however, made little progress in its earlier days, and exercised no considerable influence in affairs. In the Election of 1910 it took no part, and was at a low ebb. Gradually it became moribund; but with the advent of the War in 1914 it reappeared, not, however, as the old Sinn Fein movement, for the policy of dual kingdoms

was abandoned, and gave place to a policy of Republicanism.

Then came the Rebellion of 1916. I and others had warned the Government that conditions were very serious; but they made no preparation. The Rebellion was not really important in itself: it was put down easily. It had no great popular support, and, had the episode been closed by the prompt execution of one or two ringleaders, that would not have been resented by the people. But executions were dragged out over some weeks. Every now and then a man or one or two men were taken out of prison and shot—nobody knew why, or what the specific charge against them was.

On the whole I think fifteen men were thus executed during a period of some three weeks or more. The people looked on that as evidence of malignant hatred towards Ireland, and, naturally, responded in malignant hatred towards Great Britain.

The Rebellion and its failure had remarkable political results. The Lord-Lieutenant, the Chief Secretary, and the Under-Secretary resigned. Mr. Asquith paid a visit to Ireland, and on his return expressed the view in the House of Commons that "Castle Government had entirely broken down," and announced that at the request of the Cabinet Mr. Lloyd George had undertaken the task of endeavouring to secure an agreement between the Irish parties. The announcement received a sympathetic response from Mr. Redmond and Sir Edward Carson, and from Mr. William O'Brien, speaking for the Independent Nationalists.

Mr. Lloyd George succeeded in his task, and on July 10 the Prime Minister described the agreement as a "golden opportunity of settling the Irish question, an opportunity that will not recur." It was proposed

to set up a Home Rule Government in Dublin, excluding the six north-eastern Ulster Counties and the three Parliamentary Boroughs of Belfast, Londonderry, and Newry. The Irish House of Commons was to consist of the Members of Parliament for the Irish counties not excluded. Representation in the Imperial House of Commons remained unchanged. The Act was to remain in operation for twelve months after the War, when the whole question was to be reviewed.

The proposed temporary settlement, however, met with opposition from the Conservative Party, Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Bonar Law refusing to agree to the condition retaining full Irish representation at Westminster during the War.

On July 24 the Prime Minister intimated to the House changes in the proposals, namely, that the Irish members at Westminster should be reduced in number as soon as the Home Rule Parliament was set up, but should be allowed to come back at full strength when the temporary settlement came up for review after the War. He also explained that the exclusion of Ulster Counties and Boroughs was permanent, unless, and until, they voluntarily came in. Mr. Redmond moved the adjournment of the House, stating that the Nationalists could not agree to the proposed changes.

The Prime Minister replied that a Bill would not be introduced unless the Irish Parties (Nationalists and Unionists) were in agreement. As no such agreement was reached, the proposals were dropped. At the end of July Lord Wimborne returned to the Viceroyalty with somewhat enlarged powers, Mr. Duke, K.C. (a Unionist), being appointed Chief Secretary.

In December 1916 Mr. Asquith resigned, and a

Coalition Ministry was formed. Both Mr. Redmond and Sir Edward Carson were invited to join the Administration: the former declined; the latter accepted.

In 1917 a Convention was held in Dublin at the request of the Government, with the wide Reference to try and devise a Constitution for the future government of Ireland within the Empire. The moment was propitious, for the 36th Northern Division and the 16th Division of the south of Ireland had fraternised. They had fought side by side, and died side by side in the battles of the Somme.

The Government endeavoured to secure representatives from the principal political parties, religious bodies, public and commercial bodies, and Labour organisations, and, with the addition of 15 nominees of the Government, the membership of the Convention consisted of 95 persons.

After August 1914 I was but little in this country, being engaged in my hospital transport-carrier *Grianaig* in the Mediterranean and elsewhere. But in 1917, as she was then employed as an annexe to Osborne Hospital, taking batches of convalescent officers about the Solent, I was able to get away a good deal, and attended many sittings of the Convention, though not as many as I should have wished. Sinn Féin, with perfect honesty, would have nothing to say to it; and had the people of North-East Ulster been equally honest, they would not have participated in it. They had no intention whatever of accepting any conditions, and, in fact, during the Convention the delegates merely held the position of having a "watching brief." Mr. William O'Brien (as representative of the All-for-Ireland Party) also refused to attend the Convention—doubtless for reasons which were in his eyes adequate; and I have no

doubt that my other two friends with whom I had so long worked—Mr. Tim Healy and Mr. Maurice Healy—were actuated by the same motives. Nevertheless, I regretted, and still regret, their decision. I had for several years been endeavouring to work for a settlement on Federal lines. Mr. William O'Brien and the two Healys were sympathetic to that idea. If they had attended the Convention, I think that, with the assistance of two such eminent advocates, we might have made some impression. But, being absolutely isolated, I could do very little in my individual capacity. I worked in the Convention, as far as I could, with the delegates of the Unionists of southern Ireland. They were good enough to invite me to attend their meetings and conversations. They did not go quite as far as I should have wished, but we worked cordially together.

The Convention came to nothing. It was far too large. Where a round-table Conference of ten or a dozen might have accomplished something, a Convention of close upon one hundred members, without any definite subject, or subjects, to discuss, with set speeches from a rostrum—every man anxious to air his own views—had but a poor chance of success; and time was wasted. Lord Southborough, the Secretary, who had had experience of the South African Convention, was anxious that the Irish Convention should be given the opportunity of talking as much as it pleased and as long as it liked. In vain I warned him of the difference in character of the two peoples. For days we talked, and did nothing but talk, and the Convention got completely out of hand. It was not until October 11 that an effort was made to get to business by the election of a Committee of nine to consider proposals and draft a scheme. That was sound business; but it was spoiled. The Com-

mittee was not left to its own devices. The Chairman of the Convention asked Mr. Redmond to draft a scheme for submission to the Committee. On his very wise refusal, the Bishop of Raphoe undertook the task, with the result that the Committee of nine were confined to the consideration of that scheme. I have nothing to say against the scheme of the Most Reverend Prelate except that it limited and strangled the Convention by precluding the consideration of other schemes, and amongst them Mr. W. M. Murphy's efforts to get Dominion Home Rule discussed.

Though the Convention, with the exception of the Ulster delegates, very nearly came to an agreement, it fizzled out in confusion. Members would not come up to Dublin, or, if they did, they repaired to the smoking-room. In the end, most of them had the haziest notion what they were for or against; and the Report was unsatisfactory. I signed the Report of the majority of the Convention, but in doing so added the following note :

“ I. I regret that no recommendation is made in favour of a Grand Committee composed of Ulster representatives in the new Irish Parliament, who would be empowered to supervise legislative and administrative action seriously affecting the interests of that province.

“ II. In my opinion Federalism is the best principle upon which to base a Union that will give Ireland the fullest measure of self-government, that will enable the new Irish Constitution to fit into complete federation of the United Kingdom when the appropriate time comes, and to form the consistent link in the chain that may lead to Constitutional synthesis within the Empire.

“ III. I regret, therefore, that the Convention did not proceed on more definite Federal lines ; but the decisions arrived at are not incompatible with a

Federal system ; they mark reconciliation between hitherto antagonistic bodies of public opinion ; they indicate the lines which legislation should follow, and I accept them without further reservation."

In December 1918 the General Election took place ; and that Election formed a distinct point of departure in the history of Ireland. It closed a long chapter of Irish politics ; for it resulted in the complete obliteration of constitutional Nationalism. The right of small nations, or of distinct communities, to determine their own form of government within limits had emerged from theory and had become a recognised fact. Schemes based on federation had, for the time at any rate, to be abandoned. It became evident that complete autonomy, subject only to the condition that Ireland remained within the circumference of the Empire, was the only basis upon which an agreed settlement could be built. Sinn Fein was amply supplied with funds, and held the definite policy that Ireland was an independent State and had a right to self-determination. Mr. de Valera was elected President of the Irish Republic by a Sinn Fein Convention held in Dublin in October 1917, being proposed by Mr. Arthur Griffith, who had been President of Sinn Fein for six years ; and proceeded to form a Cabinet and set up a Parliament in Dublin under the name of Dail Eireann, with a Ministry responsible to it. When Dail Eireann met in April 1919 he was again chosen President. The Republicans did not attempt to throw Great Britain out of Ireland by force ; their policy was to render British administration and government of the country impossible ; and in that they succeeded. Sinn Fein also advanced a claim to be heard at the Peace Conference in Paris, but nobody paid any attention to it.

The *Times*, with clear vision of the situation and of its necessities, had consistently and strenuously pressed for an effort at settlement on most liberal terms, and had put forward a definite scheme. During 1918-19 it was good enough to publish various contributions from me, making suggestions for solving the Irish tangle. To attempt to apportion blame between Governments and Departments in their folly, and Ireland in her fatal failure to see the difference between "self"-determination and "selfish"-determination, was fruitless. But the inevitable consequences of Ireland's conduct during the War in stiffening the attitude of those whose only policy was to maintain the Union as it was, and "govern the country," could not be lost sight of. That policy was, to my mind, a mere counsel of despair, a confession of the bankruptcy of statesmanship, a serious handicap to the moral standing of our negotiators in the great task of world-reconstruction. I urged that a scheme for the better government of Ireland drawn on the most liberal lines ought to be placed before the Irish people, and that, if they refused it, Ireland should be administered in accordance with the principle of the scheme under some form of Crown Colony government—in trust, as it were, until the Irish people were prepared to take over government themselves. I also suggested the possibility of referring the political question to some external authority. Though admitting that many and cogent objections existed to submitting the Irish political problem to the Peace Conference or to a League of Nations, I thought the Prime Ministers of the Dominions, then in Paris, might have been consulted—perhaps unofficially—and I demurred to the plea that to do so involved too great a renunciation of sovereign rights on the part of Great Britain. The Irish problem, I said, primarily

concerned the people of the United Kingdom ; but it was questionable whether a problem profoundly reacting throughout the Empire ought to be looked upon as purely domestic. Undoubtedly, if the case of Ireland *versus* Great Britain could have been heard before some impartial and sufficiently august tribunal, the advantages would have been great, for in the process the real issue would have been cleansed of all the nonsense with which perfervid agitators sought to delude the Irish in the Dominions and in the United States into believing that the condition of Irishmen in Ireland was similar to that of Armenians in Turkey or of other persecuted races. The naked issue—Ireland's right to self-determination—would have stood out clear. Self-determination has never, so far as I know, been defined ; but the ex-President of the United States had said that individual interests and common interests must be considered together.¹ That is a sound doctrine, and would have been accepted as sound by any competent tribunal.

THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND BILL, 1920

The Government of Ireland Bill was introduced in March 1920, and I was in hopes that, judging by the Prime Minister's speech on the first reading, the measure would have been on somewhat federal lines : but it was not. It contained two fatal errors—first, the vivisection of Ulster and the attempt to create a small Protestant enclave, against which I protested in the House of Lords and in the Press, and, second, the insufficient powers granted to Ireland. I did not

¹ (Extract from speech by President Wilson in New York on the occasion of the opening of the fourth American "Liberty Loan," September 27, 1918.)

"No special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all."

object to the "dual" system introduced by the Government. I was, of course, always against the partition of Ireland, and said so over and over again in speeches and in letters: but I did not entirely agree with my friends of the Anti-Partition League. An All-Ireland Parliament was obviously impossible at the moment, and I considered that the establishment of an Irish Parliament and the exclusion of any part of Ireland from it, leaving that part under the Act of Union, was partition in a worse form than in the creation in Ireland of two Parliaments. If Northern Ireland had a Parliament of its own, it would be Irish not only geographically but legislatively, and, as a consequence, economically and socially. Northern Ireland an annexe of Great Britain would be Irish, but only geographically. The only way to arrive at ultimate unity was, in my opinion, to begin by duality; moreover, two Parliaments, or half-a-dozen Parliaments, would be quite compatible with Federalism. I was therefore quite ready to support the Bill, with certain exceptions and amendments which I had reason to believe would be made.

Both in the House of Lords and in letters to the Press I protested vehemently against cutting up Ulster. If there were to be two Parliaments, there must be one for Ulster and one for the rest of Ireland; and I practically gave up all hopes of the Bill when the Government declared that the Northern Parliament was to consist of six counties of Ulster and the Southern Parliament of the remaining twenty-six counties, two of which are situated in the extreme north. It tended to divide Ireland into Protestant and Roman Catholic; and I hate and abominate religious limitations. It relieved the Northern Parliament of its poorest and most necessitous counties and transferred them to the Southern Parliament.

It broke up ancient ties and boundaries, and outraged history and tradition.

In June of the same year Lord Monteagle brought in a Bill in the House of Lords to carry out the views of the Dominion League. I objected very strongly to the measure, and moved its rejection, for it seemed to me that, so far from effecting a settlement, it simply invited difficulties by placing Ireland in a position which was not natural to her. In the course of my speech I said :

“ The Dominion status is not compatible with the relations—social, economic, commercial, and political—existing between two communities so closely connected geographically, and in every other way, as are Great Britain and Ireland. No analogy can be drawn between Ireland and the Dominions. The latter have grown up from the infancy of small colonies. Ireland never was a colony, and cannot be a colony. She was a kingdom, ought to have remained a kingdom, ought to be a kingdom. The ‘ Dominion ’ of Ireland says nothing to me. The ‘ Kingdom ’ of Ireland says much.”

I considered that the operative machinery would prove inefficient, and would break down. I argued that the proposal cut right across my federal path, and for that, if for no other reason, I felt bound to reject it. Ireland was being offered not Dominion status, but Dominion status minus a great deal—a sort of “ shoddy ” Dominion status.

Later in the month I expressed these views in letters to the *Times* : I said that Ireland ought not to have been deprived of her status of a kingdom ; that that status should be confirmed and a union of a federal character entered into between the two kingdoms ; that my ideal was that Ireland should have been given her own Parliament and Executive

dependent upon it, and representation at Westminster; that in return Ireland should surrender the major attributes of sovereignty to the Central body at Westminster. I regarded the dual system as a necessary transition stage, and I pointed out the impossibility of framing at the present moment any statute suitable for all time, as much would depend upon the form that devolution would take in Great Britain, and upon the character that the Second Chamber of the Central Parliament would assume.

Early in September I published, and circulated widely, a pamphlet entitled *The Crisis in Ireland—Federal Union through Devolution*. It consisted of a reprint of three long letters which I had contributed to the *Times* in July, as well as the speech which I had delivered in the House of Lords on Lord Montague's Bill. I dealt with the consequences of the Government's determination to postpone further consideration of their Bill to an Autumn Session; with the root-causes of discontent in Ireland; and with the falsity of the argument that to propose any measure of political reform to a country in a state of anarchy is dangerous and unwise. I again urged the Government to extend the scope and powers to be transferred, to acknowledge Ireland's nationality, and to grant full fiscal control, which Ireland properly regarded as the essential symbol of nationality. The decision of the Government to postpone further consideration of the Bill until an Autumn Session was most regrettable, for it not only knocked the feet from under those who had maintained that the Bill, though faulty in many respects, was an honest effort to deal with the situation, but hardened into conviction the suspicions of the Irish people that the Government had no intention of passing it. As I stated in a letter to the *Times*, it required no genius

to foresee that during the interval of four months between June 28 (the last day on which the Bill was discussed in the Commons) and the commencement of the Autumn Session on October 19, the situation in Ireland would rapidly grow worse. "The breakers were visible, and the ship driving towards them. Those responsible for her safety had been wrangling about the position, and had done nothing to avert calamity in full sight. She was on the rocks, in danger of breaking up, and nothing but prompt action could save her." Had she been allowed to drift in ignorance or by design? It was not surprising that in Ireland the latter theory prevailed. It was indeed incomprehensible how, without some sinister object, any Government, with their eyes open and experience to guide them, could have allowed Ireland to drift into the unprecedented condition that then prevailed, and I again urged the necessity of a frank offer without delay, for public opinion was fluid, and a clear firm offer of autonomy as an alternative to republican independence might solidify it; nothing else would.

When discussion of the Bill was resumed in the House of Commons in October, a small group in the House did what they could to induce the Government to grant Ireland increased financial powers; and Colonel the Hon. Walter Guinness moved an amendment designed to confer on Irish Parliaments control of Customs and Excise. But the Government refused.

On November 23 the Government of Ireland Bill came up for Second Reading in the House of Lords, and I moved an amendment declining to proceed with it, on the ground that it met with no support from the great majority of the Irish people and afforded no prospect of any permanent settlement. The Bill as it came up completely demolished all my hopes of a federal or any other kind of settlement. Ulster had

been cut to pieces : six counties had practically the power to keep Ireland disunited for ever ; and the financial provisions of the Bill were quite inadequate. It was absolutely essential that both Parliaments should be fairly satisfied with the powers entrusted to them, and necessary, therefore, as the Southern Parliament required it, that Ireland should be given complete fiscal and financial control. "The Bill was designed to build a bridge of amity between the two islands ; but the keystone of the arch—fiscal and financial control—had been left out." Mainly for these reasons I practically moved the rejection of the Bill.

I was taken to task by the Lord Chancellor for having changed my mind as regards the Bill. But that was not correct. I had always said that it lacked the vital element of fiscal and financial control. It is true that, as the Lord Chancellor quoted, I did say in the earlier part of the year, "Why clamour to scrap the Government Bill ?" but he omitted to add that I followed my inquiry by saying that the Bill could, by amendment, be brought up to the grant of full autonomy, fiscal and financial ; that His Majesty's Government knew that full autonomy was the only alternative to moral, social, and economic ruin ; and that, if they preferred the former, it was their duty to put their proposals into concrete shape in an amended Bill.

Lord Midleton urged the postponement of the debate, in order to see whether a settlement could not be arrived at on the lines suggested by the large body of opinion in the south and west of Ireland, and he moved the adjournment of the debate for a fortnight. But Lord Curzon asked the House to accept the Bill as the Government's contribution to the solution of the Irish problem—the responsibility for the destiny of Ireland would then pass to the Irish. My Amend-

ment was lost by 164 to 75 ; but among the 75 were 28 peers closely connected with Ireland. The Motion for the adjournment was also defeated by 177 to 91.

To all our protestations the Government paid no heed ; and the Bill became law, with no material alterations from the form in which it was introduced. Its rejection by the Irish people was certain, and I was filled with despair. The ignorance of the Government was incredible, and to those who understood the psychology of Irishmen the New Year opened without hope, and the outlook was of the darkest. And yet the Chief Secretary (Sir Hamar Greenwood) assured the world that he knew no anxiety for the future, but had a " reasoned and justifiable " optimism . . . that in six months' time two Parliaments would be working in Ireland, and that that would prove to be " the opening of the happiest chapter of the history of Ireland." Was ever the optimism of a Government doomed to so dismal a failure !

In a letter which I addressed to the *Times* on New Year's Day¹ I dealt somewhat fully with the Government's failure to deal with the Irish problem.

I admitted that the problem confronting the Government was very difficult. Ulster delegates to the Convention of 1917 having refused to even consider a proposal for a Grand Committee which would have given them practical independence in an Irish Parliament, with a statutory right to come out and set up for themselves if they so desired, and as Ulster was not to be coerced, His Majesty's Government had wisely decided upon two Parliaments, with an open door leading to unity. The idea was sound, but its validity depended upon two considerations : firstly, that both Parliaments, in administering the Act, should have an equal chance of success ; and secondly,

¹ See Appendix IV.

that effective means for arriving at unity should be provided in the Council. But, unfortunately, when the Bill came before the Lords both of these conditions had been nullified by financial clauses unsatisfactory to the southern area, and by confining the northern area to six counties, with equal representation on the Council, thereby rendering the minority capable of making duality perpetual, and of dooming the majority to Crown Colony government under the sanction of martial law.

It appeared extraordinary to me, I said, that, founding their Bill upon their theory of a distinct cleavage, and after making it suitable only to a minority which they described as alien to the majority in race, religion, and ideals, the Government should have expressed astonishment that it did not suit that majority. I further expressed the belief that, had the present Act provided that, as Irish revenue exceeded expenditure, the time had come to give Ireland control over expenditure and taxation, the Bill might have been accepted as the basis of a firm settlement.

I reiterated what I have frequently endeavoured to impress upon the public—(1) that from the time of Henry VIII. to the Act of Union Ireland was “a kingdom,” and that, therefore, the “status” of dominion was inconsistent with her position; (2) that for the dual system to lead to unity, both Legislatures must be satisfied with the powers conferred upon them; (3) that such powers should be limited only by the conditions laid down by the Government in their Reference to the Convention.

And I laid stress upon my belief that if Ireland were restored to her individuality as a “kingdom,” an “atmosphere” favourable to a settlement would be created. The full text of the letter is in the Appendix.

1921 was only a day old when the first official

reprisals—the burning of some houses at Midleton, Co. Cork—were announced ; and almost simultaneously there was an extension of the Martial Law area in Ireland to the counties of Clare, Kilkenny, Waterford, and Wexford.

Parliament met in the middle of February, and the Speech from the Throne disclosed an unalterable determination on the part of Ministers to persist in their Irish policy. I was abroad at the time, and could not, therefore, take part in the debate in the Lords when the Archbishop of Canterbury called attention to the absence of detailed information about important incidents in Ireland, and moved for papers. The Lord Chancellor replied that the mischiefs existing in Ireland could only be cured by the assertion of force in its most vigorous form. The motion was withdrawn.

But the mischief did not yield to the remedy of force. Reprisals were met by reprisals ; violence and assassination increased ; conditions grew worse and worse, and it became evident that the optimism which the Government had displayed on the passing of the Government of Ireland Bill was doomed to develop into pessimism. I hoped against hope that the Government would yet allow reason to prevail before the elections under the Bill took place in May, and would announce proposals of a conciliatory character ; and Southern Unionists and others did all they could to urge the Government to postpone the elections. All in vain ; regardless of all warnings from those who spoke for moderate opinion in Ireland, the Government pursued their own course.

A few days before the elections Sir James Craig informally met Mr. de Valera, and our hopes rose ; but nothing followed.

The elections took place, and resulted, of course, in a sweeping victory for Sinn Fein. The Act was

rejected except by the six counties in north-east Ulster and by Dublin University. In "Northern" Ireland Unionists returned members for forty seats out of fifty-two. For the remaining twelve seats six Nationalists were returned and six Sinn Feiners. Nearly one-fourth of the members elected for the Northern Parliament were pledged to take no part in the working of the new Act, and, of course, refused to take their seats. In "Southern" Ireland all the members elected, except the four representatives of Dublin University, were also pledged to repudiate the Act.

Mr. de Valera was again nominated President of the Republic, and he in turn nominated the same Cabinet as before. The same policy of endeavouring to substitute their Courts for the ordinary Courts, and to make administration impossible, was continued: and it succeeded. It must in fairness be admitted that where Sinn Fein Courts were allowed to operate they administered fair and impartial justice, they acted with great promptitude, they kept order, and they punished offences. The effect which this produced on moderate opinion in Ireland, and probably in England also, was salutary, for it proved that Irishmen possessed governing capacity, and that the people obeyed the law when satisfied with its origin.

About the same time the election of Senators for both the Northern and the Southern Parliaments took place. Under the Government of Ireland Act the members of the Southern Senate were to be elected by Archbishops or Bishops of the Roman Catholic Church and Church of Ireland, by Peers and Privy Counsellors who were tax-payers or rate-payers in respect of property in, and having residences in, Southern Ireland, and by members of County Councils voting together as provinces. The latter, however, took no part in the elections. I was one of the sixteen who

were elected by the Peers. But we and members elected by the Privy Councillors found ourselves in a somewhat anomalous position, and I and eighteen other Senators addressed to the Government the following memorial :

“ We, the undersigned, having been elected to serve in the Senate of Southern Ireland, desire to place it on record that in accepting such appointment we do so with the intention of exercising the fullest freedom of action as to the powers to be hereafter granted to the Parliament and Government of Southern Ireland.

“ We are of opinion that the powers given under the present Act are insufficient to enable the Government of Southern Ireland to be carried on with any prospect of success ; and, having regard to the speech of the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland at Belfast on June 7, we urge upon his Majesty’s Government that the earliest possible steps should be taken to recast the Act.¹

“ We desire further to make it clear that we are ready to act in a Second Chamber with a Lower House sitting constitutionally as representing a majority of the electors, but we are not prepared to exercise functions in connection with any body nominated by the Lord Lieutenant to replace an elected Lower House.

| | |
|---------------------|----------------------|
| DESART. | MAYO. |
| DE FREYNE. | BRYAN MAHON. |
| DONOUGHMORE. | MIDLETON. |
| DUNRAVEN. | ORANMORE AND BROWNE. |
| W. J. GOULDING. | POWERSCOURT |
| GRANARD. | RATHDONNELL. |
| HOLMPATRICK. | SLIGO. |
| INCHQUIN. | THOMAS STAFFORD. |
| WALTER M. KAVANAGH. | WICKLOW.” |
| KENMARE. | |

¹ Referring to the Act, the Lord-Lieutenant had described it as very imperfect, and had said that it wanted amending, and that he would not be surprised if it was amended in the not very far distant future.

On Tuesday, June the 21st, a debate initiated in the House of Lords on the previous Thursday by Lord Donoughmore was continued. He had moved :

“That this House is of opinion that the situation in Ireland urgently requires that His Majesty’s Government should determine forthwith what amendments they are prepared to propose, and authorise negotiations to be opened on such terms as they think calculated to terminate the present deadlock.”

Most urgent appeals to the Government to revise their policy were made by Lord Donoughmore, Lord Desart, Lord Midleton, Lord Crewe, myself and others.

I pointed out¹ the difficulty of any one not intimately acquainted with Ireland fully comprehending the appalling chaos, state of crime, and negation of all law in Ireland, and gave it as my opinion that deliverance could only come by remedial legislation, amending the Act in the direction in which, ever since the Bill had been introduced, moderate opinion had been urging upon His Majesty’s Government—particularly in connection with the financial clauses.

I held that, throughout, the Government had made the fatal mistake of not appealing direct to the people of Ireland. They had expressed a desire to treat with “accredited representatives”; but as they did not and could not recognise the Irish Republic, no representatives existed accredited to speak for the people of Ireland. A liberal measure as regards fiscal and financial autonomy would undoubtedly have been accepted six months ago, and I urged that the introduction of an amending Bill at once might not be too late. Force would accomplish nothing, and there was no justification for placing twenty-six

¹ See Appendix V.

counties of Ireland under military dictatorship until every means within the limits of security for the United Kingdom and the integrity of the Empire had been tried. And I gave it as my opinion that up to the present "nothing has been tried."

In conclusion I entreated His Majesty's Government to accept the motion before the House, and to act upon it.

But the Government were adamant, and gave no indication of any change ; indeed, all they said pointed in the reverse direction, and the faint hope that even at the eleventh hour wiser counsels would prevail was swept away by a speech by the Lord Chancellor.

But a complete change in the situation was imminent. On the following day the King opened the Northern Parliament, and made that memorable speech in which he appealed to all Irishmen "to pause, to stretch out the hand of forbearance and conciliation, to forgive and to forget, and to join in making for the land which they love a new era of peace, contentment, and good-will," and to reach "a satisfactory solution of the age-long Irish problems which for generations embarrassed their forefathers as they now weigh heavily upon us." An epoch-making appeal, which gave birth to events of far-reaching importance to Ireland, and not only to Ireland, but to the Empire, and perhaps to the world. As the *Times* said in its leading article, it was "a triumph of statesmanship—the statesmanship that is great enough to be human, and obviously sincere." It produced a very rapid change. On the Tuesday the Government had returned a *non possumus* reply to our entreaties to be wise in time ; and two days after the King had made his historic speech the Government, "deeply anxious that the King's appeal for reconciliation in Ireland should not have

been made in vain," addressed invitations to Mr. de Valera, as "the chosen leader of the great majority in Southern Ireland," and to Sir James Craig to attend a Conference in London, "to explore to the utmost the possibility of a settlement"!

The invitation of the Government, though dated Friday June 24, did not appear in the Press until Sunday the 26th, and when on Friday the 24th I addressed the following communication to the *Times*, I was in ignorance of the dramatic departure from the policy so emphatically announced earlier in the week. The attitude of the Government in the debate on the preceding Tuesday had filled me with the utmost despair. The situation seemed so serious, and the decision of the Government so appalling, that I decided to write a letter,¹ which the *Times* was good enough to publish. I was hopeless, and considered it my "swan-song"—so far as Ireland was concerned.

I said that the tragedy of Ireland was daily increasing in intensity, and that even the faint hope that at the eleventh hour wiser counsels would prevail had been killed by the Lord Chancellor's speech in the House of Lords. I pointed out how, both in legislation and in administration, the Government had completely failed. As far back as 1916, though repeatedly warned, they had refused to recognise the gravity of the situation, and, when it became necessary to employ military force, they had neglected to put the forces of the Crown, including the police, under one command. The splitting up of authority among officers independent of each other foredoomed the measures taken to failure.

It appeared only just to have dawned upon the Government that a state of war existed. Had that

¹ See Appendix VI.

been recognised long ago, all the bitter hatred engendered by an abominable system of reprisals would, in my opinion, have been avoided, since no complaint of the consequences incidental to a state of war would have been made.

As far as legislation was concerned, I pointed out that the Government appeared determined to wreck their own Bill. In consideration of conditions in Ulster, I was fully in accord with the dual system upon which the Bill was founded ; but in my opinion, in order for unity to be achieved, it was necessary for both Parliaments to function, and, unfortunately, long before the Bill had passed through the House of Commons, it was evident that its financial clauses would preclude the Southern Parliament from accepting it.

In framing a Bill to suit a minority in the north-east, the Government could never have had the slightest doubt as to its rejection in Southern Ireland. Both the Sinn Fein Party and Constitutional Nationalists had plainly stated its rejection, whilst Unionist opinion had found similar expression in both Houses and elsewhere. Yet, notwithstanding this volume of opinion, the Government had insisted that Southern Ireland should accept the Act as it stood, and it seemed to me that the time had now come to appeal to the British people.

No one attempted to deny that the Act of Union had proved a failure, and it now only remained to prove that Ireland's claim to self-determination and Great Britain's claim to self-preservation were not irreconcilable.

In my opinion, had an attempt been made to grant Ireland self-determination "within the Empire," her extreme claim to complete separation would never have been made : nor should the Prime Minister's

letter be forgotten, in which he requested the Convention "to submit to the British Government a constitution for the future government of Ireland within the Empire," whereby he accepted Ireland's claim to self-determination within certain limits. It was greatly to be regretted that upon the failure of the Convention the Government had not made any definite offer to the Irish people. It was no longer a question whether fiscal or financial control was, or was not, convenient, but rather that the granting of such control to both Parliaments was the sole alternative to military rule. It might even be that, if made now, the offer would come six months too late; but it should be made nevertheless.

It was, I argued, the bounden duty of the Government to place without delay before the Irish people the most comprehensive offer, within the limits laid down by the Prime Minister for the security of Great Britain—a policy which moderate opinion had never ceased to urge during the past eighteen months.

I further expressed the belief that force would be held justifiable, both by Great Britain and Ireland, to put down secession; but in no other eventuality was it justifiable to place twenty-six counties of Ireland under military dictatorship—at any rate until every attempt had been made within reasonable limits to satisfy them.

In conclusion, I still dared to hope that the summoning of the Southern Parliament would be postponed until September 20, and that before that date an interchange of views might lead to an Amending Act which would enable both Parliaments to function.

To revert to the Government's invitation to Mr. de Valera and Sir James Craig. Before giving a definite reply, Mr. de Valera invited Sir James Craig,

Lord Midleton, Sir Maurice Dockrell, Sir Robert Woods, and Mr. Andrew Jameson, to a Conference at the Mansion House, Dublin, stating that the reply which he would make to the invitation was one which would affect the lives and fortunes of the political minority no less than those of the majority. Sir James Craig declined, on the ground that he had already accepted the Prime Minister's invitation to a Conference in London. The others invited did, however, confer with Mr. de Valera, and on July 8 he replied to the Prime Minister that he was ready to discuss on what basis a conference could reasonably hope to achieve the object desired. On the following day a truce was declared; and three days later the first of the informal talks between the Prime Minister and Mr. de Valera took place, which, though a basis for a formal Conference was not found, resulted in the Government putting down (on July 20), in black and white, definite proposals on which they were prepared to negotiate. Had they been put forward in response to moderate opinion a year previously, an infinity of trouble might—and probably would—have been avoided.

Mr. de Valera replied on August 10, stating that Sinn Fein could not accept the conditions; and he described the Dominion status offered as "illusory." In reply, Mr. Lloyd George said that the Government could not go beyond their proposals. At the same time General Smuts wrote (on the eve of his return to South Africa) a remarkable letter to Mr. de Valera, urging the Sinn Fein Government to accept the Government offer, and to leave Ulster to herself.

Then followed a protracted correspondence between the Prime Minister and Mr. de Valera, making confusion worse confounded, which ended in the Prime Minister, to the dismay of all Ireland,

cancelling the proposed meeting, at Inverness, on September 20.

Some more fencing took place, but without result, and a complete breakdown seemed inevitable, which would have been too appalling. For my own part, I had disagreed with the attitude taken up by the Government. I did not think it necessary for them to insist upon any special negations or assertions before going into a Conference. My views were set forth in a letter in which, after expressing my dismay at the cancelling of the Conference, and that Mr. Lloyd George's attitude should have caused Mr. de Valera to define his position by contending that the Irish plenipotentiaries should enter the Conference as representatives of a "sovereign and independent State," I nevertheless expressed the hope that some "mutually satisfactory formula" could still be found. In my opinion all that was necessary was that the principle of complete separation was "not to be argued, but need not be abandoned as a condition precedent to a Conference," that "discussion must be free, both parties retaining their right to revert to pre-Conference attitudes in the event of failure," and that, as "neither Mr. Lloyd George nor Mr. de Valera were dictators," ultimately the two peoples must decide.

Finally, on September 29 the Prime Minister telegraphed to Mr. de Valera saying that no purpose was to be served by any further interchange of explanatory and argumentative communications, that the Government remained keenly anxious to make, in co-operation with Sinn Fein delegates, another determined effort to explore every possibility of settlement by personal discussion, and that as they felt that conference, not correspondence, was the most practical and hopeful way to an understanding,

they sent a fresh invitation to a Conference in London on October 11.

Mr. de Valera accepted the invitation, the "respective positions having been stated and being understood," and on October 11 the first meeting of the Conference took place at 10 Downing Street. The Irish delegates, nominated by Mr. de Valera and his Cabinet, and approved by Dail Eireann at a private session, consisted of Mr. Arthur Griffith, Mr. Michael Collins, Commandant R. G. Barton, Commandant E. Duggan, and Mr. G. Gavan Duffy. The British delegates to the Conference were Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Lord Birkenhead, Mr. Winston Churchill, Sir L. Worthington-Evans, Sir Hamar Greenwood, and Sir Gordon Hewart (now Lord Hewart).

The great majority of the people of Ireland hoped much from the Conference; they desired a settlement and a peace—a "peace with honour"; and when on Wednesday, December 7, the newspapers published the text of the proposed Treaty,¹ signed by the plenipotentiaries, a great wave of relief spread throughout the country. Only those who were in Ireland at the time can conceive the satisfaction with which it was at once hailed by the great majority of the people, who saw that the Treaty would give to Ireland far more than the "Home Rule" for which she had struggled so long, and which (outside the six counties of North-East Ulster) she was prepared to accept as recently as July 1916. They saw in it that Ireland would be enabled to be mistress of her own destiny—a nation, with complete control of her own affairs, with full fiscal and financial autonomy, yet at the same time an honoured member of a great Commonwealth of Nations. Much surprise was there-

¹ See Appendix VII.

fore created when on December the 8th Mr. de Valera issued a statement "To the Irish People," after a meeting of the Cabinet of Dail Eireann, in which he said that the terms of the Agreement were in "violent conflict with the wishes of the majority of the nation as expressed freely in successive elections during the past three years," and that he could not recommend acceptance. He summoned a meeting of the Dail for December the 14th, the same day on which the proposed Agreement was to come before the British Parliament. On the other hand, Mr. Arthur Griffith issued to the Press the following statement :

"I have signed a Treaty of Peace between Ireland and Great Britain. I believe that Treaty will lay the foundation of peace and friendship between the two nations. What I have signed I shall stand by, in the belief that the end of the conflict of centuries is at hand."

And with this statement Mr. Michael Collins stated that he was "in absolute agreement."

I was at Adare when on December the 8th I received a telegram from Lord Curzon, on behalf of the Government, informing me that Lord Morley had consented to move the Address at the meeting of Parliament on December 14, and inviting me to second it. I replied that I would be glad to do so.

The terms of the Motion were :

That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty as followeth—

"Most Gracious Sovereign,—We, Your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in Parliament assembled, beg leave to thank Your Majesty for the most gracious

Speech which Your Majesty has addressed to both Houses of Parliament.

“Having taken into consideration the Articles of Agreement presented to us by Your Majesty’s command, we are ready to confirm and ratify these Articles in order that the same may be established for ever by the mutual consent of the peoples of Great Britain and Ireland, and we offer to Your Majesty our humble congratulations on the near accomplishment of that work of reconciliation to which Your Majesty has so largely contributed.”

The debate took place on December 14, 15, and 16, and many notable speeches were delivered, among them a very wise one by Lord Morley and a very violent one by Lord Carson. The Lord Chancellor made a great speech in reply.

I insert my speech in the text because it is, to me at any rate, interesting as indicating my appreciation of the victory won for Ireland, and my ignorance of the force of petty and personal objections to be raised against it.

“My Lords, in rising to second the Motion before your Lordships’ House, I do so with a very keen consciousness of the great privilege that has been accorded to me in following the veteran statesman whose distinguished career has been so intimately connected with the cause of Ireland, both in the political aspect, the grant of self-governing power, and in respect of the liberal settlement of the once very vexed Land Question, and with all other matters connected with the welfare of the country. And I am conscious also of the very slender claim that I have upon that privilege afforded me. I, as a private and independent member of your Lordships’ House, have done what I could, but have done very little, to further a settlement of what has been for so long, but will no longer be, the Irish question.

“I could do nothing else. I was actuated primarily, no doubt, by affection for the country of my birth, by great sympathy for the people in the pathetic tragedy of their history, and by admiration of their great tenacity of purpose. But I was actuated by many other motives also. I believed that the people of Great Britain—a just and large-hearted people—were ignorant of the real causes of the perpetual discontent in Ireland, and did not understand the people on the other side of the Channel. And of later years it has seemed to me that the reconstruction of society after the Great War and the peace of the world were very largely in the hands of the great Commonwealth of Nations that we call the Empire, and perhaps depended entirely upon a complete understanding on essential principles between the Empire and the great Republic across the Atlantic. And, as it seemed to me, the one obstacle that stood between those two great Powers for good, acting in unison and accord, was the discord existing between Great Britain and Ireland. I wanted to do what I could to turn that discord into harmony ; and, though I have done but very little, we have now before us a measure that will surely bring it about.

“Until the last few days I should have had to admit that all the great work that others have done, and the little that I have done myself, had utterly failed ; that the cause we advocated was a lost cause ; and that failure was complete. Your Lordships may remember that just about a year ago I moved an Amendment to the Second Reading to the Bill of 1920 in this House. I do not want to allude to that except to say that after that debate I admit I left this House in complete despair. I thought that the last possibility of an offer that might be accepted and might save bloodshed was gone ; I thought I was

doomed to see Ireland suppressed by military force, wrecked and ruined in the process. For though I very well knew that military force was bound to prevail, I knew, too, that it would be after a bitter struggle, and afterwards a settlement by military force could never be a real settlement. What was I to look to in the future but the renewal of the struggle by another generation and to all the increased bitterness and hate that had been engendered by suppression by military strength ?

“ And now, my Lords, I find myself having the honour and the privilege of seconding a Motion for an humble Address to His Majesty thanking His Majesty for his gracious Speech from the Throne in which is announced a great act of reconciliation that will completely change the whole relations in the future between Great Britain and Ireland, will heal the feuds of centuries, and bring about an era, I believe, of true friendship, understanding, and fellowship between the two peoples. It would be impossible, and it would be useless for me to try, to find words to express the gratitude I feel and the intensity of the feeling of relief. But I should not be sincere if I did not admit that my great joy is suffused also with regret. How can it be otherwise when I look back upon the last twenty years, the opportunities lost, the great mistakes made on both sides, by Governments here, by leaders of Irish opinion in Ireland, and when I think of the catalogue of calamities that might perhaps have been avoided—would surely have been avoided—had more timely action been taken ?

“ But I do not wish to dwell upon the past. I have taken to heart the words of His Majesty in the great Speech—an epoch-making Speech, for it marked the turn of the tide—in opening the Northern Parliament

at Belfast, when he urged us all to forgive and forget. I wish to forgive and forget. And whatever little time may be left to me, whatever opportunities I may be afforded, I shall devote to doing the best I can to make this great instrument of reconciliation and peace fulfil all that the authors of it could possibly desire.

“It is not for me to say anything about the statesmanship, the patience, the determination to win a way out somehow, of all those who were engaged in the negotiations and in the Conference of which this great measure is the happy outcome. They have their reward in the consciousness of what they have accomplished, and they will have it brimming over when time reveals the consequences of the noble work they have done. I do not desire, either, to go into the Articles of the Agreement. It is an Agreement of tremendous scope, and it inaugurates a gigantic change. Without injustice to any one, without compulsion, it offers a free people all that they can possibly desire to enable them to govern themselves. It puts their destiny in their own hands. For the welfare of their country they in the future, and they alone, will be absolutely responsible. It is a tremendous responsibility, but responsibility is a great solvent, and I believe that under that sense of responsibility many of the differences and prejudices that oppress us in Ireland now will gradually melt away.

“There are many people, and I daresay some members of this House, who think that this great act and deed of peace goes too far. There are others, of course, though not members of this House, who think that it does not go far enough. My Lords, it does not go too far. When His Majesty's Government saw that a change of policy was necessary—requiring,

as I think, great courage, and an act of great magnanimity—when they determined upon a great measure of renunciation and reconciliation, they were wise to make it complete, without reservations or qualifications of any sort or kind whatever. You have to trust the Irish people. If you trust them at all it is wise to trust them all in all, and I believe it will be found that they can be trusted. The Agreement goes too far, I know, for many of my friends, but to those who are afraid of this great experiment and who think it will end in disaster and ruin I would make this appeal. I would ask them to be patient, to give the people of Ireland a fair chance to make good, as I believe they can and will make good, to do nothing, to say nothing, that could possibly add to the great difficulties which will have to be surmounted in any case.

“I do not wish to refer to the past in any way, but I would like to say this. Whatever may be thought of acts and measures employed during the last few melancholy years, I think that any candid man living on the spot and understanding the conditions in Ireland would admit that under the form of government which was set up in Dublin and which the people thought was properly constituted, those in authority and the people themselves displayed qualities of administration and of obedience to the law which augur well for the future of the Irish Free State.

“Ireland will want the help of all her friends. The difficulties to be surmounted will be very great. We cannot expect a miracle, and it would be little short of a miracle for any people to take over this great responsibility without difficulty and to put the whole machinery for complete self-government into operation without friction. Ireland, therefore, will want the

help of all her friends, and I rejoice to see that my friends the Southern Unionists—I suppose I am one myself but I think we shall have to be re-christened—have received assurances from the Chairman of the Irish Delegation guaranteeing the safeguarding of their interests and asking for their help and support. I am sanguine enough to think, I have faith enough in me to say, that I believe that in time, and in a little time, you will find all Irishmen from north to south and from east to west helping each other in ensuring the prosperity and welfare of what, after all, in spite of all differences and prejudices, in spite of all that is said and done, is the common country of them all.

“It is thought by some that this Treaty does not go far enough. I confess that frame of mind is incomprehensible to me. I do not know what may happen in Dublin; I do not know what may be happening there while I am speaking; but of this I feel absolutely confident—that the people of Ireland will not dishonour the signatures of the plenipotentiaries that they trusted to negotiate this great Treaty for them. I cannot understand how any human being can cavil at the terms of this Treaty. No man can deny that it confers upon the Irish people all the powers and all the privileges that are necessary to give them absolute control over their own affairs and to put the whole destiny and future of the country in their hands. Absolute independence can do no more than that, and absolute independence would mean a great deal less. Absolute independence for a small nation situated as Ireland is means isolation. The isolation of a little unit limits her opportunities and prevents her real enjoyment of the solid substance of independence, of freedom, and of liberty.

“These Articles not only give Ireland complete control of her own affairs, but offer her the position

of an honoured member of a great Commonwealth of Nations—a position which endues her with a power that in no other circumstances could she possibly have gained, and which while giving her complete control of her own affairs and placing her destiny in her own hands, gives her also the opportunity, a larger opportunity, of doing her duty in a wider sphere of life. I am very confident that the Irish people will not dream of rejecting this great message of peace which is offered to them. It has been my fortune to see two great historic episodes in history—to see the triumph of militarism when the King of Prussia was proclaimed German Emperor at Versailles in 1871 (a glorification of the great Prussian god of war), and to see that idol overturned, the rehabilitation of a despoiled and suffering nation, and the right of weak peoples to live and of men to be free secured when the Treaty of Peace was signed in the same room in the same place in 1919. Those were two great episodes in history; but I feel sure that, under heaven, this great pact, this great gift, recognition by a powerful nation of the rights of a small and feeble folk, will stand out for ever as a landmark, pointing to the realisation of that grand ideal, a world at peace. I beg to second the Motion before us.”

The division in the Lords took place on December 16, 166 voting in favour of the Address and 47 against. In the Commons the figures were 401 for, and 58 against.

The Dail met on December 14, and Mr. de Valera immediately charged the plenipotentiaries with exceeding their instructions; and sharp passages took place. Mr. Arthur Griffith and Mr. Michael Collins refuted the charge.

Four days were wasted by the Dail in secret

Session, and it was not until December 20 that it entered upon the public discussion of Mr. Arthur Griffith's Motion "That Dail Eireann approves of the Treaty signed in London on December 6, 1921." He opened the debate in a very statesmanlike speech; and the Motion was seconded by Commandant M'Keon,¹ of the I.R.A.

Mr. de Valera followed, vigorously attacking the Treaty, and asserting it was signed under duress.

Mr. Michael Collins replied, also in a very statesmanlike speech.

On the second day's debate a dramatic scene occurred. Mr. Sean Milroy, after stating that the issue was between two forms of association with the British Empire, read, in support of his statement, a form of oath which he indicated had been discussed at the secret Session. Mr. de Valera strongly objected to what he referred to as dragging-in of an irrelevant matter; to which Mr. Griffith replied that it was right that the Irish people should know that there was that difference between them.

Many of the speeches were very passionate, at times the debate was carried on with no little heat, and it soon became very evident that the Dail was sharply divided. After two days' further debate it was decided to adjourn until January 3.

That the Dail did not express its readiness to approve and ratify articles of agreement by acclamation and without discussion filled me with amazement. So far as I am personally concerned, I do not say that the Treaty is all that I could desire. Where

¹ It is worth noting that Commandant M'Keon was the only member of Dail Eireann whom the Government had decided not to release when members were released on August 6 for the purpose of enabling them to attend the meeting of Dail Eireann on August 16. He was, however, released two days later, after a grave pronouncement by Mr. de Valera on the danger to prospects of peace negotiations by his continued detention.

you have peoples with distinct individualities and urgent instincts towards separation, but who are, at the same time, subject to powerful incentives equally urgent towards union for mutual advantages and self-preservation, federalism has always appealed to me as the principle by which local freedom of action of the parts can best be reconciled with unity of action in essentials of the whole. But, whatever might have happened a few years ago, it had become evident to me that my ideal had to be abandoned. I leaned also, at one time, towards a dual monarchy. That idea had the merit of simplicity. Ireland had for over a century persistently rebelled against the rape of her constitution. Why not, I thought, restore her to the position she occupied before the Union, but with a constitution modified to meet present requirements? But a dual monarchy, though simple, in the main outline presents many constitutional difficulties of detail, and I gladly accepted the principle of, and the terms of, the Treaty. It gave to Ireland all that I had long laboured for—recognition of distinct individuality and responsibility for her own destiny through complete control over her own finance.

I disliked the idea of a Dominion of Ireland, and was glad that under the Treaty Ireland is not a Dominion. The status of the Free State may be described according to choice; but a Free State entering into the community of free nations constituting the Empire places Ireland in an entirely different position from that of a Dominion which has emerged from the position of a Crown Colony of Great Britain. The Articles of the Treaty and the title accorded to Ireland were therefore satisfactory to me; and that they are unsatisfactory to any one passes my comprehension. The only logical objection that can be raised against them is disbelief in the capacity of

Irishmen to manage their own affairs. I can understand men who fear responsibility rejecting the Treaty in order to be able to say, as an excuse for Ireland's failure, that if she had been an independent republic all would have been well—an illogical and preposterous line of argument to take.

I am not a Republican. I regard the Monarchy as the one and only centre of gravity that can hold the Empire together for the benefit of mankind. Putting aside all personal feeling towards individuals or principles, I cannot see any advantages in a republican system of government. I have seen something of the working of other Republics; and of this I am perfectly certain—that there is more individual freedom and that the people have more control of their own affairs in Great Britain under the Crown than is enjoyed by the people under the two principal Republics—the United States and France. Though, as I explained in letters to the Irish Press, I can understand those whose ideal is a Republic, I cannot see how acceptance of the Treaty interferes with it. Cannot they allow Ireland to attain a position in which the realisation of their ideal may at least some day or other be possible? They must know that its attainment is impossible now. Nobody can be insane enough to think that Ireland can now grapple with Great Britain and conquer her; for that is what it comes to. All that can be done would be to continue the effort to make administration by Great Britain impossible. But that is already accomplished by the Treaty. Everything that could be gained through great loss of life, Ireland running with blood, devastated and destroyed, is accomplished by the Treaty without the shedding of a drop of blood or a tear.

I deeply regret that the Dail was not unanimous

in accepting the Treaty. If we are to begin by fighting each other, the future will be imperilled. If the real motive in rejecting the Treaty is not love for Ireland but hatred of Great Britain, we shall fail, for hatred is a bad foundation on which to erect any edifice. But I do not believe that Ireland is going to be untrue to herself. I believe patriotism will prevail, and that if the Dail do not accept the Treaty, acceptance will be forced by the vast majority of the people.

III

POLITICAL

FOR some inscrutable reason, Lord Palmerston, when he was Prime Minister, invited me, then little more than a boy, to stay a few days at Broadlands. We used to play billiards a good deal, and he was very genial and chatty and delightful; he talked about all manner of subjects, but not, if I remember right, about politics. When I say that the reason of the invitation was inscrutable, I suppose that it was really to look me over as a possibly promising political foal. To what conclusions he came I do not know.

My father, who died in 1871, had no great *flair* for politics. He was a man of science, had been educated under Sir William Hamilton in astronomy, was devoted to geology and deeply interested in archæology, an intimate friend of Montalembert, who dedicated one of the volumes of his *Monks of the West* to him. He wrote, in collaboration with Miss Margaret Stokes, a classical work on Irish archæology—*Notes on Irish Architecture*, which was published after his death. He represented the County of Glamorganshire in the House of Commons as a Conservative, but when he went to the House of Lords he sat on the Liberal side of the House, not, I think, so much from political convictions as because he was a Roman Catholic, and Roman Catholics at that period sup-

ported the Liberal Party. When I succeeded him I took my seat on the Liberal Benches, not from any political preference, but simply following my father's example.

OFFERED A POSITION IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS

It must have been somewhere about 1872 that Lord Granville offered me the position of Lord-in-Waiting, and to speak for some Department (I forget which) in the Lords. What a charming personality was his. I respected and liked him greatly; but his offer fell upon deaf ears. It did not appeal to me at all. We had a long talk. He was very persuasive, and wound up by saying, "Well, think it over. I began in the same way, and very soon popped into the Foreign Office, and there I have been ever since." I thought it over, and declined the honour. Whether, had I accepted, I should have "popped" into the Foreign or any other office, goodness only knows.

I certainly came into the world with a predilection for large open spaces. The sea, the great rolling prairies, the vast unbroken forests, appealed strongly to me. And in politics the same impulse for the large influenced me. My thoughts dwelt upon expansion of the Empire and foreign policy, but they remained chaotic, unformulated, until by mere chance I found myself projected into active political life.

I was in the habit of paying constant visits to the United States, mainly for big-game shooting, and in December 1877 I arrived in New York City from a trip to the wild and woolly West. A few friends formed a very pleasant little coterie there: dear old Sam Ward, prince of Lobbyists, genial, quick, very sagacious—a *bon viveur*, and a very staunch friend; Henry Hurlburt, editor of *The World*; Louis Jennings,

editor of the *New York Times*; Rosebery, myself, and one or two others. I used to do odds and ends of literary work for Hurlburt. One day he horrified me by asking my views on the condition of Europe.¹ I said that was not in my line at all, that I had not studied the subject, and that my views, though distinct in the general, were nebulous in the particular; that I had never written anything political for publication, and had no desire to do so. "Well," he said, "never mind your desires, you have got to write me an article on the subject before you sail." (I was leaving in a few days.) So I did, and thought no more about it. To my vast astonishment and dismay, I found, on getting home, that I had become somewhat famous, or infamous. Hurlburt had liked the article, had cabled it over, and it had apparently attracted some attention.² Two or three friends or acquaintances—among them Edward Lawson and Lord Stratheden and Campbell—came to me and said, "Now you must go at once and make a speech in the House of Lords." I had never made a formal speech anywhere, nor had I attended the sittings of the House. I was shy of that august assembly. How well I remember, when I took my seat, plumping myself down on the Front Bench—knowing no better—and my uncle by marriage, Lord Emly, gently suggesting that I was a little premature, and my precipitate retirement to a remote back bench shyer than ever. The House of Lords was to me an awesome place, and so, not having got down in my saddle, the

¹ The war between Russia and Turkey had been in progress since 1877, and had arrived at a point when the complete defeat of the Turkish Army was imminent, threatening the interests of Great Britain.

² He was good enough to say, in a prefatory note to the article, that my contribution "unquestionably shed more light on the currents of political thought and feeling set flowing through English society by the pressure of the existing emergency in European politics than anything which had recently been published on either side of the Atlantic!"

idea of venting my political views before so terrifying an audience was somewhat alarming. However, I did make a speech after waiting in nervous tremor for two or three days for an opportunity. Deliverance was a great but somewhat mixed-up relief. The speech was kindly received. Lord Granville whispered to me not to be led away by Tory cheers, and Monty Cory (Lord Rowton) came to me afterwards conveying honeyed words from Lord Beaconsfield—"very patriotic, most useful speech," and so on, and so on, and would I come and see him at Downing Street whenever I liked? Of course I looked upon that invitation as somewhat florid politeness; but some days after the Prime Minister stopped me when leaving the House and asked why I had not been to see him. I said naturally I was not going to bother a Prime Minister. He replied, "I mean what I say. I would like your friendship, and I hope you will value and cherish mine." Whether he really meant it or not I even then felt doubtful, and wondered whether it was not an oriental flowery figure of speech. It was, at any rate, a very pleasant form of reception, very different from that of his great rival on the only occasion on which I saw him on a matter of public business. Gladstone rushed into the room brandishing a bundle of proofs. "I am very busy correcting proofs; what can I do for you?" "If you are so busy," I said, "shall I come another time?" "I am always busy, just as busy; what is it you want?"

ACQUAINTANCE WITH LORD BEACONSFIELD

After that I constantly went to see Lord Beaconsfield. He did most of the talking, though sometimes he would ask my opinion on some direct political

question. He used to walk about the room—explaining his political views and ambitions and complaining of difficulties with some of his colleagues : he talked with complete abandon. I suppose it was some relief to him to open his mind to an impartial listener and to clear away grievances and difficulties into a safe receptacle. At any rate, I greatly valued and cherished his friendship, and saw and talked with him very frequently till very near the end. He used to question me about my views for the future, political ambitions, and so on. I was beginning to realise that three years spent at Oxford in having a good time, and six in the 1st Life Guards in much the same pursuit, was not the best preparation for active public life, and told him so. He would not agree. “Scholastic education is not so important as you think,” he used to say. “You have seen men and cities, and that is the best of all education.” He was a marvellous man, and influenced me undoubtedly in the direction of thinking “Imperially,” which was my natural inclination.

He was, I think, at that time, when after half a century of labour he had reached the summit of his ambition, the most lonely man I have ever met, the most remote from all the ordinary stream of life that flowed around and beneath him ; and he was to my mind in his political views absolutely sincere—a patriot to the core. I had always thought so. I remember having an argument with Lord Granville on the subject. I took the line of an honest patriot. He took that of an honest competitor in the political game. I think I was right. It is the sincerity of the man that has touched the true instincts of the public. The primroses that deck his statue after nearly forty years are the tribute to honest patriotism, and I think his name will remain in the hearts of the people when

the names of his perhaps more brilliant rivals must be sought for in the pages of history.

FOREIGN POLITICS

In the article which I wrote for Hurlburt in *The World* in January, and which thrust me into practical politics, I expressed views that, though uttered nearly forty years ago, have not been without their bearing upon the currents of international politics.

I dealt, in particular, with the rumour that Russia was negotiating with other States of the Baltic for the exclusion from that sea of the war vessels of all non-Baltic Powers.

I pointed out that "the Baltic States" in such a proposition stood, of course, simply for Russia and Germany; that Bismarck's price for co-operation with Russia must be Russia's co-operation in the annexation of Holland; that it was absurd to talk of a cordial and honest alliance between two such Powers as Imperial Germany and Imperial Russia; that those who would anticipate the probable course which either of these Powers would take had to consider the prospective advantages which either of them might hope to secure from any measure postponing the inevitable death-grapple; that there were two great European Powers (Germany and England) which had deep and continuing interests of antagonism to Russia; that if Russia were steadily drifting down the Black Sea to a great collision with England, she was drifting as steadily down the Baltic to a great collision with Germany; and, should the rumour concerning the conversion of the Baltic into a Russo-German lake—with Scandinavia condemned to be the ally and instrument of whichever of the two Empires could best play its cards—prove to be well founded, it might be assumed

that Bismarck considered it wiser to secure Holland as an Atlantic base, with Russia's aid, than to rely upon the friendship and alliance of England when Russia and Germany would be in conflict. On the other hand, I recognised the possibility that the rumour (which had originated in Berlin) might have been encouraged by Bismarck with a view to arousing England thoroughly, and making her actively co-operate with Germany in imposing such a peace upon the Eastern combatants as would best meet the views of Germany and least damage the interests of England.

The Asiatic aspect of the Eastern question interested me, and when it became acute in 1878 I spoke on the subject in the House of Lords and also made contributions to the Press. I dealt with the consequences to us if Russia were permitted to establish herself in Asia Minor. I said that if she were permitted to obtain possession of Kars and other strong places, and could acquire a safe harbour on the Black Sea, her position would be a very formidable one, as she would be able to advance in either direction. I argued that if she were allowed to establish herself in Asia Minor she would dominate the shortest future road to India by the Euphrates Valley; that fortified on the Black Sea she would be able to close the Straits to the commerce of all nations; that our right-of-way over the then shortest road through the Suez Canal would be imperilled. I said that if Russia were in possession of Kars we should certainly lose the respect of the Mohammedans in India. I urged that from a purely commercial and economical point of view Russia should not be allowed to establish herself in Asia Minor. And, I asked, "Which would be the cheapest—to prevent her obtaining possession of these strong places and of Batoum now, or to be compelled to erect a barrier

against her when her forces are rolling down the Euphrates Valley in an irresistible flood, and to have to maintain an army of occupation in Egypt to watch her in Syria?" I argued that Germany also was much interested in those considerations, and that she was perfectly well aware that, as surely as Russia would some day collide with England in the East, so surely must Russia come into collision with Germany down the Baltic, and if England was to co-operate with Germany or Austria, or both, the price of co-operation should be that they in their turn should back up England in making such terms as might appear suitable to her in regard to Armenia. I held the view that whether we should have allies or not was comparatively unimportant *provided that Turkey were on our side*. I therefore wrote and spoke strongly in favour of an alliance with Turkey; and in dealing with the Anglo-Turkish Convention later on in the year I expressed the view that if Asia Minor was ever to have fair room and opportunity for development, if the Christians in Armenia were to be adequately protected, some such agreement was an absolute necessity, seeing that no other Power but England could undertake the task.

It was not, however, until the Afghan Question became a really "live" one and an electoral issue that I took an active part in addressing public meetings upon Foreign Affairs. I strongly held the view that it was essential that England should assert her proper position in order to check Russian ascendancy, to reassure the people of India that we intended to be masters, and to secure a better frontier for our Indian Empire. I held that with the Passes and Kandahar in our hands, India was safe. To the retention of Kandahar I attached the highest importance; and in March 1881 I made a speech in the

Lords strongly protesting against its abandonment. I spoke at many meetings upon the subject, and have very vivid recollections of a meeting which I addressed at the Duke of Wellington's Riding School in London, presided over by my old friend the late Earl of Wemyss. The meeting was entirely non-party and national—indeed, I believe there were more distinguished Liberals than Conservatives present. I moved the following resolution :

“That our abandonment of Kandahar would be a breach of faith with the inhabitants, who have welcomed and supported British rule, and would leave them to anarchy and oppression, while order and good government will follow its retention ; and Kandahar, under British protection, would become the great emporium of commerce, and the centre of civilisation for all Central Asia.”

I addressed large meetings upon this subject in the Free Trade Hall, Manchester, in the Town Hall, Birmingham, and in other places.

UNDER-SECRETARY, COLONIAL OFFICE

When Lord Salisbury formed his Administration in 1885 he sent for me. He was very kind, but most dreadfully polite. He apologised profusely (which was quite unnecessary) for not offering me a seat in the Cabinet, explained why for the moment that was impossible, and begged me to take my choice of the Under-Secretaryships. I placed myself of course at his disposition. He selected the Colonial Office, giving me certain reasons why he particularly wished me to accept that position ; and Under-Secretary for the Colonies I in due course became.

I held that office during his short Administration, and again when he came into power in 1886, and

resigned in 1887 for the following reasons. I had a very grave difference of opinion with the Secretary of State, Sir Henry Holland, afterwards Lord Knutsford, on a matter connected with the rights of Newfoundland, in which, in my opinion, a great principle was involved. I had become very much alarmed at what I conceived to be a general reactionary tendency on the part of the Government, more especially as regards Ireland. I disapproved also of their attitude towards questions of economy, for the whole tendency had been for the Estimates to rise. I was very strongly in favour of a broad and comprehensive measure of County Government, and of measures to enable agricultural labourers and others to obtain allotments: in fact, I thought the whole policy of the Government was becoming ultra-Tory.

I was at this time already on terms of great intimacy with Randolph Churchill. I approved of his political theories, and was, naturally, inclined to follow his lead. In fact, I consulted him about my position, whereupon, in a letter dated December 1, 1887, after referring to the distrust and aversion entertained by Lord Salisbury and Goschen for our mutual "Tory Democracy" principles, he advocated a bold course, and begged me not to undervalue my influence and following in the country. This advice, together with the other reasons I have already mentioned—especially the Newfoundland business—really brought me to a decision.

Randolph Churchill was a marvellous and curiously composite personality. He made for himself many enemies, and some very close friends. In manners he was certainly ungracious; but the rudeness, so often complained of, was due, partly, to slight deafness and to want of that self-control necessary to enable a man to "suffer fools gladly," and to the

irritability of a very nervous temperament accentuated, as I think, by the unrecognised germination of the disease to which he ultimately succumbed. That Randolph was a sick man when he made the fatal mistake of his life in resigning the Chancellorship of the Exchequer in 1886 I am certain now, though I did not recognise it then. If I had, I would not have urged him, as I did, to return to public life after the *débâcle* of his resignation. He was staying with me at Adare, and we talked the matter over, fully. He was against it: he said he had not the necessary strength and stamina. I could not recognise that at all, and thought it an infinite pity that, for his own sake, and that of the country, a man of his brilliant attainments should allow himself to be permanently shelved. Well, he made the effort, a gigantic one, and it was a failure—a most pathetic failure. He recognised his disabilities. He used to complain to me that people thought he was tipsy when he suffered from difficulty of articulation; but he struggled on. At his best he was a most effective speaker, endowed with a wonderfully keen and accurate political instinct; and he was all through, at his worst as at his best, quite the most courageous man I have ever met.

To return to myself. Lord Salisbury was very kind, and tried hard, and I think honestly, to persuade me to reconsider my resignation of my humble post. In fact, he treated me better than perhaps I deserved in offering me the Governorship of the Cape, an offer which for private reasons I was forced to refuse, much to my regret. It was a billet which would have suited me well.

SWEATED INDUSTRIES

But I was anxious for work, and, as soon as I was freed from office, I turned my attention to social

subjects, and developed an active interest in the conditions of labour in what were called the "Sweated" Industries. In February 1888 I moved in the House of Lords for the appointment of a Select Committee to inquire into the subject of "sweating" in the East End of London. The Motion was agreed to; and I was appointed Chairman of a very strong Committee. Our field of inquiry was at first confined to London, but in the following August I moved that the Reference be extended to the "United Kingdom," for we had found that sweating was prevalent not only in the East End of London, but also in various other districts in London, and in other towns and cities throughout the country.

The difficulties experienced in getting evidence were very great. The work was arduous, and in doing it I received most valuable assistance from my private secretary—Kinloch-Cooke (now Sir Clement Kinloch-Cooke, M.P. for Devonport). Considerable difficulty arose from the inability of a Committee to indemnify witnesses against possible loss, and the reluctance of witnesses to give evidence which might prove prejudicial to their future prospects; moreover, some witnesses were unable to understand or speak the English language. But, on the whole, the Committee had reason to believe that the case, in all its aspects, was fully and fairly laid before them.

The majority of the Committee were imbued with the "Manchester School" theory of cheap labour; and the idea of demanding a living wage was obnoxious to that school. If an industry could be carried on by Polish Jews under conditions of wages, food, length of hours, and sanitation, under which British workers perished—well, so much the worse for the British; they may perish, but the industry must persist. Members of the Committee used to pro-

pound questions involving profound problems of political economy to poor starved ignorant workers—questions which conveyed nothing to them, and which might just as well have been asked in ancient Greek. Of course, such witnesses were knocked out of time at once. My object throughout was to get those poor people to describe accurately the conditions under which they worked and lived, and, strange to say, it was very difficult. The very poorest of them, such as chain-makers and others, were very proud and very self-respecting. They borrowed clothes from their better-off friends in order to put in a respectable appearance. It was the hardest thing in the world to get them to admit the way they were fed and clothed and housed. I was much struck by the intelligent and straightforward way in which, in general, the evidence was put before us, and by the manifest desire of the poorest working-class witnesses to present a favourable appearance and to minimise the effect upon themselves individually of circumstances which were the subject of complaint. They were most delightful, these extremely poor people—respectable, and to be respected.

Our Inquiry lasted two years, during which we received evidence on 71 occasions, and examined 291 witnesses. It was, I flatter myself, useful and profitable to the workers. As I stated in my draft Report, the investigation, even during its progress, accomplished great good by the publicity given to the exposures of the sweating system—a fact which, I said, encouraged me to believe that if the Government and Municipal Authorities would set their faces steadily and strongly against the system of sweating, and if the public would take some interest in the quality and origin of the goods they purchased, many of the evils referred to would tend to disappear. But

the Committee would not accept my Report as even a draft for consideration, and, as I could not possibly abandon my views *in toto*, I asked to be relieved of my position.

My draft Report recommended (1) an increase in the powers and numbers of the Sanitary Inspectors; (2) the consolidation of Sanitary Laws, combined with measures to secure united action between the Sanitary Authorities; (3) the appointment of additional inspectors under the Factory and Workshops Act, some proportion of them to be drawn from men possessing a practical knowledge; (4) the compulsory registration and inspection of *all* work-places (whether private or other) in which three or more persons worked, and other measures in that connection; (5) the inclusion of the occupation of the dock labourer within the scope of existing legislation so far as to provide that the work should be carried on with all practicable and due regard for the safety of those employed, legal responsibility for accident resting with the Dock Companies; (6) more rigorous enforcement of the Truck Acts and such amendment of the Prevention of Payment of Wages in Public-houses Act as would cover cases relating to the docks and the chain-makers of Cradley Heath and District; (7) the concentration, as far as practicable, of the duties of attending to matters divided among five Departments of the State, in one Department of Industry, charged, among other things, with the duty of watching over the legal rights and the interests of labour; (8) the termination of scandals of sweating in connection with Government contracts, contracts to be given out to *bona fide* firms, and not to agents, and not to be sub-contracted; (9) Municipal Authorities to discourage the employment of any firm or persons carrying on business through the operation of sweating; (10) the development of technical educa-

tion and the employment of trained teachers in charitable and industrial schools, thus providing a wholesome counteracting influence; (11) steps to be taken by our consuls abroad to explain the true condition of the labour market in England to those parts of Europe from which foreigners were exported, in order to keep them in their own country.

The Committee adopted another Report, and some time after it had been presented to the House I moved a Resolution pointing out the urgent need of legislation, and, in doing so, I found it necessary, of course, to criticise various features of the Report—not a pleasant task. But it was plain to me that the case presented in evidence before the Committee was not clearly, fairly, and justly presented in their Report, and also that, although improved sanitation would do something if the recommendations of the Committee were carried out, in other respects things would remain very much as they were. I felt very strongly upon the subject, and I spoke again on the following day, expressing my belief that a Labour Department would have a very beneficial effect, and requesting the Government to consider whether the institution of such a Department were possible.¹

I held that there existed a close connection between the abuse of sub-contracting and sweating. The Committee's Report, however, treated this question of sub-contracting very lightly, merely stating that some witnesses urged that "sweating was an abuse of the sub-contract system," while others maintained that

¹ It was a matter of much satisfaction to me when, in 1893, a "Labour Department" was established, with distinct offices and a special staff, and a staff of correspondents in the larger towns, whose duty it was to inform the central office of important events affecting labour in their districts, and to conduct local investigations. Subsequently, as a result of war conditions, the idea was still further developed, and a "Ministry" of Labour was established.

sub-contracting was by no means a necessary element of sweating, thus conveying the impression that opinions were about evenly balanced, and that it was quite an open question. As a matter of fact, of the 86 witnesses who gave evidence on this point 83 were of opinion that the evils complained of were due to the unnecessary number of middlemen and to the system of sub-contracting. To make no mention of the fact that there was an overwhelming mass of evidence of witnesses of the highest authority who attributed sweating to sub-contracting and unnecessary middlemen, and merely to assert that some witnesses took one view and some another, was to convey a false impression as to the evidence.

I was pleased when, at the close of the Inquiry, an acquaintance of mine told me that it had cost him £150,000, and when, some time later, a man who was doing some work in my room at Dunraven replied to a question if I had not seen him before: "Oh, yes! I was employed at . . . and gave evidence at your Sweating Committee. I lost my job, but I did not mind that. We were very grateful for that Inquiry."

Though my draft was not accepted, I am justified in thinking that my Report laid the foundation upon which much valuable labour legislation has been based.

THE NEWFOUNDLAND QUESTION

In 1891 the Newfoundland Question became a prominent issue, and we had some very interesting and instructive debates in the House of Lords upon the subject. I flatter myself that my "suicidal action" in resigning office had furthered an object always very dear to me—the growth and expansion of the Empire by active support to all the legitimate objects and ambitions of what were then the Colonies

and are now the King's Dominions over sea. The Newfoundland question had been a source of difficulty and anxiety to our statesmen for nearly two hundred years. Under the provisions of the Treaties of Utrecht, Paris, and Versailles the French had been given certain fishing rights along a portion of the Newfoundland coast. Their interpretation of these rights was hotly disputed by the Newfoundlanders, who found the French claims increasingly onerous as the Colony advanced in population and material development. There was incessant friction. Exasperated by the high French bounties which kept colonial-caught fish out of European markets, the Colonists had retaliated by a Bait Act directed against the French fishermen.

At the moment the storm-centre lay in the claim that lobsters were fish and that the French had the right to apply their fishing rights to the lobster-canning industry. Our Government had effected a temporary settlement of the matter for the previous year by carrying through a *modus vivendi* with France. Against this the Colonists vigorously protested, and refused to legislate themselves along similar lines for the approaching fishing season. The French claim to an exclusive Fishery and that the right to cure fish covered the right to can crustaceans could not, of course, be admitted; but, to keep the peace, our naval officers were instructed to interpret their powers of enforcing treaty rights in regard to lobster-canning as they had hitherto done in respect to drying and curing cod-fish. Some British factories were, at the request of the French agents, destroyed or removed. It turned out that our naval officers, in enforcing the *modus vivendi*, had really been acting illegally, as the old Statute of George III., from which the Crown had derived its powers to authorise

such action for the enforcement of treaty rights, had lapsed in 1832, and had never been renewed.

Thus the state of affairs had become very serious. To my mind, the most important aspect of the whole situation was the Imperial one—its bearing on the relations which did, and should, exist between the Imperial Parliament and the Governments and Parliaments of the self-governing Colonies. The Government, uncomfortably placed between two fires, was undoubtedly in a most difficult position, and, in its natural anxiety to avoid any possible grounds of collision with France, was tempted to strain its powers to the uttermost in order to secure a satisfactory settlement. Its difficulties were increased by the intransigent attitude assumed on some points by the people of Newfoundland, who were more concerned to stand stoutly for their constitution rights than to come to any compromise. The irritation in Newfoundland against Her Majesty's Government was profound.

Having received information of the inflamed state of feeling which existed, I asked the Colonial Secretary for full Papers on the subject at the outset of the Session. I also called attention to the refusal of the Government to assent to a draft Convention negotiated between Newfoundland and the United States and to the strong Resolutions of condemnation passed by the Newfoundland Legislature in consequence. Lord Knutsford's view on the latter question was that leave on the part of the Colony to negotiate carried with it no obligation on the part of Her Majesty's Government to sanction such an arrangement, and that other interests demanded that it be overruled. He stated that full Papers would soon be laid. He admitted friction, but denied that the Colonists had any just grounds for resentment.

On the 19th of March 1891 the Government introduced the Newfoundland Fisheries Bill, intended to revive the powers of the Crown contained in the old Act of George III. In putting the case for the Bill, the Secretary of State expressed the deepest sympathy with the grievances under which the Colonists suffered—and that was indeed general in all parts of the House. He did not deny that legislation of this kind was a new thing as applied to a self-governing Colony, but declared it to be the Government's view that the refusal of the Colony to submit the lobster question to arbitration save on condition of the withdrawal of the French from their coasts had created an impossible situation, that interference by the Imperial Parliament had become absolutely necessary. He suggested that the Bill might be hung up, or its operation suspended after it became an Act, should the Colony itself legislate along satisfactory lines. No speeches were made against the Bill on the First Reading; but, when a crowded House assembled for the Second Reading on the 23rd of April, a decided change took place in the situation. A strong and very influential delegation, headed by the Prime Minister of Newfoundland, Sir William Whiteway, had come over to protest against the Bill. On this occasion I presented a Petition from the Legislature of Newfoundland praying to be heard by one of the members of the delegation against the Bill at the Bar of the House of Lords.

After mentioning numerous precedents for such a course, and referring to the petitioners' view that the legislation involved in the Bill was subversive of their constitutional rights and incompatible with the principles of liberty and justice, I pointed out as the most weighty reason for granting the petition that the Colony enjoyed full legislative powers, and was in

possession of all the functions associated with responsible government.

Sir William Whiteway then argued the Colony's case at length at the Bar. His speech was an exceedingly able one. He promised legislation on the Colony's behalf, and his plea that to pass the Bill in those circumstances would be "a needless indignity to a loyal people," and would give "a feeling of insecurity to every self-governing Colony," produced a marked effect upon the House.

The extent of the impression made could be estimated by the adjourned debate on the Second Reading a few days later, when several speakers, including the Earl of Kimberley, strongly criticised the lack of consideration with which the Colonial Government and Legislature had been treated, and pointed out the dangerous repercussion which the appearance of putting unnecessary pressure upon Newfoundland might have upon our relations with all the other self-governing colonies.

I felt very strongly that the Bill could not be regarded as purely Imperial in its implications; that it would, if passed into law, very seriously affect the whole internal development of the Colony, and, therefore, constituted a dangerous interference; and that it should be hung up at the stage it had then reached in order to give the Colony a chance to legislate. I concluded my speech by saying:

I regretted that the Colonial Legislature did not legislate to carry out the *modus vivendi*; but from what had been said by the Prime Minister of Newfoundland at the Bar of the House, and from what he had undertaken to do, there could be but little doubt that the colony would legislate, and I believed that would be done. I sincerely hoped that would be so, and I also hoped that Her Majesty's Govern-

ment would not press this Bill through all its stages in this House, but that they would consent to hang it up in order to give the colony an opportunity of fulfilling its obligations itself.

My feeling that everything possible should be done to avoid irritation and to consult the feelings of the colonists in the matter led me to support a resolution moved by the Earl of Kimberley in Committee proposing that the Bill should not be proceeded with until the Colony had had time to pass the necessary legislation. But the Government remained adamant in its determination to pass the Bill through all its stages in the House of Lords, justifying their action by the theoretic argument that the measure was purely Imperial, and the more cogent practical ones that the imminence of the fishing season demanded immediate legislation, and that, in view of past experience, they would like to see the proposed colonial legislation actually in being before they called a halt.

The Bill passed its Third Reading on the 11th of May. It was, however, hung up in the House of Commons before its Second Reading, as the result of an announcement that an arrangement had been come to with the Colony, at the eleventh hour, for the passage of an Act authorising the enforcement of the *modus vivendi* until the end of 1893. A permanent Colonial Act, not a temporary one, was what our Government wanted; but this arrangement served as sufficient justification to abandon a policy having even the appearance of coercing a self-governing colony.

It is impossible here to go into the later history of the Newfoundland Fisheries dispute. Suffice it to say that the Newfoundland Legislature continued, under protest, to pass temporary Acts for a number of years. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to find a permanent solution, but it was not until

1904 that a final settlement of the whole difficult question was effected by the Lansdowne-Cambon Convention.

SOCIAL REFORMS

Various questions, social and economic, have from time to time appealed to me. Ages ago I did my best to obtain some relaxation of the rules for closing museums and similar places on Sundays. It seemed to me that the strict way in which it was then customary to preserve the purely religious character of Sunday pressed heavily upon the poor, for Sunday was, in those days, when holidays were rarer and hours of labour so much longer than at the present time, far more important as a public holiday than it is now ; and yet to go to bed or to a public-house was about all the relaxation open to a poor man.

Marriage with a deceased wife's sister was comparatively easy, even in Victorian days, to any one who could afford to out-manceuvre the law, but impossible to any one who could not. It was not fair, and in June 1896 I introduced a Bill to legalise marriage with a deceased wife's sister. The matter had been in suspended animation for some years. The House of Lords had rejected (only, however, by narrow majorities) previous Bills on this subject ; but my measure proved more acceptable to Churchmen, as it did not propose any change in the Marriage Law of the Church. I pointed out that in continental countries, in our Colonies, in the United States, and in South America such marriages were legal and produced no bad consequences, either as affecting family relations or morals. The Archbishop of Canterbury acknowledged that the Bill did not compromise the Church, and did not oppress clergymen by compelling them to perform marriages against which they had conscien-

tious scruples, but, nevertheless, he felt that he could not vote for a Bill which created a difference between the religious law and the civil law. The late King (then Prince of Wales) strongly supported the movement, and voted in favour of the amendment of the then existing law—the only occasion, I believe, on which he exercised his privilege as a peer. My Bill passed its Second Reading by 142 votes to 113, and its Third Reading by 142 votes to 104. I received the following most kind letter from the late King after the passage of the Bill through the House of Lords :

MARLBOROUGH CLUB,
 PAUL MALL, S.W.,
July 10th, 1896.

MY DEAR ADARE—So many thanks for your kind letter. I am so glad you obtained so good a majority this evening. For so many years I hoped the Bill would pass that I am delighted at the result, and if in my small way I contributed towards it I am thoroughly content.

You worked very hard for some time, and so did St. Albans, and must naturally be much pleased. If only we could get it through H. of Commons this Session, it would be a great triumph; but I much fear it will not be possible. But we must hope for the best. —I am, Yours very sincerely,

ALBERT EDWARD.

The measure was sent to the Commons, but was not taken into consideration, and it was not until 1907 that marriage with a deceased wife's sister received legal sanction.

TOBACCO-GROWING

Another question in which I have taken a keen interest is the encouragement of tobacco-growing in Ireland.

Tobacco was, it is said, and I think truly, introduced from Virginia by Sir Walter Raleigh, who grew it at his place at Youghal. What is commonly called "Old Irish tobacco" still exists, and is probably the lineal descendant of the seed Sir Walter Raleigh brought over. I am bound to say that, according to my taste, it is a coarse variety of the plant; but it may have degenerated. Richard Boyle, the first Earl of Cork,¹ must have been a very remarkable man. Starting as a needy adventurer into Ireland, he died possessed of the greater part of South Munster. It was his custom to send gifts of tobacco and usquebaugh to his patrons in England, and on one occasion he accompanied the gift to the wife of his patron with the advice that if she would tell her lord "to drink in the morning fasting a little of the usquebaugh as it is prepared and qualified," it would "help to digest all raw humours, expel wind and keep his inward parts warm all day after, without any offence to his stomach."

Whisky taken fasting in the morning is strong medicine; but men were strong in those days. Sir Dudley Carleton, writing in 1623, begged his lordship "to bestow a little tobacco upon me if you have any pure, otherwise not." So open a request for purity forbids the supposition that the noble lord dealt in faked tobacco. It probably refers to some special mixture. Tobacco was certainly grown in Ireland to a considerable extent, but was eventually entirely prohibited in favour of the "plantations," as they were then called, in North America.

The question of permitting the cultivation of

¹ *The Life of Richard Boyle, first Earl of Cork*, is a book that should be studied by any one interested in Irish history in Elizabethan days.

tobacco was energetically taken up by Mr. Willie Redmond in the House of Commons, and I also advocated the cause in the House of Lords. Eventually the Department of Agriculture proposed a scheme granting to tobacco-growers and rehandlers a certain subsidy per acre, with the idea of making an experiment on a large scale. It was taken up by Sir Nugent Everard and myself. I imported a "Proctor" machine from America, built the necessary barns, grew up to about 30 acres myself, and got farmers in the county to grow up to about 50 acres. My experiment, however, came to an untimely end during the War, all my machines and barns being accidentally burnt on New Year's Day, 1916. It was, of course, impossible then to replace machinery or to continue experiments.

As a matter of fact, the experiment was far too complicated, and was hedged round with an enormous amount of unnecessary work in the way of keeping accounts, writing reports, etc. All that was really wanted was a small but sufficient allowance on the Excise Duty to enable tobacco to be grown and cured with a reasonable chance of success. That good and marketable tobacco can be grown in Ireland, and also in England, has been abundantly proved. The soil and climate seem to suit the plant. In very wet seasons it is true that the gum gets washed out of it, but on an average the tobacco is in colour, texture, and flavour a good marketable commodity. The industry should be encouraged, for it is valuable in that it gives large employment to children, boys and girls. Since my plant and machinery were destroyed by fire I have contented myself with growing Turkish tobacco sufficient to supply the cigarette factory which I started at Adare in 1911.

FISHERIES

The fishing industry and its neglect by the State is a subject on which I hold strong views.

Though opposed to State management and State interference in trade and commercial matters, I have always felt that in a case affecting the food of the people State assistance and State control over certain matters, such as transportation and preservation, was legitimate ; and it has always seemed to me that governments were lacking in their duty in not taking steps to develop our fishing industries, the potentialities of which are so great. The War, by depriving us of the German and Russian markets and by taking up for service a large proportion of our fishing fleet, completely disorganised the whole industry ; and, at a time when starvation was staring us in the face, I endeavoured to call attention to the importance of fish supply by a lecture on the subject before the Royal Statistical Society, and in a speech in the House of Lords in 1917.

No reason, I said, except neglect, existed why fish, as an article of diet, should not be of the same value to modern and civilised men as it was to ancient and uncivilised man. The industry had never been organised on a modern industrial basis ; no other item of our food supply had been so little affected by scientific methods ; and yet in no other section of our food supply would the adoption of scientific principles of preservation and organised rapid transport effect so marked a revolution. Moreover, the fisheries formed an attractive field for enterprise and the employment of capital. There was no vested interest in the sea. No ploughing and planting were necessary. The harvest was there in inexhaustible quantities, and all that was needed

was to reap it and carry it to the consumer. I believed that with up-to-date organisation, and some assistance from the State, the people could be supplied with a most valuable article of food at an extremely cheap price, and without any loss to the State.

I urged that State assistance was necessary for scientific fertilisation and fish culture; for the re-organisation of the fishing fleet, by the return of fishing vessels taken over by the Admiralty, and the fitting out of other suitable vessels; and for the construction and maintenance of cold storage in all the principal landing ports and the control of railway rates.

I especially urged propagation of salmon. In my early days salmon was, in all districts to which it found access, a very cheap fish, fetching about 3d. or 4d. a pound. If we are ever again to see salmon on our slabs at any such price, we must follow the example of Canada and the United States and resort to scientific fish culture.¹

I argued that, in so far as our home fisheries are concerned, efficient organisation for landing, transport, and distribution would bring about the following results. It could greatly increase the yield. It could halve the price to the consumer, it could double the return to the producer, and yet leave a handsome profit to the distributor. Fish ought to become a staple food for the working-class population.

In moving a Resolution in the House of Lords to the effect that the Government should assume control of the provision and sale of fish in the same

¹ In Canada the fifty or sixty Government hatcheries release yearly 100 million salmon and trout, nearly 500 million white fish, and 900 million lobsters. To show how utterly negligent we have been, it is sufficient to say that for every pound we in this densely populated and sea-girt country have spent, Canada has spent £5, and the United States have spent £26; and it has paid them well.

manner as it had already done during the War in the case of other commodities, I urged it as essentially a War measure; but I did not confine my argument to the necessity of dealing with the matter for the period of the War only. I dealt with the subject generally, as I had done before the Statistical Society, and strongly urged the creation of a Department of Fisheries under a responsible Minister.

Nothing, however, has been done by the State to put this most important industry on a sound commercial basis, and it is now in a sorry plight. Fleets of vessels are laid up, and capital is lying idle. Fish food is dear, and cheap fish would reduce the price of other foodstuffs. The future of a great and most valuable industry is gloomy indeed. I shall not be surprised if the Irish Free State gives a lead to Great Britain in developing and gathering the harvest of the sea.

THE DECLARATION OF LONDON

Events have often justified the action of the House of Lords, and on no occasion more notably than when in 1911 it saved us from the consequences of the Declaration of London.

That Declaration was the outcome of the Second Peace Conference held at The Hague in 1907, and a very evil outcome it would have proved for us had it been accepted. Tommy Bowles¹ (Thomas Gibson Bowles, M.P.) fought against it gallantly in Parliament, on the public platform, and in the Press, and to his untiring efforts the agitation against it owed a great deal. I spoke against it in the House of

¹ Since writing the above I have heard with very great regret of his untimely death. He was a very good friend of mine—a formidable but genial controversialist, a man of letters, an incisive speaker and writer, and last, but not least, a first-rate sailor-man.

Lords, arguing that the general tendency of all its provisions was to the advantage of Powers that were weak at sea, and to the disadvantage of Powers that were strong at sea ; that if we were unfortunately driven into a war, our best means of bringing that war to a speedy and successful issue would be by the use of such economic pressure upon our enemy by harassing and destroying his commerce and trade at sea as would compel him to stop hostilities : that while hostilities were going on we should have to depend for our daily bread upon an imported supply of food ; and that to take away the powers we had hitherto exercised, or to diminish them, was to incur a responsibility which ought not to have been taken by His Majesty's Government without at any rate ascertaining the views of the great Dominions upon the subject, and certainly not without acquainting Parliament, and through Parliament the country, with the details and the possibilities and the probabilities of the arrangements that His Majesty's Government desired to enter into.

The debate lasted three days, and among the speakers who severely criticised the Declaration was Lord Halsbury, who said that, whereas under former rules a merchant ship could only be fitted out as a warship in port, vessels could now become warships during their voyage, and that, so far from the Declaration leading to peace, under it Great Britain might lose a great deal, while gaining nothing. He added that the whole tone of the Declaration was hostile to any great naval Power. The Government spokesmen, of course, supported the Declaration ; but the Motion was withdrawn. The debate had served its purpose. Ratification of the Declaration was postponed, and, as the Great War has proved, the House of Lords saved the country from disaster and vindi-

cated its position as a useful and integral part of the machinery of the State.

REFORM OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS

The House of Lords is a great institution. In no other assembly are so many members to be found whose views on law, science, economics, naval and military matters, diplomacy, administration, the ruling of alien races, the theory and practice of representative government, command, and ought to command, the respect due to intimate knowledge and vast experience. And even extreme Radicals would admit it to be an ideal Upper House were it not that the hereditary system is deemed to be incompatible with democratic ideals. Yet heredity is useful. It takes two or three generations to make a perfect cotton-spinner, or agriculturist, or metal-worker, or fisherman; and the value of transmitted knowledge is not confined to trade and industry. It is equally applicable to legislation and administration; and in natural aptitude and acquired knowledge in all phases of life, national and Imperial, no legislative body in the world can compare with the House of Lords.

But an hereditary right to legislate is an anachronism, and Reform of the Upper House (admittedly grown unwieldy owing to the inordinate Radical appetite for Peerages) has long been "in the air," and is there still. As far back as 1888 I brought in a Bill dealing with the subject. At that time the cry against the House of Lords was based on "Black Sheep." The accusation was a nonsensical one; but the fact that on critical occasions Peers who, as a rule, took no interest in politics or in national affairs, came up from the four corners of the earth

to vote, did constitute a grievance which required a remedy. I desired to retain the hereditary principle—the right of succession to a Peerage, and I did not, of course, propose to interfere with the King's prerogative to create Peers; but I aimed at finding a remedy by gradually reducing the number of Peers entitled to sit and vote to 180. I proposed to accomplish this by the creation of an inner circle, to which Peers either on creation or succession would be eligible by election—the whole body of Peers being the electorate. The Upper House would in time have consisted of 180 of the best men in it without depriving any living man of his rights. My Bill was read a second time, and then politely, but firmly, squashed by Lord Salisbury. It is a pity, I think, that the Bill did not pass, or that some reform based on similar lines was not carried out at that time. A reduction of the hereditary element in the House of Lords might then have been effected without depriving living men of their privileges. But it is useless to cry over what might have been, and such a scheme of reform would not be of the slightest use now.

In 1907 the House of Lords appointed a Select Committee, of which I was a member, under the Chairmanship of Lord Rosebery, to inquire into the whole subject. The Committee reported in December 1908, the principal recommendation being that the Peers should elect 200 from among them to sit as Lords of Parliament—that number to be brought up to 400 by Peers who had held high office, and by the creation of Life Peerages. The Government did not even consider the Report, and the matter dropped.

In 1909–1910 the question of mending, ending, or mutilating the House of Lords was forced into an acute stage by the very transparent device adopted by the Government of compelling the Lords either to

refer the Finance Bill of 1909 to the judgment of the people or to abdicate their position as a Second Chamber. The Government aimed at reducing the Second Chamber to a condition of impotence, and, as a means to that end, deliberately forced a false position on the House of Lords by sending to them a Finance Bill which no sane man could pretend did not exceed the customary objects of such a Bill, and which was, as the author of it admitted, a Bill of "a very unusual character." A false issue was raised, and I expressed my views on reform in an article to the *Nineteenth Century*, entitled "The Constitutional Sham Fight." In that article I wrote that

"The hereditary section, whatever its numbers, should, I think, be numerically superior; but I attached, and do attach, great importance to the introduction of an element composed of commoners or peers indirectly chosen of the people. Friction is not likely to occur between the two sections. On the contrary, I am convinced that in their harmonious working the hereditary principle would gain in popularity and strength. What has been called 'a fresh current of air' could not fail to have an energising effect upon the House. It would be an immense advantage to peers to be able to offer themselves as candidates, and a door would be opened to those who failed to be chosen by their peers or who were not otherwise qualified to sit and vote.

"Ought the hereditary section to be created by election, or by selection on a qualification basis, or by both? Election by their peers has the advantage of being consistent with the process obtaining in the case of the Scotch and Irish Peerages; but it has the following disadvantages:—fair proportional representation would be difficult to obtain; the independent attitude, the cross-bench mind, which should be encouraged, might be wiped out. It would probably require amendment of the Acts of Union between

England and Scotland and between Great Britain and Ireland.

“Qualification has the merit of simplicity; but it is difficult to see how young men are to find opportunities of becoming qualified. Qualification should, I think, be sought mainly in Parliamentary and departmental experience—great pro-consular ideals are not always compatible with practical Parliamentary procedure. Tenure by election, whether by peers or outside constituencies, should be for a fixed and fairly long term, a certain proportion retiring periodically and being eligible for re-election. The object of any Second Chamber is to check violent and temporary changes and to ensure recognition of steady and permanent changes of public opinion; election for the life of a Parliament might fail in the first case, and election for the life of the individual might fail in the second. The prerogative of the Crown cannot be interfered with, and a reformed House would consist of Lords of Parliament nominated, chosen by the hereditary peers, sitting in virtue of office or qualification, and recommended by outside constituencies.”

The General Election of January 1910 was fought mainly upon the question of the relations between the two Houses, and Lord Lansdowne offered in the early part of that year to co-operate with the Government in defining the relations between them. No notice was taken of that offer, but in March Lord Rosebery submitted to the House of Lords the following Resolutions, which were duly passed:

“That the House do resolve itself into a Committee to consider the best means of reforming its existing organisation, so as to constitute a strong and efficient second chamber, and, in the event of such motion being agreed to, to move the following resolutions: (1) That a strong and efficient second chamber is not merely an integral portion of the British Constitution, but is necessary to the well-being of the

State and to the balance of Parliament. (2) That such a chamber can best be obtained by the reform and reconstitution of the House of Lords. (3) That a necessary preliminary of such reform and reconstitution is the acceptance of the principle that the possession of a peerage should no longer of itself give the right to sit and vote in the House of Lords."

A month later Lord Rosebery gave notice that he would move the following further Resolutions :

"(1) That in future the House of Lords shall consist of Lords of Parliament : (a) chosen by the whole body of hereditary peers from among themselves and by nomination by the Crown ; (b) sitting by virtue of offices and of qualifications held by them ; (c) chosen from outside.

"(2) That the term of tenure of all Lords of Parliament shall be the same, except in the case of those who sit *ex officio*, who would sit so long as they hold the office for which they sit."

In April Mr. Asquith moved the Veto Resolution ; but before any steps had been taken the death of the King, on May 6, supervened. By common consent the question was left in abeyance for a few weeks ; but in June an attempt was made to find some compromise through a private Conference consisting of Mr. Asquith, Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Birrell, and Lord Crewe for the Government, and of the following members of the Opposition—Mr. Balfour, Lord Lansdowne, Lord Cawdor, and Mr. Austen Chamberlain. The Conference held twenty-one sittings ; but it ended in November without arriving at an agreement. In that month the Parliament Bill came before the Lords, and Lord Rosebery thereupon moved the additional Resolutions which had been standing in his name since April, but which he had not been allowed an opportunity of

moving. A few days later Lord Lansdowne moved that the House resolve itself into Committee to consider a series of resolutions expressing the opinion that it was desirable that provision should be made for settling differences between the two Houses, re-constituted and reduced in numbers in accordance with the resolutions of the House of Lords. Lord Rosebery moved that these resolutions and those moved at his own instance be communicated to the Commons: this Motion was agreed to. Prorogation, however, followed a few days later, and the Parliament was dissolved.

The Parliament Act was passed in 1911. Concurrently with the revision of the powers of the House of Lords, the Government determined that a remodelling of the constitution of the Upper House was a matter which (in the words of Mr. Asquith) "brook no delay." Nothing, however, was done, and with the advent of the War the question was necessarily "hung up."

In August 1917 the Government of the day, emboldened by the success of the Speaker's Conference on Electoral Reform, appointed a Conference, under the Chairmanship of Lord Bryce, to consider the Reform of the Second Chamber. That Conference consisted of 32 members (of which I had the honour of being one), fairly representative of parties as they then existed. I was strongly in favour of indirect election—that is, election by groups of constituencies, plus a proportion of *ex officio* members—men having held high office in the State or having occupied great administrative posts. We reported in April 1918, Lord Bryce making the general report to the Government on our behalf, and accompanying it with recommendations adopted by the large majority of the Conference. From these recommendations Lord Lore-

burn, Lord Sydenham, and Mr. Scanlan dissented. I have printed the main points of these recommendations as an appendix to this book.¹

I thought the recommendations too elaborate and complicated, and I doubt whether legislation (if legislation ever takes place) will be on these lines. Though declared by the Prime Minister to be a matter that brooked of no delay twelve years ago, Reform of the House of Lords is likely to remain in an urgent pigeon-hole for some time to come; and I think the Peers can be content to wait.

The position of the House of Lords is not so ignominious as it may seem to be. Power of revision is not a very glorious attribute of an Upper House, but it is a useful one; and the suspensory powers of the House are pretty nearly equivalent to the right of actual rejection. A powerful Senate is essential to a well-balanced constitution, and is especially necessary in the case of a people in perpetual close contact with foreign political complications. I wish we had it; and we may get it some day, but not just yet. A Senate all-powerful in the most conservative system in the world is tolerated by the most undemocratic of all democracies—the people of the United States; but, at present at any rate, a Senate enjoying such power would not be accepted here. Therein lies the difficulty. Reform is urgent; but Radicals do not desire a stronger Second Chamber.

That the Speaker of the House of Commons, of necessity a partisan, should be the authority to decide whether a Bill is in reality a Money Bill is ludicrously unfair; but if that duty were transferred to some impartial authority, I do not think the House of Lords has much cause for dissatisfaction with its position.

¹ See Appendix VIII.

FAIR TRADE

The depression in trade existing in the early eighties seemed to me, in spite of efforts made to deny it, to be most serious. Bad harvests and over-production were assigned as the causes: but they were comparatively unimportant. Over-production affected us not because supply throughout the whole world was greater than demand, but because we were no longer allowed to supply our fair share of that demand. Foreign markets were closed against us, and our own markets were unfairly interfered with. Foreign bounties and foreign tariffs cut into our industries.

In 1884 I moved in the House of Lords a resolution for the appointment of a Select Committee to join with a Committee of the Commons to inquire into the condition of the trade and commerce of the country.

Lord Granville stated, on behalf of the Government, that the demand for Fair Trade was as fallacious as anything could be. Lord Salisbury in winding up the debate deeply regretted the Government's refusal to accept the Resolution; but added that the structure of the motion made it inconvenient for the House to resolve upon inquiry when the Government were quite determined to refuse it. Under these circumstances I withdrew my motion; but in the following year a Royal Commission, of which I was a member, was appointed to inquire into the subject.

The Final Report of the Commission was presented in December 1886; but I and Mr. Farrer Ecroyd, Mr. P. A. Muntz, Mr. (subsequently Sir) Nevile Lubbock found ourselves unable to sign it. We felt that the extent and severity of the depression of trade and industry, and the consequent insufficiency of employment, were not adequately

recognised and set forth in the Report. We did not think it contained a sufficient exposition of the gravity and permanent character of the causes which operated to prevent the growth of our chief industries keeping pace with that of the population, or any indication or recommendation of remedial measures to deal with adverse agencies, which were of the first importance, not only in their immediate effect, but in their permanent and growing nature. We presented a Minority Report; but to one paragraph I felt bound to make certain reservations, as I thought it went too far in the direction of dictating to self-governing communities. I concluded by saying :

“ While unable to approve entirely of paragraph 138 (of the Minority Report), I consider that a trading union with the Colonies securing preferential treatment for British and Colonial manufactures and food products, without interfering with perfect freedom as to the internal fiscal arrangements of the Colonies or the United Kingdom is, for the reasons mentioned in the Report, most desirable. But we should, I think, be going beyond our powers in making any distinct recommendation on a matter affecting the policy of self-governing Colonies.”

On the 31st of May 1881 a private conference of merchants, shippers, bankers, etc., interested in home and colonial trade, took place and resulted in the formation of the Fair Trade League, of which I was chairman. For some reason, which I forget, I resigned that position, and I think the League was eventually dissolved and was succeeded by the Fair Trade Club, under the Presidency of Mr. Cunliffe Lister (subsequently Lord Masham).

In 1885 the late Mr. Louis Jennings, Conservative M.P. for Stockport, and I, being in general agreement on the subject of our fiscal policy, became actively

associated in efforts to prove the advantages of a "Fair Trade" as compared with a "Free Trade" policy for Great Britain and her Oversea Dependencies. Jennings and I jointly edited a weekly paper called *Fair Trade*, devoted to industry and commerce. Our opening Manifesto in October 1885 embodied the following four points of policy :

1. Commercial Treaties with Foreign Nations affecting fiscal arrangements to be terminable at a year's notice—and not to hinder us from dealing with our Colonies and Dependencies as our interests dictate.

2. Imports of Raw Materials for Home Industries to be admitted free from every quarter.

3. Import Duties to be levied upon the Manufactures of Foreign States.

4. A moderate duty to be levied upon articles of Food from Foreign Countries, the same being admitted free from all parts of our own Empire.

The last issue of *Fair Trade* was made in December 1891.

My theory throughout was (1) that stability of trade was impossible if fair prices were undercut by dumping foreign goods at less than cost price in our home market ; (2) that protecting an industry against that unfair competition was quite a different thing from protecting it against fair competition ; (3) that free imports and taxed exports were not free trade ; (4) that we had to rely upon inter-Imperial trade and neutral markets : and on that theme I made many speeches.

Feeling in political circles ran so high at the time that the meetings which I addressed were not invariably "plane sailing." Speaking at Cardiff on October 24, 1885, however, I carried the majority of a very large audience with me by the declaration

that "it is the Colonies that we have to look to in the future for markets for our goods." And I went on to say that "day by day our trade in foreign countries and in the United States decreases in proportion to the population, but, on the contrary, our trade with the Colonies gets larger and larger."

Perhaps the most tumultuous political gathering I ever addressed was a meeting at Macclesfield Town Hall in September 1885, on behalf of Mr. Jennings' candidature for Stockport. Long before the proceedings were timed to commence an organised clique of obstructionists took possession of the back of the hall, calling for "cheers for Gladstone" and employing almost every description of unpleasant cat-call and offensive epithet. In the picturesque aphorism of a local reporter, "hats were thrown about the room in great profusion, fists were brought pretty frequently in contact with softer substances, and a vermilion-coloured liquid trickled quietly from the proboscis of more than one staunch politician at an early stage of the meeting."

Some time after his triumphant return to the House of Commons, Mr. Jennings and myself were the guests of Mr. and Mrs. A. H. Sykes at Edgeley Mount, Stockport, for a big meeting which we both addressed in the Armoury of that town on October 17, 1887. While finding it necessary to devote some time to a criticism of the Irish problem as it then existed, I spoke at considerable length on the subject of Fair Trade *versus* Free Trade for our Oversea Dominions. I reminded my very large audience that—

"Not one single Colony of ours is a free-trader. Every one of them protects its workmen and its manufactures more or less, and you must remember that, owing to the absolutely inflexible rule which we

have laid down to guide us in our commercial system, it is impossible for us to make any bargains whatsoever for our Colonies, or with our Colonists, or, for that matter, with foreign countries; and what you will find will happen is this—it will become better worth the while of your Colonies to trade with foreign countries. . . . They can make a distinct bargain. That is what we cannot do, and the time will infallibly come when it will be better worth the while of our Colonies to make arrangements with foreign countries than to remain in the same circumstances as they are now. . . . If you want to keep your Empire, if you want to keep your great trade with your Colonies—a trade which to a great extent supports the manufacturing interests of this country now—you must never allow it to be advantageous to your Colonies to put duties against your goods, to shut us out, and to trade with foreign nations.”

At the same time I emphasised the difference between Protection as protecting an industry against fair competition and protecting it against dumping and unfair competition; and I made it quite clear to my audience that I had never been an advocate of Protection in the former sense.

Jennings and I did not carry big enough guns to batter down “Free Trade.” Both parties in the House of Lords denounced me as guilty of damnable heresy. We were too early in the field, and failed; but we did great spade-work. When Mr. Chamberlain took it up, public opinion was riper. But he would have done better to stick to our title “Fair Trade” instead of adopting the title of “Tariff Reform.”

Fair Trade and colonial expansion were to me almost synonymous terms, and I made many contributions to the Press upon the far-reaching advantages to be derived from a more intimate trade relationship with our Colonies.

IMPERIAL TRADE AND DEFENCE

In February 1891 I moved in the House of Lords a resolution on the desirability of the Colonial Governments being invited to send representatives to a Conference to be held in London to consider the advancement of trade within Her Majesty's Dominions, and the formation of a fund for certain purposes of Imperial defence. I referred to the good done by the Conference four years previously (which created a precedent) "from the contact and free interchange of views that took place." But I argued that though much progress had been made along many different lines, on two subjects, namely, organisation for defence and inter-Imperial trade, very little had been done.

My theory was that, as the retention of our coal-boxes scattered about the globe and the security of the great ocean trade routes were, in a special sense, of common vital importance to all units of the Empire, it was not fair that the whole responsibility, financial and otherwise, should rest upon the Mother Country.

I should like, I said, to see a fund raised by the Mother Country and the self-governing Colonies, to be devoted to the armament and maintenance, in a proper state of defence, of certain coaling-stations and strategic points, and the complete equipment and maintenance of a fleet of swift ocean-cruisers. I desired to see the vital question of the security of great trade routes lifted out of the influence of party politics. I believed that good results would follow, and that, if such a fund was formed and maintained, it would introduce a very wholesome principle—that of mutual obligation, mutual responsibility, and mutual help; and that it would add greatly to the stability and security of our commerce and trade in times of difficulty or of war. I proposed that the necessary money

should be raised by a small duty on imported foreign goods. By this means the Mother Country or Dominion or Colony that dealt largely with foreign countries would be the most heavily taxed, while the units of the Empire that traded most within the Empire would be lightly taxed.

I also dealt with the question of encouraging inter-Imperial trade and of developing the material resources of the Empire; and pointed out that while the ties that bind the Empire together are strong, yet, practically speaking, they are ties of sentiment, community of origin, of race, blood, and religion, common institutions and common traditions; but that one tie, perhaps the strongest of all—community of material advantage in trade and commerce—was lacking. I agreed that all the nations of the Empire must, and will, infallibly develop in their natural direction according to the genius of the people, and as influenced by natural laws and by their environment and the circumstances which surround them; but I argued that statesmanship could do a great deal by seizing opportunities of strengthening existing ties, by supplying those ties which are now wanting, and by doing all that is possible to counteract the evil consequences to our home and inter-Imperial trade of the artificial attractions offered under the commercial and fiscal systems that were universal in foreign countries. Democracies are, I argued, not slow to grasp large Imperial ideas, and are keen enough to see the benefits which would accrue from them. The ideal of a great Empire, occupying the four corners of the earth, advancing steadily in the paths of peace and progress under one flag, exercising complete freedom to develop in every possible direction, according to their own individualities, and, at the same time, knitted together by the

great ties of sentiment as well as of material advantage, was one which would commend itself, not only to the people of the United Kingdom, but of all parts of the Empire.

Lord Salisbury, in reply, said that discrimination meant levying a heavy duty on grain, wool, and meat, which the people would not tolerate, and that, for the present, the summoning of a Conference was not expedient. After protesting against the idea that a differential tariff would have the effect of raising the price of food-stuffs in this country, I withdrew my Motion.

In 1892 I moved in the House of Lords that a copy of the Motion agreed to in the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada, referring to preferential trade with the United Kingdom, should be laid before the House. It was the first time that the question of reciprocity had been put forward in what might be deemed a practicable shape. I argued the case at length, partly because I felt that the true interests of the industrial population lay in encouraging trade between the Mother Country and the Colonies, partly because I held that the policy of doing nothing, the policy of isolation, must, and would, result in the Colonies drifting further and further from our flag in their desiring, and succeeding in giving, preferential treatment to foreign labour and foreign goods as against British labour and British goods. I advocated "community of trading interests," and strongly appealed to the Government to take measures for ascertaining the views of the Colonies and the effect upon our own manufacturing industries and upon our trade with foreign countries if a proposition of the kind contained in the resolution passed by the Canadian Parliament were in principle extended to the whole Empire. My Motion was agreed to; but

Lord Balfour of Burleigh, speaking for the Board of Trade, made it clear that his assent did not imply acceptance of the policy, and was accorded solely because it was desirable that the Imperial Parliament should know the specific terms of any resolution of the Parliament of the Dominion of Canada on so interesting a subject.

We are a very slow-moving people, and up to now practically nothing has been done.

I have for nearly forty years consistently advocated "Fair Trade"; and I quote from a letter accepting the Presidentship of the Tariff Reform League of the Cardiff district in 1903 as fairly representing my views :

"The subject which is now brought so prominently before the country is one in which I have always taken the deepest interest. Since 1884 I have advocated fiscal reform in my place in the House of Lords, at Birmingham, Glasgow, Penarth, Swansea, Runcorn, Stockport, and in many other industrial centres. I pointed out that, though in neutral markets we were holding our own, foreign markets were gradually closing against us, owing to protective tariffs, to the great detriment of our manufacturing interests; and I suggested at Birmingham as far back as 1884 that a remedy can only be found in forcing open foreign markets, or in finding fresh fields for industry, or in developing those markets which are still open to us. I maintained that untaxed imports and heavily taxed exports did not constitute free trade, whatever else it might be called; and that protecting ourselves against artificial competition, and discriminating in favour of good as compared with bad customers, was not 'protection' in the ordinary accepted sense of the term. I argued that a system which may have worked well while we enjoyed a practical monopoly of manufacturing was not necessarily beneficial under totally different circumstances,

at a time when we had lost that monopoly, and when foreign nations were barricading their home markets against us, were pressing us hard in neutral markets, and were invading our home markets with their surplus stock at below cost price. I endeavoured to impress upon the manufacturing population the importance of the Colonies as markets, and stated that, in my opinion, the remedy for an unhealthy condition of trade was to be sought chiefly by developing existing markets, by increasing the purchasing power of our Colonies and of our great Indian Dependency. My theory was, and is, that though we might enjoy spurts of activity when demand temporarily exceeded supply in highly protected countries, such spurts were not really beneficial, and that a steady and increasing trade could only be obtained by turning capital and emigration towards the Colonies and encouraging them to exchange their produce for our manufactured goods. I suggested that a duty should be imposed upon foreign manufactured articles, sufficient to counterbalance the unfair advantage which the manufacturers of these goods have at present over our own manufacturers, and I recommended a differential duty in favour of the products of the British Empire and against the rest of the world.

“In discussing the question of a small duty upon wheat, I maintained (what I still believe to be true) that the cheapest article determines the market price, and that competition with free Colonial wheat would force foreign taxed wheat to pay any small duty placed upon it; and I urged that the ultimate result would be to increase the wheat-growing area, and, consequently, to cheapen bread. Putting that on one side, and even adopting the arguments of opponents, I stated that even if the consumer at home paid all the duty, it would not amount to more than a few shillings a year to an average family of six persons, and they would save a great deal more than that by the diminished cost of tea, coffee, etc.

I did not then, nor would I now, confine myself to the purely practical, materialistic aspect of the case. No country, I said, ever had such a chance as England, possessing, as she does, an Empire which can produce everything that man requires in the world. If we, the present generation, neglect our opportunities and fail to appreciate and make good use of the marvellous resources of our Empire, we shall prove ourselves but unworthy children of those who won and founded it, and we shall richly deserve the reproaches of those who come after us, and who assuredly will suffer bitterly for our fault."

In 1903 the question of Tariff Reform became red-hot. Mr. Ritchie, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, threatened to resign if the shilling duty on imported corn was not repealed: and the Unionist Government repealed it. That repeal was a mistake, for the duty was bringing in a substantial revenue. A proposal to remit this duty on Colonial corn would have been popular, and would have put Colonial preference in the position of being a remission, and not an imposition, of taxation upon a staple food-stuff.

In September matters came to a crisis in the Cabinet, and Mr. Chamberlain resigned. In his letter of resignation addressed to the Prime Minister (Mr. Balfour) he stated that "a somewhat unscrupulous use has been made of the old cry of the dear loaf," that "serious prejudices have been created," that "for the present, at any rate, a preferential agreement with our Colonies involving any new duty, however small, on articles of food hitherto untaxed, is, even if accompanied by a reduction of taxation on other articles of food of equally universal consumption, unacceptable to the majority in the constituencies," and that he felt he could "best promote

the cause from outside," where "in a perfectly independent position my arguments may be received with less prejudice than would attach to those of a party leader." Mr. Balfour accepted his resignation, great though he recognised the loss to the Government; but, as he added in the letter which he addressed to Mr. Chamberlain, "the gain to the cause you have at heart may be greater still; if so, what can I do but acquiesce?"

The Duke of Devonshire (after some hesitation), Mr. Ritchie, Lord George Hamilton, and Lord Balfour of Burleigh also resigned, because Mr. Balfour, whilst acquiescing in Mr. Chamberlain's withdrawal from the Government, would not, as Prime Minister and Leader of the Party, repudiate Mr. Chamberlain and his policy. The Government was reconstituted; but during the following two years it encountered great difficulties, mainly owing to differences of opinion upon the fiscal question among Unionists themselves.

In the autumn of 1903 the Tariff Reform League of the Cardiff district¹ were good enough to invite me to become its President. I have already referred to the first part of the letter which I wrote accepting the office (see pp. 138-140). The remainder of the letter contained the following:

"It was said, and perhaps not without reason, that proposals should first emanate from the Colonies. Well, the Colonies have expressed their views, and it is now for the Mother Country to express hers. I most sincerely rejoice that the man who has done more than any one else to consolidate the Empire has come forward as the champion of a cause which will, I am sure, commend itself to an overwhelming majority of my fellow-countrymen when they under-

¹ The Association was subsequently reconstituted under the title of the "South Wales Tariff Reform Federation" (for the development and defence of the industrial interests of the British Empire), and I remained its President.

stand it. I have always held, and hold now, to the view that we cannot fight ironclad tariffs with bare fists, and that it is useless to attempt bargaining with empty hands; that discrimination in favour of Colonial produce and discrimination in favour of home manufactures is desirable for the subsistence of our wage-earners; that purely sentimental ties may fail to hold the Empire permanently together if the force of diverging material interests tends too powerfully to pull them asunder; that the British Empire is the most potentially active instrument making for freedom and civilisation that the world has ever yet seen; and that it is the duty, as it is the privilege, of this generation to do all it can to cement the Empire into a firm and imperishable whole."

That autumn I stayed with Mr. Chamberlain at Highbury (Birmingham), and there we discussed the project which I contemplated of forming a Tariff Reform Association in Ireland. He entirely approved of it, but on the whole thought it expedient that he should "keep entirely outside the movement," partly on the ground that Ireland might feel that she had a free hand to work out a scheme for herself, partly because, though "fully alive to the importance of Ireland," he was "perfectly conscious that any allusion to the fact that Ireland would to a certain extent benefit from anything in the nature of a tax on food would be taken hold of as the offer of a bribe to the Home Rulers and Nationalists." He was especially desirous that the proposed Committee should be independent of politics, and fully representative of the industrial and agricultural interests of Ireland.

In June 1904 I contributed lengthy statements of my views upon the question of Ireland and Tariff Reform to the *Independent and Nation*, pointing out that the question was one which touched profoundly

the prosperity of Ireland, and urging Irishmen not to let slip an opportunity of securing the advantages which Tariff Reform would confer upon Ireland lest it might be long before another opportunity occurred. I also pointed out that its advocacy could not by any possibility prejudice the political aspirations of even the most ardent of Nationalists, and that the question was one which ought to be discussed and judged purely on its merits, and by minds unbiassed by political motives, and not only in reference to Ireland in particular, but also to the Empire in general, of which she formed a part.

Mr. Chamberlain's views upon the prospects of Tariff Reform and of the Unionist Party at the next General Election were, as he wrote to me, that the General Election would come next year (1905) after a Redistribution Bill had been either passed or defeated, an appeal to the country being equally necessary in either case.

Meanwhile he did not think any sensational campaign necessary or desirable; but desired that the constituencies should be quietly instructed and the sheep separated from the goats. Success required a united party. The minority must give way to the majority and leave the organisation in the latter's hands. When this was done, victory was certain at the next swing of the pendulum.

He regarded the next General Election as lost to the Unionist Party, although not by a large majority; and thought that we must really work with an eye to the election after that.

In January 1906 came the General Election, in which the differences of the Party on the fiscal question were a very serious source of weakness. The extreme views expressed by some Tariff Reformers, and on the other side by some Free Fooders, together

with dislike of any departure from economic tradition, and the lack of co-operation among the leaders of the Party, all contributed to the defeat of the Government; and though Tariff Reform was prominent in the election, it had not a fair chance. Moreover, the election cry of "Chinese slavery" raised in connection with the temporary employment of Chinese labour in South Africa swept the country, and practically turned the election. For this and other reasons into which I need not enter the Unionist Government suffered a disastrous defeat.

After the election much discussion took place as to the future attitude of the Unionist Party towards Tariff Reform. The Leadership of the Party was suggested to Mr. Chamberlain, but he refused to place himself in competition with Mr. Balfour: at the same time he asked for a meeting of the Party for the purpose of having the position defined.

The result was that on February 14 Mr. Balfour and Mr. Chamberlain exchanged letters which, as they were written on St. Valentine's Day, became known as the "Valentine" letters. Mr. Balfour held that fiscal reform was, and must remain, the first constructive work of the Unionist Party: that without going into particulars, which was not even advisable, he thought the establishment of a moderate general tariff on manufactured goods, not for the purpose of protection but against illegitimate competition, and a small duty on foreign corn, were not in his opinion objectionable; and Mr. Chamberlain entirely agreed with this description of the objects which he and Mr. Balfour had in view. This policy was accepted by a large meeting of the Party held at Lansdowne House on the following day.

The Unionist Party therefore continued the policy of Tariff Reform, and extensive propaganda was

undertaken throughout the country, in which the Tariff Reform League,¹ which had established a multitude of branches, took a very prominent and active part. All propaganda was, of course, closed down by the advent of a War which wrote "End of the Chapter" or "Finis" to many projects and schemes.

On this question of Fair Trade, and all that it connotes, I am still at this moment of writing (December 1921) unrepentant. My creed is a simple one. I hope for active co-operation among all English-speaking peoples. I believe in the Commonwealth of Nations forming the Empire and in the heart of the Empire these little islands in the North Sea, and I trust in the strong common sense of the people therein.

Agriculture is the root of all prosperity in every country, even in England. Barely five years have slipped away since we were tottering on the very verge of starvation. Food production at home was then urged and compelled. Never again, we were told, can the country be allowed to fall into so perilous a situation. Already that peril is forgotten. It must not be forgotten. It must be remembered. Agriculture must not perish.

The deliberate undercutting of prices is ruinous to steady trade. Dumping must not be permitted.

If British wage-earners receive better wages than their competitors, the balance must be made good by superiority in quality and output. It is a mistake to speak of capital *and* labour. Money, brain-power, muscle, are all capital, and there should be no quarrel between them.

The debt of the Empire is prodigious, but not

¹ Of this League Mr. Hewins was Secretary. He is a very able economist, an admirable organiser, blessed with clear and special gifts in presenting a case. He did most excellent work for the cause. From 1917 to 1919 he was Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, and presided over the Special Economic Committee of the Imperial Conference of 1918.

formidable compared with the assets of the Empire. The realisation of those assets must be expedited. Rapid development of the resources of the Empire is the only alternative to paralysing taxation.

During all my life productivity of the soil at home, fair trade for our manufacturing industries, peace with Ireland, expansion of the Empire, friendship with the United States, have been the themes worth struggling for ; and they are worth struggling for still.

IV

CONCLUSION

AND now, having looked back on far-distant years, may I turn my eyes for the moment on the immediate past? What has happened to us all since the War! Philosophers and historians, psychologists, sociologists, and all the other "ologists" will write big books about it; but in the meantime what is to become of us? Well, the personal will always thrust itself forward, and naturally I ask myself, What has happened to me? I was contented during the War. That may sound brutal; but it is a fact—we become reconciled to, and in a sense indifferent to, plague, pestilence and famine, battle, murder and sudden death. I was actively employed. I was doing useful work, interesting in itself and with the spice of danger necessary to make it also exciting. Since the War, though unconscious of any reaction from strain, I have not been so contented. I was never in doubt as to what the end of the War would be; but Peace has brought uncertainty, disquietude, and serious doubts about the future. I think that, so far as I am personally concerned, one cause of contentment during the War was the fact that I had little or no responsibility. I got orders, and carried them out to the best of my ability. I was told when to go, where to go, and what to do when I got there. Since the War I have, on my favourite element the sea, been

my own master and forced to settle for myself and for others—which is more difficult—when to go and where to go ; and it has been irksome.

The main causes of social and industrial unrest and collapse are doubtless the great reaction—the sudden unbending of the bow ; the dislike of men to return to a sedentary life ; the illusive dream of an England “fit for heroes ” ; the discovery that all the tall talk about bringing the Kaiser and other criminals to justice, and the promise that Germany would be compelled to pay the expenses of the War, had come to nothing ; the action of Trades Unions largely responsible for unemployment relieved by a system of doles enabling a man—a single man—to live comfortably if he preferred idleness to work. But I am inclined to think that general discontent is to some extent due also to sudden reversion to individual responsibility.

Since the Peace England has shaken to pieces all my preconceived ideals. What has happened to her ? What is it that has differentiated her in her conduct from other nations that have suffered as much, or more ? The Armistice was scarcely signed before Belgium set to work to repair damages and rehabilitate herself. France bears privation patiently ; and men, women, and children labour, determined to save France. In Great Britain alone is to be seen the strange phenomenon of a people apparently as determined to ruin their country now as they were insistent on preserving it, at the sacrifice of their lives, only a few years ago. We are faced with complications and staggering commitments abroad ; at home Ireland is still a source of anxiety ; strikes and lock-outs have dislocated industry ; the country is taxed beyond the productive limit, and lies under the shadow of bankruptcy ; agriculture is

depressed, and the land of England is changing hands, with no benefit to any one so far as I can see; in trade we are unable to compete with our rivals. And to all this the people seem, until quite lately, to have been indifferent. Newspapers have to sell their wares, and they know what the people want. What do they provide? What are they full of? Racing, football, boxing, polo, golf, lawn-tennis, games, international competitions—which we lose. Bread and games! Have we come to that? Is our form of patriotism different from that which makes a Frenchman feel and say “anything and everything for France”? With us, which comes first—the individual, or the country; my wages, or my native land? It is a phase, no doubt, due partly to a quick rebound from the complete subordination of self during the War; to the shattering of idealistic conceptions of “Merrie England,” by reluctance to face the fact that, if a nation is to save itself, self-sacrifice is as necessary in peace as in war. It is an evil phase which will pass, for it is inconceivable that the *morale* of a people capable of superhuman effort during the War should have permanently given way. But this is moralising, and to moralising there is no end save in writer’s cramp. Nevertheless, looking over these scribblings, some few comments on so long a retrospect may be permitted.

It has been my privilege to be present at notable pageants celebrating great historical events. Among them all the one that appealed to me most was on the occasion when the Prince of Wales, placing his hands between the King’s hands at Carnarvon, did homage for his Principality of Wales. That was to me much more than picturesque mediæval ritual. The Prince of Wales declaring allegiance to his feudal Lord, and the Prince of Wales the idol of great democracies,

symbolises that unbroken chain that, link by link, uniting the distant past with the present, is the surest guarantee for the future integrity of Empire.¹

I have led a diversified life—many interests conflicting because unregulated by any one paramount ideal. I have seen much of cities and of peoples, and more of the great open spaces of this wonderfully beautiful world. Civilised sophisticated mankind I have studied, and unsophisticated mankind—the natural man.

Society has been very kind and indulgent to me, and I have had a very good time: but my heart was never centred in society, club-land, and the life of great cities. I have had my “ups and downs,” and I have suffered great bereavements—who has not who transgresses the orthodox limit of threescore years and ten? Fortunately the mind has a firmer grasp on happy than on unhappy memories. I have felt loneliness, but relieved by friendship; and a great friendship is the most precious gift of God. My life has been full. Had I run in the steady rut of politics, would existence have been more interesting? I think not. Would it have been more useful? That is another matter. I do not know.

I was always interested in Colonial Affairs; and the Foreign Office also attracted me greatly, not only on account of the work to be done there, but also because it was to some extent more independent of party politics than other departments. If the Secretary of State had been in the Commons, and I had entered public life as Under-Secretary in the Lords,

¹ Since then I have witnessed a most pathetically tragic scene—the surrender to the King for his safe keeping of the colours of the disbanded Irish Regiments—the sacrifice of the corporate life of Regiments, with glorious records, on the altar of economy. A necessary sacrifice! Well, perhaps so; but surely great traditions might have been kept alive, and the feelings of gallant men respected without much expense, by creating a composite Regiment with the original Regiments represented by companies.

I would probably have stuck to my job. The truth of the matter is that politics in the larger sense appealed to me strongly, while party political life did not. Government by party is an established and permanent fact in our political system, and it appears to me that it worked well enough so long as it meant government by men who were socially and financially independent of political life. Doubtless some statesmen honestly believe themselves to be necessary to their party and their party to be necessary to national salvation—all great conquerors have been subject to the same delusion—but the vision of most men is limited to their own horizon. Even in the days of which I am now writing, national welfare tended to become subordinate to party exigencies. Politics were becoming more and more a trade, and not a particularly clean one. In short, I have throughout my life been blessed, or cursed, with a “Cross-bench” mind.

Imperial expansion and consolidation and a good understanding between all English-speaking peoples is a theme which has always deeply moved me, and I have done what I could to further that ideal. Fully twenty-five years have passed away since I delivered an Address in the Athenæum Hall, Glasgow, under the auspices of the Scottish Society of Literature and Art, and in the course of it I expressed a hope not only “for Colonial Unity, but for the union of all English-speaking peoples, not only between the United Kingdom and her Colonies, but also with that great English-speaking Republic in the West.” Such a union would, I believed, “further the cause of true liberty, progress, and civilisation.” I rejoiced, therefore, when in 1918 the English-speaking Union was founded, with the aim of “increasing the knowledge of one another possessed by the English-speaking peoples, believing

that the peace of the world and the progress of mankind can be largely helped by the unity in purpose of the English-speaking democracies." That the aim is a sound one becomes every day more and more evident, and upon its realisation the future of the world largely depends.

A life devoted to science or art is, of all, most to be envied; but I had no strong natural aptitude for art or science. Politics attracted me strongly, and, had I steadfastly pursued that career, who knows to what it might have led? But the life is arduous and disappointment almost inevitable. Ambition is a noble quality if directed to a noble end. There is great joy in struggle, but, if the end is personal, what then? In politics a man must make up his mind to drag back or to pull forward. If he is wise he will choose the former course, for so difficult is it to get "a move on" the peoples of this ultra-conservative country that he may spend half a lifetime, or his whole life, in successfully resisting something. That is success, though very negative success. But, if he pulls forward, he rarely sees achievement accomplished by himself. Is that failure? I think not. Certainly it is not, provided achievement is accomplished by some one else. Spade-work is as honourable and fruitful as any other kind of work. The one who digs the foundation may have been of more use than he who crowns the edifice.

Political life, even in its lowest aspect—just playing a hand in a great game—is fascinating, but fatiguing, and I do not think I could have stood the strain. I have not enjoyed good health. Dysentery and other tropical or semi-tropical diseases have found in me an easy victim. I came very near leaving my bones in South Africa during the Boer War, and have never made a complete recovery. During the last fifty

years I have had a large experience of gout, and know more about it than all the doctors in Harley Street. For the benefit of other sufferers, I may add that experience teaches me (1) that if you can stand it, it is better to abstain from remedies and let an attack work itself out; (2) eat and drink what you find for yourself that you can best digest; otherwise diet makes no difference. If you must exceed, it is better to exceed in drink than in food. I have also been cursed by one of those ridiculous nervous systems that now and then, for no particular reason, spring a leak and temporarily let all vitality run out, producing a condition of abnormal shyness. Shyness is a disease, and a very inhibitive one. It is a mistake to attribute shyness to self-consciousness due to vanity. That may be the case in the mental form of the disease; but it is more often attributable to a purely physical cause—abnormal sensitiveness due to depletion of nervous force. I doubt if I could have endured the strain and stress of an active political career; and of this I am certain, I could not have assented to a perpetual repressive policy towards Ireland. Neither personal ambition nor a false estimate of my importance would have enabled me to condone so foolish and unjust a policy. Sooner or later I would have been driven to resign, and to do so sooner rather than later may have been wise action on my part.

Existence has been full of interest, vibrating under the force of great developments. Radical modifications in the social structure have taken place. I have seen a revolution in means of locomotion, of transport, and of communication. Wireless and flying must in the future do much to rub down the rough edges of national prejudice, and will effect profound changes in the relations of nations towards one

another that may be vital to humanity. A great advance in physical science, a stirring of the dry bones of theology among the Churches—all these, and many more changes have taken place in the half-century during which I took an intelligent interest in such matters. I have seen a great war—in a great cause, exhibiting the noblest attributes of human nature. I have witnessed the psychological reactions and the material results in the overthrow of financial stability. In the sphere of politics the desires of my heart were justice to Ireland for Ireland's sake, and for the sake of the Empire; and expansion and consolidation of the Empire. Ireland has been offered a position from which she can achieve all that she can sanely desire; and Colonies that fifty or sixty years ago were looked upon as encumbrances have become a great Commonwealth of Nations.

Youth is joyous, but it has no monopoly of happiness. New interests push off the old ones, as buds push off the old leaves. With the changing years we change our toys: that is about all that happens. And this much I can say—I have never been bored. Many friends of mine, young men, have been *blasé*—tired of everything. I do not understand it. I cannot imagine how any one ever was, or ever could be, bored if he lived for thousands of years in this wonderful world with every blade of grass a mystery. How can any one tire of life with so much to do and so little done, with all the problem of this little world and of the universe unsolved?

V

POSTSCRIPT

SINCE I laid down my pen, or rather my pencil, at the close of the year 1921, Ireland has been passing through such an extraordinary phase of her extraordinary political career that, though I have had little to do with events that have taken place during the last seven months, I am reluctant to abandon the subject without trying to summarise them—a far from easy task.

To follow the course of history and the action and inaction of the Provisional Government during the last few months, the difficulties under which that Government have laboured must be understood. That Ireland, in the throes of a new birth, was denuded of troops and police has been severely criticised—and naturally: but, nevertheless, it was necessary. Consider what would have happened if they had been retained. The R.I.C. would have been in an impossible position, most unfair to them and their future prospects, and the position of the military suddenly called upon to assist and befriend men who had been waging guerilla warfare against them would have been nearly as bad. But the real necessity for withdrawal lay in the fact that if British troops and the R.I.C.—a semi-military force—had remained in occupation, no amount of eloquence would have persuaded the people that the intention to confer autonomy and evacuate the country was genuine.

The Articles of Agreement would not have had a dog's chance.

The small majority with which the motion to accept the Articles of Agreement was passed by the Dail was a grievous disappointment to me. No one denied that the people were almost unanimous in accepting the Treaty ; but at the same time the Dail, representing the people, was, on the motion for acceptance, nearly equally divided for and against. That was very awkward for the Provisional Government, and their difficulties were aggravated by the fact that the country was overrun by bandits owing obedience to none.

The tactics employed by the minority in their determination to override the will of the people and to substitute a military dictatorship for constitutional government were not easy to cope with. Altogether it must be admitted that the Provisional Government found themselves faced by unparalleled difficulties ; and I think it must be admitted also that they have dealt with the situation with commendable wisdom, discretion, and ultimately with firmness.

So far as onlookers are concerned, the course of history has been further obscured by peculiarities in the relative positions of different governing bodies in Ireland one to another. Sinn Fein, when originally instituted, concerned itself mainly with economics and internal development. When it became political, it took the history of Hungary for its model, and claimed for Ireland an independent existence under a dual monarchy. When it swept the board in the election of December 1918, it had become republican. Mr. Arthur Griffith was then President : Mr. de Valera became President in 1919.

Ard-Fheis is a sort of general meeting of Sinn Fein—Sinn Fein clubs and other organisations being

represented by delegates. Ard-Fheis may therefore be considered as a general meeting of the party of the vast majority of the South and West, and of a very substantial minority in the six counties forming the Northern area.

The Dail—the Parliament—was elected in 1921, and was exclusively Sinn Fein with the exception of the four members for Trinity College, who, for obvious reasons, did not take their seats. Mr. de Valera was then President of the Dail. The whole complexion of the Dail was changed by its acceptance of the Articles of Agreement; and Mr. Arthur Griffith became President.

Mr. Collins—the Minister of Finance (until his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Supreme War Council on July 13)—was the Head of the Government which has been given administrative authority pending the setting-up of the Free State, and in that capacity may be looked upon as Prime Minister. Mr. Arthur Griffith, as President of the Dail, may be considered Leader of the House of Commons, and Mr. de Valera, as Chairman of Ard-Fheis, as Leader of the party that elected the Dail. The President of the Dail and the Chairman of the party that elected it were in direct political antagonism—a curious political position.

The situation was further complicated by most terrible occurrences in the Northern area. The inherent difficulty of the situation there was accentuated by a difference of opinion on Clause 12 of the Articles of Agreement setting up a Boundary Commission. Mr. Collins and Sir James Craig had agreed (on January 20) to settle the question themselves—dispensing with the Boundary Commission; and we were all in hopes that a satisfactory agreement would be come to. But, as has so often happened,

it seems that the two parties held quite different views as to the meaning of adjusting the boundary. Mr. Collins thought that, as two whole counties had refused to come under the Northern Parliament, a large revision of boundary would take place. Sir James Craig, on the other hand, believed that the objects of the Boundary Commission were merely to effect some very slight modifications. They differed so absolutely that the idea of a mutually agreed settlement came to an end.

That some revision is necessary was exemplified by a regrettable incident that occurred about the middle of January, when certain Monaghan men on their way to play in a football match at Derry were arrested by the Northern police, on the ground that they were carrying arms in Northern territory. This arrest incensed the I.R.A., and on February 11 a party of nineteen special constables, proceeding by train to Enniskillen and passing through Southern territory, were held up by the I.R.A. They resisted, and several casualties occurred. Since then a neutral zone has been created between North and South.

It is not necessary, and it would be painful, to follow in detail all the horrors that occurred in the North-East. Assassination followed assassination, reprisal followed reprisal, outrage followed outrage, producing a condition resembling at any rate religious war—the truth about motive will probably never be known. Whatever it may be, it is certain that the root of the trouble was in Belfast, where many thousands of Catholics were turned out of work. Whether on account of their political views, or of their religion, made little difference to them. It was a cruel outrage.

On January 7 the Dail, after wasting thirteen days in idle discussion, voted on Mr. Griffith's motion

for approving the Articles of Agreement, with the result of a majority of seven for the Treaty.

Discussions in the Dail have not been of an edifying character, and it is quite impossible to follow Mr. de Valera in his extraordinary political gymnastics. He accused the plenipotentiaries of exceeding their powers. That accusation was disproved, as was his secondary charge that they had not reported to him. The Dail argued for days about the meaning of "Document 2" and "Document 3," and so on, and upon the forms of oaths of allegiance, all of which amounted to nothing, and were merely designed to cause delay. Driven from those positions, Mr. de Valera demanded revision of the existing Register of Electors on the ground that it contained several tens of thousands of names which ought not to be on it and omitted several tens of thousands of names which ought to be on it. Mr. Griffith replied that the Register was perfectly valid, and that he would not be a party to preventing the electorate from expressing their views: that if the judgment of the people proved to be in favour of the Treaty, and if the Constitution was endorsed, a measure of adult suffrage would be introduced, and the country would have an opportunity of electing the succeeding Parliament on a Register compiled on that basis. He added that he would be acting contrary to the best interests of Ireland if he allowed any further attempt to postpone the elections to succeed.

Finally, Mr. de Valera came to rest on the ground that he was a pure and simple Republican, and that, if re-elected President, he would "have the right to get a Cabinet who would think with him and to the full use of the resources of the Republic to defend the Republic" and would "throw out the Treaty." At a meeting of Ard-Fheis in Dublin towards the end

of February, he moved a Resolution that the aim of the Sinn Fein organisation should continue to be to "secure the international recognition of Ireland as an independent Republic." This was an entirely new attitude on his part. He had told us himself that he took the oath of allegiance to the Republic in order to do the best he could for the Irish people, but that he was "not a republican doctrinaire as such." He had advocated the republican form of government as the only form of government that was suitable for the occasion. But, in any case, whatever his real opinions may have been, he abandoned the establishment of a republic as essential when he sent plenipotentiaries to London to engage in a conference in which, as a preliminary, it had been agreed that a republican form of government was not to be discussed. The terms of reference to the plenipotentiaries—"to negotiate and conclude, on behalf of Ireland, a Treaty or Treaties of settlement, association, and accommodation between Ireland and the Community of Nations known as the British Commonwealth"—precluded the idea of an independent Republic.

On February 23, in order "to avoid a division of the Sinn Fein organisation and avert the danger to the country of an immediate election, and to give an opportunity to the signatories of the London agreement to draft a Constitution, so that when the people were asked to vote at elections to decide between the Republic and the Saorstát (the Free State), the Constitution of the latter might be definitely before them," an agreement was reached between the Provisional Government and Mr. de Valera providing (1) for a three months' adjournment of Ard-Fheis, during which period Dail Eireann was to meet regularly and continue to function in all its departments as before the

signing of the Articles of Agreement; (2) for no Parliamentary election to be held in the meantime; and (3) for the Constitution in its final form to be presented at the same time as the Articles of Agreement when the election did take place.

The second reading of the Irish Free State (Agreement) Bill was moved by Mr. Churchill on February 16, when he strongly argued in favour of "clothing the Provisional Government with lawful authority without delay; and yet it was not until March 21 that the Bill came up to the Lords. I spoke on the 22nd. The Bill was admittedly very imperfect and obscure on some points; but I urged the House not to introduce amendments that would have even the appearance of altering the Articles of Agreement, either directly or indirectly. I reminded the House that Mr. de Valera had used with great effect the argument that by some means or other Ireland would be cheated out of the independence granted in the Articles of Agreement. I pointed out that no community of people had ever been placed in so difficult a position—a complete change of government contemplated, and the country absolutely denuded of military and police during the interval which must elapse between the exit of one form of Government and the entry and full establishment of the other; and I urged that the best and most efficacious way of putting an end to the unparalleled condition of things was to set up a Provisional Government at the earliest possible moment, giving them full power and authority. If, I said, the Irish people refused to accept the terms of the Agreement, the responsibility rested upon them; but if anything was done by the Lords that could justify the people of Ireland in agreeing with Mr. de Valera that they could never get assured independence except by setting up an independent

Republic, then the responsibility rested upon the House of Lords and Parliament.

On March 31 the final stage of the measure was reached in the House of Lords, and the Bill received the Royal Assent. This long delay was most unfortunate. Had the Bill been rushed through immediately after the Treaty had been accepted by the Dail, and had an election followed immediately, all would have been well, for it is no exaggeration to say that, at the very least, 95 per cent of the people were strongly in favour of the establishment of the Free State. On the other hand, the matter has throughout been so ably handled by Mr. Churchill that it is safe to assume that delay was unavoidable.

The Provisional Government appear to have been afflicted from the commencement with that obliquity of vision which has so often proved fatal to Ireland. They have laboured incessantly to come to terms with their opponents in order to preserve the unity of the party, being unable to see that they were sacrificing substance for shadow, and reality to a mere semblance. But, on the other hand, their desire to avoid bloodshed, their horror of the idea of comrades turning their weapons against each other, is natural, and to be respected.

In his speech at the meeting of Ard-Fheis in Dublin on May 23, which, by agreement with the Provisional Government had, on February 23, been adjourned for three months, Mr. Michael Collins mentioned, as an instance of the fatal effects of disunion, the dispute between Butt and Parnell, and over Parnell himself; but he failed to see that these were disputes on personal matters. Over and over again the interests of Ireland have been sacrificed to preserve the unity of a party. Party discipline is, of course, necessary for the achievement of great ends, and personal differences

should be put on one side ; but when a party is split from top to bottom on a fundamental issue, as was the case now, real unity is obviously impossible. A split so complete cannot be stuck together by phrases and soft words.

As early as January 3 Mr. Collins made overtures to maintain unity, and a Committee of both sides was appointed to endeavour to find some compromise. Of course they failed, and it came to nothing. On February 23 came the agreement (to which I have already referred) between the Provisional Government and Mr. de Valera providing for a three months' adjournment of Ard-Fheis and the postponing of the elections for the same period. Towards the end of March Mr. Griffith declared that an Army Convention which it was proposed to hold in Dublin was illegal, and instructed the Minister for Defence that the holding of the Convention was forbidden, as it was evident that it was proposed to endeavour to remove the Army from under the control of the Government elected by the people—Dail Eireann. The Convention was, however, held, and passed resolutions reaffirming its allegiance to the Irish Republic. On April 19 a series of conferences took place between Mr. Collins, Mr. Griffith, Mr. de Valera and Mr. Brugha with the avowed object of arranging for a truce over the election.

Three definite proposals were made by Mr. Griffith and Mr. Collins to the Republican Leaders :

1. That a general election should proceed in June on the issue of the Treaty and Constitution ; that the opponents of the Treaty should guarantee that no attempt would be made to intimidate or obstruct the voters from exercising their lawful rights ; that, in the event of the issue being favourable to the

Government, the Constitution should be enacted subject to any amendments carried by the House ; that, after its enactment and other essential legislation, including the enactment of adult suffrage, the Irish Parliament should dissolve and a new General Election be held, in which every adult would participate, ratifying or non-ratifying by the popular voice the Constitution.

2. That an election should be held in June on the single issue of the Treaty. That the body elected should devise the Constitution and pass a measure of adult suffrage, thereafter dissolving and giving the adult population a free opportunity of accepting, rejecting, or amending the Constitution.

3. That the Ard-Fheis Agreement of February 22 should be duly honoured in the letter and the spirit, and that a plebiscite of the people on the issue of acceptance or rejection of the Treaty should be taken within a month. It was suggested that the plebiscite should be held on a Sunday and that all persons of 21 years and upwards should be entitled to take part in it ; and that local committees should arrange the details.

All were refused by the Republican Party ; and on April 30, no basis of agreement having been found, the conference was broken up, and the Provisional Government decided to proceed with the elections, stating that "the people of Ireland who are, and must be, the sovereign authority, shall be free to vote their approval or disapproval of the Treaty, signed by their authorised plenipotentiaries." They added, "This duty it will discharge on the conviction of Abraham Lincoln that the will of the people must be supreme and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from this earth."

On May 1 a manifesto was issued, signed by Mr. Collins and Mr. Mulcahy, Minister of Defence, and other Officers of the I.R.A., setting forth a basis for the closing of the ranks all round. They recommended :

1. The acceptance of the fact, admitted by all sides, that the majority of the people of Ireland are willing to accept the Treaty.
2. An agreed election, with a view to—
3. Forming a Government which would have the confidence of the whole country ; and—
4. Army unification on the above basis.

To this the Republican Forces replied that the statement did not tend towards the unification of the Army, but made for further disunion, and was “clearly a political dodge intended by the anti-republicans to split the republican ranks.”

On the following day hopes were raised by the appointment by Dail Eireann of a Committee of Ten—five from the Treaty party and five from the anti-Treaty party—to consider proposals for an election and national government. The Committee held eleven sessions, but on May 10 it announced that it had failed to find a basis of agreement. A further effort was made on the 13th, when the Committee resumed deliberations ; but that effort also failed.

On May 19 Mr. Griffith made a gallant speech in the Dail, in which he stood up for the rights of the people to express their own opinions. He said : “Those men who would deny to the people of Ireland the right to vote on this vital issue were the enemies of the Irish nation, and let them call themselves what they would, they were the enemies of the nation, of democracy, and of civilised government. If this country, or any other country, was

going to submit to the rule of the revolver, civilisation was scrapped at once." And he added: "We are not going to adopt the rule of the bullet; we are going to give the people the right to express their opinions, no matter what intimidation is brought against us, and no matter what methods are adopted."

But, the day after, an agreement was signed by Mr. Collins and Mr. de Valera, and approved by the Dail on the same day, to the following effect:

That a "National Coalition Panel" representing both parties in the Dail and in the Sinn Fein Organisation should be sent forward, on the ground that the national position "required the entrusting of the government of the country into the joint hands of those who have been the strength of the national situation during the last few years, without prejudice to their respective positions;" the number for each party to be its then strength in the Dail; candidates to be nominated through the existing Party Executives; "any and every interest to be free to go up and contest the election equally with the National-Sinn Fein-Panel;" the executive, after the Election, to consist of the President (elected as formerly), the Minister of Defence (representing the Army), and nine other Ministers—five from the majority party and four from the minority: and, in the event of the Coalition Government finding it necessary to dissolve, a General Election to be held as soon as possible on Adult Suffrage. Sir James Craig took the view that the new Peace Pact changed the whole situation. On May 22 Mr. Churchill stated to the House of Commons that the Government did not fully understand the new Agreement, which appeared to raise serious issues, and that they had summoned the signatories of the Treaty to London

to discuss the Constitution. Several meetings took place, and on the morning of June 16—the day on which the elections were held—the text of a draft Constitution of the Irish Free State which both parties had agreed to was published.

It is impossible to deal with this Constitution in a brief and supplementary chapter: the only comment I would make upon it is that the powers of the Senate are too limited. The reconstruction of Ireland will be expensive, Ireland's credit will depend entirely upon the firm establishment of stable government; and that will depend upon the solid business element of the population having a fair share of control.

As was to be expected from the intransigent attitude of the Republicans, the Constitution met with a direct negative, Mr. de Valera describing it as “peculiarly fitted to the end in view—the degradation of a people, directed not against the few, but against the many”: and he added, “Dail Eireann will not dishonour itself by passing it.”

In spite of the “National Coalition Panel,” and the extraordinary conditions under which the elections were held, they passed off fairly peaceably, and demonstrated that the vast majority were in favour of the Treaty. There were victories of real significance. For the city of Cork seven candidates stood for four seats, but only one Republican (Mrs. MacSwiney, the widow of a former Republican Lord Mayor of the city, whose hunger-strike caused his death) was elected, and she was at the bottom of the poll. In the city of Dublin the Republican Party suffered a severe reverse. The former representation of the city, consisting of seven members of the Treaty Party and five members of the Republican Party, was changed to seven members in favour of the Treaty—three Independents, one Republican and one Labour.

Pro-Treaty candidates received 46,936 votes, while the Republican votes amounted to only 4819. The will of the electors in Dublin County was even more markedly expressed, the voting in favour of the Treaty being 10 to 1. Mr. Michael Collins, standing for Mid-Cork, secured a great victory, receiving 17,106 votes, the second candidate (a Labour candidate) receiving 7513.

The final results were as follows : Pro-Treaty Members returned, 58 ; Anti-Treaty, 36 ; Labour, 17 ; Farmers, 7 ; Independents, 6 ; Dublin University, 4. It must be remembered, however, that 34 of the Panel candidates were returned unopposed, 17 being returned for each side.

Labour asserted itself, only one of the 18 candidates which that party put forward being defeated, and he was defeated by the Minister of Labour by only 13 votes. The elections—unquestionably a triumph for the Treaty, and plainly indicating the will of the people—enabled the Government to take active steps to assert their authority. They had exhausted their patience and the patience of the country in laudable endeavours to avoid bloodshed, but were finally driven to a decision to put down mutiny and brigandage by force—a decision strengthened by a speech of Mr. Winston Churchill's in the House of Commons. Firmness, he said, was needed as much in the interests of peace as was patience. He expressed the view that as the Irish Government was greatly strengthened its duty was to give effect to the Treaty in the letter and in the spirit, and without delay. He declared that the presence in Dublin, in violent occupation of the Four Courts, of a band of men styling themselves the Headquarters of the Republican Executive, was a grave breach and defiance of the Treaty, and that

“if the campaign of murder and outrage did not cease, the Government would consider that the Treaty had been formally violated, and would resume their freedom of action.” He renewed the pledge to defend Ulster against coercion from the South; and, at the same time, declared that there could be no further excuse for acts of lawless reprisals against the Catholics in their midst.

On the following day an official statement was issued by the Irish Government, which declared that: “Since the close of the General Election, at which the will of the people of Ireland was ascertained, further grave acts against the security of person and property have been committed in Dublin, and in some other parts of Ireland, by persons pretending to act with authority. It is the duty of the Government, to which the people have entrusted their defence and the conduct of their affairs, to protect and secure all law-respecting citizens without distinction, and that duty the Government will resolutely perform.” It went on to say that “Such outrages against the Nation and the Government must cease at once, and cease for ever”; and that “for some months past all classes of business in Ireland has suffered severely through the feeling of insecurity engendered by reckless and wicked acts which have tarnished the reputation of Ireland abroad.” The statement concluded: “The Government is determined that the country shall no longer be held up from the pursuit of its normal life and the re-establishment of its free national institutions. It calls therefore on the citizens to co-operate actively with it in the measures it is taking to ensure the public safety, and to secure Ireland for the Irish people.”

The next day, in the early hours of the morning, the Irish Government launched an attack upon the

Four Courts. The rebels were given a time limit within which to vacate the Courts, but, as no reply was received to the ultimatum, the Four Courts were surrounded. Another party invested the Orange Hall—a second stronghold—in Rutland Square. On the following Friday, after much bombardment, the Courts were rushed. Later on in the day they caught fire, and a few minutes afterwards occurred a terrific explosion (which appears to have been caused by the Irregulars exploding ground mines), which shook the whole of Dublin and resulted in casualties to over thirty of the National troops. Soon after, the Irregulars hoisted the White Flag, and surrendered unconditionally.

The surrender was followed by a lull, and the remainder of the Irregulars, with de Valera among the leaders, fortified themselves in a square of hotels and other buildings in the Sackville Street area. The task of dislodging the rebels was not an easy one; but a close investment, coupled with vigorous attacks, resulted, after a five days' battle, in victory.

The tactics adopted were an imitation of those of Easter Week, 1916—street fighting by men without uniform in the midst of a congested civilian population. Such methods cannot be too severely condemned. Moreover, the destruction of valuable buildings—inevitable in the circumstances—is a tragedy. The restoration of the Sackville Street area alone will cost an appalling sum; and the loss of the Four Courts cannot be measured in pounds, shillings and pence. The attack was admirably planned and carried out. The back of the rebellion was broken by its complete discomfiture in Dublin, and the strong action taken by the Provisional Government—distasteful as it must have been to them to take it against old comrades—proved their resolve that the

people's will as expressed at the elections should not be flaunted, and that Ireland would not be allowed to fall under the rule of a pseudo-military dictatorship.

My references to these events would be incomplete if I failed to refer to the various Proclamations issued by the Provisional Government during this very critical crisis.

On June 28, the day on which the attack on the Four Courts began, Mr. Collins made a statement to the Press, putting the position in a nutshell, and clearly indicating that the failure of the Provisional Government to give evidence of their strength had been due to the hope that, in the event of a definite mandate being given at the General Election, that mandate would be "respected by all elements and interests in the country who pretended to any degree of patriotism." Mr. Collins said that the Government had "borne with extreme patience the illegal and improper conduct of certain elements since the signing of the Treaty with Great Britain and its endorsement by the supreme Authority of the nation—Dail Eireann"; and that on many occasions within the past six months they had gone far to meet them and had refrained from taking any action, despite the greatest provocation, and at the risk of laying themselves open to the serious charge of neglecting their duty to their citizens. He added that the General Election had shown the huge majority of four to one—a very definite mandate to maintain the situation created by the Treaty, and to enforce order and settled conditions; that their fond hopes that such an unmistakable mandate would be respected had not been realised; that still after the elections they had cherished the belief that in a little while even the most disorderly element would come to see that the people's will could not be flaunted with

impunity ; but that action was now absolutely necessary.

On the same day the Provisional Government issued a Proclamation in which they said that “ a section of our people have set themselves against the people’s will so emphatically declared. Against your mandate they proclaim war,” and “ under cover of revered battle cries they have enlisted Irish youths, and set them deliberately to the task of creating disorder by defying every lawful activity of an Irish Government.” It added : “ The Government cannot tolerate this organised system of brigandage and outrage, and they will not allow the will of the people to be openly flouted by an armed section of the community which is in rebellion not only against the Government but against the people of Ireland.” And it concluded : “ Now that it has got this definite mandate, it intends to carry on determinedly as the sole Government of the Irish people. The safety of the nation is the first law, and henceforth we shall not rest until we have established the authority of the people of Ireland in every square mile under their jurisdiction.”

Two days later the Irish Minister for Defence also issued a Proclamation, stating that “ the social and economic life of the country is being brought to chaos by a disorder which is invading our country’s life through the action of men some of whom were former associates of your own, and who now seek to arrogate to themselves an authority to interfere with, and destroy, the lives and properties of others of their countrymen ” ; and it went on to say : “ With all the strength and with all the clearness with which we have denied, and do deny the right of any but Irishmen to interfere in our national affairs, with all that strength and with all that clearness do we deny the

right of any Irishman or of any section of Irishmen to bring disorder on our country or injury to any of our countrymen." On the same day the Provisional Government also issued a Proclamation paying a tribute to the Army in its battle "against the forces of anarchy in the capital," and stating that it was faced with a conspiracy whose calculated end was to destroy the Treaty signed by their representatives and endorsed by them.

Defeated in the capital, the Rebels throughout the country set to work to resist by every possible means the authority of the Free State, and many conflicts took place. Communications were entirely interrupted, and whole districts isolated. The conditions were really worse than actual civil war. The so-called Republicans wore no uniforms or any distinct marks to distinguish them from the ordinary civil population, which greatly increased the difficulties against which the Free State Army had to contend.

On July 6 the Government issued a Proclamation to the "Men of Ireland." It said: "The valour and patriotism of our National Army has broken the conspiracy to override the will of the nation and subject the people to a despotism based on brigandage and ruthlessly regardless of the people's inalienable right to life, liberty and security"; and went on to say that, though the present active strength of the Army had been sufficient to deal adequately with the recent situation, there was a possibility of continued sporadic action which made an increase in the Army establishment virtually necessary; it had therefore issued instructions to the General Headquarters Staff of the Volunteer Organisation to place its establishment on an active service basis and to recruit all other citizens who desired to join the National ranks. It added: "A wicked and sanguinary attempt has been made to

thwart your will and to thrust you back again into the house of bondage with your capacity for self-government discredited before the world"; and it concluded: "At this crisis in our nation's history, the Government confidently looks to the Irish Volunteers to respond to the present appeal, and it looks with equal confidence to all other citizens to respond as willingly, and do their part in making our country safe for democracy and to re-establish the resurgent and triumphant Irish nation on firm and lasting foundations."

This appeal is a noble one, and it gives sound advice to the classes that may be termed ex-unionists. It is their duty and it will be their salvation to give all the help, moral and physical, that is within their power to the Irish Government. It moved me to write the following letter to the Dublin newspapers:

"The Irish Government have done their duty to the citizens and with a heartbreak which, perhaps, only those who had to act in a tragedy of a similar character in South Africa can understand. They have now to recreate Ireland, and have a right to expect the citizens to do their duty to them. They appeal for help in a Proclamation that puts the issue, and the necessities arising from it, plainly before the people. Ireland has to rely upon herself and herself alone. If she is to be saved she must save herself; and salvation can be found in one way only—the defeat of the spirit of anarchy, and the establishment and maintenance of constitutional government. That is the only alternative to utter destruction, and must appeal to all who love their country, whatever their political views may have been.

The Government appeal to all individuals and all classes. There are many of us whose activities are restricted by age, by the requirements of business, and by other unavoidable conditions, but they can 'do their bit.' The Government has expressed confidence in them, and that confidence must not prove to be misplaced.

The object is to put down crime from whatever source

it springs, and to give the security to life and property that is essential if Ireland is not to become an industrial and social wreck. With those objects in view, and acting in their own localities, men who are unable to take a more active part can, if given a lead and authorised, give voluntary assistance to the Government as civic guards or in some similar capacity, until such time as civil courts are functioning and the ordinary procedure of civilisation is established and maintained under the sanction of regular police."

On July 13 the Irish Government nominated a Supreme War Council, Mr. Collins being appointed Commander-in-Chief, and Mr. Mulcahy, in addition to remaining Minister of Defence, becoming Chief-of-Staff.

To break the rebellion is for the present, and will be for some time, the first consideration for the Irish Government. They have cleared the Capital, and, in taking Limerick and Waterford, they have broken the line of the Republicans, who are in full, and apparently in disordered, retreat.

The mentality of responsible Republican leaders determined to carry on a useless struggle, which can only prolong the agony of their country, is difficult to understand, and it may be that, if not absolutely blinded by fanaticism, they will bow to the inevitable, and advise their supporters to give up their arms and go to their homes and lawful occupations. In any case, it cannot be long before the Republicans, so far as they are an organised body, will be defeated; but a very arduous task will remain to test all the courage and determination of the Free State leaders and their troops. Sniping continues even in Dublin, and bands of banditti, broken men and irresponsible armed children, roam the country. Such a condition is extremely difficult to deal with; arms, especially pistols, must be surrendered; and it may be long before the country is really at peace.

And after that comes reconstruction. Destruction has been complete and universal. Reconstruction will be arduous and costly. The next few years will tax the patience of the people and try the metal that they are made of. Ireland has lost much good blood, and I have often heard doubts expressed as to whether the human material available is equal to the task imposed upon it. For generations the best of Ireland's sons joined the armies of France and of other nations, and in modern times the fittest of her sons and daughters emigrated. That is all quite true ; but, nevertheless, that plenty of good material remains at home is proved by the deference paid to Sinn Fein courts, and by the calm patience and governing qualities displayed by the leaders of the Provisional Government. The future is obscure, but I am not afraid of it.

I had hoped that before concluding this Postscript the new Dail would have met, and that I would have been enabled to comment on the statement that the Government must then make ; but printers are urgent, and this rough sketch must be brought to a close. By acceptance of the Treaty the foundations of a just and durable peace have been laid. God grant that on that sure foundation an edifice worthy of the people will be raised by their enduring patience and by the genius of their leaders.

July 31, 1922.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

(Extract from *The Complete Yachtsman*, Major Heckstall Smith.¹)

AFTER referring to the success of the American designer Herreshoff in 1895, with his 20-rater plate and bulb type yacht *Niagara* over the British boats, Heckstall Smith, in his book *The Complete Yachtsman*, wrote :

“Had it not been for a yacht in the class also designed on the pure plate and bulb principle, and, moreover, designed by an amateur, which bravely upheld the prestige of British yachting in 1895, the *Niagara* would have then swept the board.

“The Earl of Dunraven, however, a yachtsman with a natural talent for perceiving the properties required to render a racing vessel weatherly and fast, made a model for a 52-footer in clay, and she was built to his model ; this vessel was the *Audrey*, and she competed with extraordinary success against the *Niagara* and a very strong class of 20-raters. Lord Dunraven’s knowledge and grasp of great problems, which in the days of vanishing displacement and the introduction of fin and bulb principle of attaining stability disturbed the minds of scientific yachtsmen, was extraordinary.

“Bentall, the agricultural implement maker, had accomplished, twenty years before, a remarkable feat in designing the *Jullanar*. We have told how in 1875 he foresaw the coming of a reduced wetted surface, and designed *Jullanar*

¹ Reprinted by the kind permission of Major Heckstall Smith and Messrs. Methuen & Co., the publishers of his book.

and *Evolution*. If, however, Bentall's feat was remarkable, Dunraven's was marvellous. In the twenty years intervening, yacht-designing had become a science, and Lord Dunraven had the combined talent of Great Britain and America against him. He designed *Audrey* in 1894, and built her in that year, but, although his ideas were right, he did not manage to fit the boat to the rule at the first attempt, and no one noticed her in 1894; she was a failure. In the winter he pulled her to pieces and rebuilt her; she was a skimming dish with a metal fin and plate, and she came out in 1895, and the following was the result of her season: *Niagara* (Herreshoff), 25 first; *Audrey* (Dunraven), 16; *Inyoni* (Nicholson), 15; *Zinita* (Fife), 6; *Isolde* (Herreshoff), 3; *Stephanie* (Clayton), 3; *Eucharis* (Fife), 2; *Luna* (Fife), 0; *Vineta* (Watson), 0; *Dragon* (Fife), 0. The only other British 20-rater with a metal fin in that year was Fife's *Eucharis*, and although she went well in the first race she sailed she was not a great prize-winner. Great Britain had only one bulb fin boat in the 20-rating class able to tackle *Niagara*, and that was Lord Dunraven's *Audrey*.

"We may be told that Dunraven had done nothing new in bringing out a plate and bulb craft in 1895. He was not the first man to introduce the type. It is, of course, true that professional designers had tried the type and found it very successful in the small classes; Nicholson's *Gareth* proving a perfect flier in the 2½-rating class as early as 1892.

"This, however, is only a stronger reason why the professional designers should have introduced the type into the larger classes, instead of only timidly introducing a compromise in the form of a wooden-built fin keel. Lord Dunraven alone had the courage to turn out a vessel of the extreme type.

"In 1875, Watson was carefully feeling his way when Bentall boldly took the lead with *Jullanar*. In 1892-94 the leading scientific designers were proceeding gingerly also, and no big vessel had been produced of the extreme type on this side of the Atlantic when Dunraven built *Audrey*. Bentall's name may justly be associated with the more original work; but Dunraven's masterpiece was wrought in the face of far tougher opposition."

APPENDIX II

(Report of the Land Conference, January 1903.)

WHEREAS it is expedient that the Land Question in Ireland be settled so far as it is practicable, and without delay ;
And whereas the existing position of the Land Question is adverse to the improvement of the soil of Ireland, leads to unending controversies and lawsuits between owners and occupiers, retards progress in the country, and constitutes a grave danger to the State ;
And whereas an opportunity of settling once for all the differences between owners and occupiers in Ireland is very desirable ;
And whereas such settlement can only be effected upon a basis mutually satisfactory to the owners and occupiers of the land ;
And whereas certain representatives of owners and occupiers have been desirous of endeavouring to find such basis, and for that purpose have met in conference together ;
And whereas certain particulars of agreement have been formulated, discussed, and passed at the Conference, and it is desirable that the same should be put into writing and submitted to His Majesty's Government.

After consideration and discussion of various schemes submitted to the Conference we are agreed :

I. That the only satisfactory settlement of the Land Question is to be effected by the substitution of an occupying proprietary in lieu of the existing system of dual ownership.

II. That the process of direct interference by the State in purchase and re-sale is, in general, tedious and unsatisfactory, and that therefore, except in cases where at least half the occupiers or the owner so desire, and except in

districts included in the operations of the Congested Districts Board, the settlement should be made between owner and occupier, subject to the necessary investigation by the State as to title, rental, and security.

III. That it is desirable in the interests of Ireland that the present owners of land should not, as a result of any settlement, be expatriated, or, having received payment for their land, should find no object for remaining in Ireland, and that, as the effect of a far-reaching settlement must necessarily be to cause the sale of tenancies throughout the whole of Ireland, inducements should, wherever practicable, be afforded to selling owners to continue to reside in that country.

IV. That, for the purpose of obtaining such a result, an equitable price ought to be paid to the owners, which should be based upon income.

Income, as it appears to us, is second-term rents, including all rents fixed subsequent to the passing of the Act of 1896, or their fair equivalent.

V. That the purchase price should be based upon income as indicated above, and should be either the assurance by the State of such income or the payment of a capital sum producing such income at 3 per cent, or at $3\frac{1}{4}$ per cent if guaranteed by the State, or if the existing powers of trustees be sufficiently enlarged.

Costs of collection, where such exist, not exceeding 10 per cent, are not included for the purpose of these paragraphs in the word "income."

VI. That such income or capital sum should be obtainable by the owners

- (a) Without the requirement of capital outlay upon their part, such as would be involved by charges for proving title to sell, six years' possession as proposed in the bill brought forward in the Session of 1902 appears to us a satisfactory method of dealing with the matter ;
- (b) Without the requirement of outlay to prove title to receive the purchase-money ;
- (c) Without unreasonable delay ;
- (d) Without loss of income pending re-investment ;

(e) And without leaving portion of the capital sum as a guarantee deposit.

VII. That, as a necessary inducement to selling owners to continue to reside in Ireland, the provision in the Bill introduced by the Chief Secretary for Ireland in the Session of 1902 with regard to the purchase of mansion houses, demesne lands, and home farms by the State, and re-sale by it to the owners, ought to be extended.

VIII. We suggest that, in certain cases, it would be to the advantage of the State, as ensuring more adequate security, and also an advantage to owners in such cases, if, upon the purchase by the State of the mansion house and demesne land, and re-sale to the owner, the house and demesne land should not be considered a security to the mortgagees.

IX. That owners, wishing to sell portions of grazing land in their own hands for the purpose of enlarging neighbouring tenancies, should be entitled to make an agreement with the tenants; and that, in the event of proposed purchase by the tenants, such grazing land may be considered as part of the tenancies for the purpose of purchase.

X. That, in addition to the income, or capital sum producing the income, the sum due for rent from the last rent-day till the date of the agreement for purchase, and the hanging gale, should be paid by the State to the owner.

XI. That all liabilities by the owner which run with the land, such as head-rents, quit-rents, and tithe-rent charge, should be redeemed, and the capital sum paid for such redemption deducted from the purchase-money payable to the owner. Provided always, that the price of the redemption should be calculated on a basis not higher as regards annual value than is used in calculating the purchase price of the estate. In any special cases, where it may have to be calculated upon a different basis, the owner should not suffer thereby.

Owners liable to drainage charges should be entitled to redeem same upon equitable terms, having regard to the varying rates of interest at which such loans were made.

XII. That the amount of the purchase-money payable by the tenants should be extended over a series of years, and be at such a rate, in respect of principal and interest, as

will at once secure a reduction of not less than 15 per cent, or more than 25 per cent, on second-term rents, or their fair equivalent, with further periodical reductions, as under existing Land Purchase Acts, until such time as the Treasury is satisfied that the loan has been repaid. This may involve some assistance from the State beyond the use of its credit, which, under circumstances hereinafter mentioned, we consider may reasonably be granted. Facilities should be provided for the redemption at any time of the purchase-money, or part thereof, by payment of the capital or any part thereof.

XIII. That the hanging gale, where such custom exists, should be included in the loan, and paid off in the instalments to be paid by the purchasing occupier, and should not be a debt immediately recoverable from the occupier; but the amount of rent ordinarily payable for the period between the date when the last payment fell due and the date of agreement for sale should be payable as part of the first instalment.

XIV. That counties wholly or partly under the operations of the Congested Districts Board or other districts of a similar character (as defined by the Congested Districts Board Acts and by Section 4, clause 1, of Mr. Wyndham's Land Purchase Amendment Bill of last session) will require separate and exceptional treatment, with a view to the better distribution of the population and of the land, as well as for the acceleration and extension of those projects for migration and enlargement of holdings which the Congested Districts Board, as at present constituted, and with its limited powers, has hitherto found it impossible to carry out upon an adequate scale.

XV. That any project for the solution of the Irish Land Question should be accompanied by a settlement of the Evicted Tenants question upon an equitable basis.

XVI. That sporting and riparian rights should remain as they are, subject to any provisions of existing Land Purchase Acts.

XVII. That the failure to enforce the Labourers Acts in certain portions of the country constitutes a serious grievance; and that, in districts where, in the opinion of the Local Government Board, sufficient accommodation has not

been made for the housing of the labouring classes, power should be given to the Local Government Board, in conjunction with the local authorities, to acquire sites for houses and allotments.

XVIII. That the principle of restriction upon subletting might be extended to such control as may be practicable over re-sales of purchasers' interest and mortgages, with a view to maintaining unimpaired the value of the State's security for outstanding instalments on loans.

And whereas we are agreed that no settlement can give peace and contentment to Ireland, or afford reasonable and fair opportunity for the development of the resources of the country, which fails to satisfy the just claims of both owners and occupiers;

And whereas such settlement can only be effected by the assistance of the State, which, as a principle, has been employed in former years;

And whereas it appears to us that, for the healing of differences and the welfare of the country, such assistance should be given, and can be given, and can effect a settlement without either undue cost to the Treasury or appreciable risk with regard to the money advanced, we are of opinion that any reasonable difference arising between the sum advanced by the State and ultimately repaid to it may be justified by the following considerations :

That for the future welfare of Ireland and for the smooth working of any measure dealing with the transfer of land, it is necessary—

1. That the occupiers should be started on their new career as owners on a fair and favourable basis, ensuring reasonable chances of success ; and that, in view of the responsibilities to be assumed by them, they should receive some inducement to purchase.

2. That the owners should receive some recognition of the facts that selling may involve sacrifice of sentiment ; that they have already suffered heavily by the operations of the Land Acts ; and that they should receive some inducement to sell.

3. That, for the benefit of the whole community, it is of the greatest importance that income derived from sale of property in Ireland should continue to be expended in Ireland.

And we further submit that, as a legitimate set-off against any demand upon the State, it must be borne in mind that upon the settlement of the Land Question in Ireland, the cost of administration, and of law, and the cost of the Royal Irish Constabulary, would be materially and permanently lessened.

We do not, at the present time, desire to offer further recommendations upon the subject of finance, which must necessarily be regulated by the approval of the Government to the principles of the proposals above formulated, except that, in our opinion, the principle of reduction of the sinking fund, in the event of loss to the State by an increase in the value of money, should be extended by the inclusion of the principle of increase of the sinking fund in favour of the purchasers in the event of gain to the State by decrease in the value of money.

Inasmuch as one of the main conditions of success in reference to any Land Purchase Scheme must be its prompt application and the avoidance of those complicated investigations and legal delays which have hitherto clogged all legislative proposals for settling the relations between Irish landlords and tenants, we deem it of urgent importance that no protracted period of time should ensue before a settlement, based upon the above-mentioned principles, is carried out ; that the executive machinery should be effective, competent, and speedy ; and that investigations conducted by it should not entail cost upon owner or occupier ; and, as a further inducement to despatch, we suggest that any State aid apart from loans which may be required for carrying out a scheme of Land Purchase as herein proposed should be limited to transactions initiated within five years after the passing of the Act.

We wish to place on record our belief that an unexampled opportunity is at the present moment afforded His Majesty's Government of effecting a reconciliation of classes in Ireland upon terms which, as we believe, involve no permanent increase of Imperial expenditure in Ireland ; and that there would be found on all sides an earnest desire to co-operate

with the Government in securing the success of a Land Purchase Bill which, by effectively and rapidly carrying out the principles above indicated, would bring peace and prosperity to the country.

Signed at the Mansion House, Dublin, this 3rd day of January 1903.

DUNRAVEN (*Chairman*).

MAYO.

W. H. HUTCHESON POË.

NUGENT T. EVERARD.

JOHN REDMOND.

WILLIAM O'BRIEN.

T. W. RUSSELL.

T. C. HARRINGTON.

APPENDIX III

(Memorandum by Sir Antony (now Lord) MacDonnell, 1905.)

1. AN effort will, I understand, be made in Parliament to censure me for having helped Lord Dunraven in preparing his Devolution Scheme. The attack on me will, it is suggested to me, be directed to showing :

- (1) That I exceeded my functions in giving Lord Dunraven any assistance,
- (2) That I failed to inform my official superiors of what I was doing,
- (3) That generally my participation in such a scheme was inconsistent with my duty to the present Government.

All these propositions are incorrect, as I proceed to show.

2. I did not take office in Ireland as an ordinary Under-Secretary. Before accepting the offer made to me of this office, I inquired into the system of Irish Government ; and my acceptance of the Under-Secretaryship was conditional on opportunities being given to me to devise reforms. The conditions under which I accepted this office are stated in the following extract from a letter dated September 22, 1902, which I wrote to Mr. Wyndham with reference to the offer of the appointment :

“ But there still remains the difficulty to which I alluded when I saw you. I have been anxiously thinking over this difficulty. I am an Irishman, a Roman Catholic, and a Liberal in politics ; I have strong Irish sympathies ; I do not see eye to eye with you all in all matters of Irish administration, and I think there is no likelihood of good coming from such a *régime* of coercion as the *Times* has recently outlined. On the other hand, from the exposition

you were good enough to give me of your views, and from the estimate I formed of your aims and objects, I find there is a substantial measure of agreement between us. Moreover, I should be glad to do some service to Ireland. Therefore, it seems to me the situation goes beyond the sphere of mere party politics, and I should be willing to take office under you provided there is some chance of my succeeding. I think there is a chance of success on this condition that I should have adequate opportunities of influencing the policy and acts of the Irish Administration, and (subject, of course, to your control) freedom of action in executive matters. For many years in India I directed administration on the largest scale, and I know that if you send me to Ireland the opportunity of mere secretarial criticism would fall far short of the requirements of my position.

“If I were installed in office in Ireland, my aims, broadly stated, would be—the maintenance of order; the solution of the Land Question on the basis of voluntary sale; where sale does not operate, the fixation of rents on some self-acting principle whereby local inquiries would be obviated; the co-ordination, control, and direction of Boards and other administrative agencies; the settlement of the Education Question in the general spirit of Mr. Balfour’s views; and generally the promotion of material improvement, and administrative conciliation.

“I am sure you will not misinterpret this letter. I am greatly attracted by a chance of doing some good for Ireland. My best friends tell me that I am deluding myself; that I shall be abused by Orangemen as a Roman Catholic and a Home Ruler, and denounced by Home Rulers as a renegade; that I shall do no good; and shall retire disgusted within the year. But I am willing to try the business under the colours and conditions I mention.”

3. Mr. Wyndham in his reply of September 25, 1902, accepted my terms unconditionally. He writes:

“When Sir David Harrel resigns I shall, accordingly, nominate you as his successor, and it is understood between us that I make, and that you accept, this appointment on the lines and under the conditions laid down in your letter and with a view to compassing the objects which you hold to be of primary importance, viz. the maintenance of order; a

solution of the Land Question on the basis of voluntary sale, and, where that proves impossible, on the basis of substituting some simple, automatic system of revising rents in place of the existing costly processes of perpetual litigation ; the co-ordination of the detached and semi-detached Boards and Departments ; settlement of Education in such a way as to provide Higher Education in a form acceptable to the majority of the inhabitants ; and administrative conciliation.

“ To these I add (1) the consolidation and increase of existing grants for Irish local purposes, with a view to reducing the rates where they are prohibitive to enterprise, and (2) if we are spared long enough, the development of transit for agricultural and other products, possibly, by guarantees to railways on the Canadian model. But this is far off.”

4. It is therefore clear that when Mr. Wyndham asked for, and when I promised, my assistance in the Government of Ireland, we both understood that my functions were to be a good deal wider than those ordinarily appertaining to the Under-Secretary. It was understood that while I was to discharge the Under-Secretary's duties with more than the usual authority and freedom, I was also to assist in solving the various pending political questions, namely Land, Education, Irish Administration, and the reconciliation of the people to the Government.

5. Acting on this conception of my duties, I have, from the very outset, taken the initiative in matters beyond the sphere of the Under-Secretary's ordinary duties, and have carried on negotiations of a political nature. If examples are wanted, I point to Lord Dunraven's Land Conference, the Land Purchase Bill, and the University negotiations. In all these matters I acted on my own initiative, but in accordance with my perceptions of the general drift of the Chief Secretary's policy as indicated in the correspondence of September 1902, and in my communications with him. Up till now I succeeded in gaining the Chief Secretary's ultimate approval. For example, I have before me as I write a letter dated March 7, 1904, in which Mr. Wyndham says “ had you not seen your way to work with me, the Land Act could never have been passed or even initiated.”

6. In this “ Devolution ” business I acted in the same

way and spirit. Before I took office I had been impressed with the want of efficiency resulting from the uncontrolled and divergent action of the numerous Irish "Boards." But when I had gained experience (from within) on the working of the Irish Government, I clearly saw that the true root of Irish mal-administration lay in the financial arrangements between the two countries.

7. For the last eighteen months I have not ceased to urge on the Lord-Lieutenant and the Chief Secretary the necessity of securing to Ireland an alteration of these arrangements and an effective voice over the allocation and expenditure of Irish Funds. The system of Provincial Contracts which prevails in India seemed to me, with some adjustments to local peculiarities, eminently suitable to Ireland. That system proceeds on the principle of delegated (and therefore revocable) authority. It postulates a supreme controlling power (which here means the maintenance of one Parliament). My representations on this point always found in Lord Dudley a sympathetic, and, I came to believe, an approving listener. In the Chief Secretary I thought I had made a convert, for on October 11, 1903, he wrote to me : "An Irish Budget on the lines of the Indian Budget is the first step towards sound government in Ireland and a due recognition of her claims here [*i.e.* Whitehall]."

8. The winter of 1903-4 was, in Ireland, occupied with the launching of the Land Purchase Act, and with the once promising, but ultimately abortive, attempt to settle the University Question. There was no time, even if there were opportunity, to touch the real question of Irish Finance, and the Chief Secretary's energies were directed to making the best of the Development Grant. But in that Grant, as a permanent remedy for Ireland's financial troubles, I had myself no faith. It seemed to me an immediate diversion of Funds from their legitimate and exigent objects, while in it there lurked the danger of possible defeat in the future of Irish claims. A true solution lay in my judgment in the creation of an Irish Budget on the Indian plan, and Irish Financial Control (subject to Parliament) which will enable the Irish Government to enforce economy and promote these material improvements through want of which the country is languishing. At the last conversation which, towards the

end of the Session, I had with Mr. Wyndham on this subject, I asked him not to take the matter from me alone, but to consult Sir David Barbour, who is not only a first-rate authority on Indian Finance, but is specially acquainted with the Irish case, having been a member of the Financial Relations Commission.

9. Thus far have I written with the object of showing how and why the idea of Financial Decentralisation or Devolution for Ireland grew up in my mind, and how that idea was received by my official superiors when I urged it upon them. I now proceed to state how and why the idea was embodied in the "Dunraven Scheme."

10. In the beginning of 1904 a conversation took place between Mr. Wyndham, Lord Dunraven, and myself on Irish Politics. Lord Dunraven was particularly interested in the creation of a moderate Irish Party of which he had at the time hopes from the temperament of a section of Irish Unionists and of the Nationalist wing which drew its inspiration from Mr. William O'Brien. It was agreed between us three that I should invite to dinner, to meet Lord Dunraven, the more prominent Unionists likely to form the nucleus of such a party. But, on reflecting on the business, I did not think the time opportune, as the Land Purchase Act had only begun to work, and, besides, I felt that I could not intervene, as proposed, without involving (or shall I say compromising?) Mr. Wyndham. On stating my doubts to him Mr. Wyndham agreed with me, and the matter dropped for the time.

11. Lord Dunraven revived it last August in a letter to me. My doubts as to the opportuneness of the time had now disappeared, and I consequently wrote to Mr. Wyndham and asked him if he had seen Lord Dunraven on the subject. Mr. Wyndham replied on August 17: "I have seen Lord Dunraven, and hope to see him again." When, therefore, Lord Dunraven in the end of August consulted me personally about a Programme for his Third Party, I felt myself at liberty to speak freely to him, to explain to him my idea of an Irish Budget, and to assist him in preparing the Irish Reform Association's Programme, which was published on August 31. I think that Lord Dunraven's mind had been running on pretty much the same lines as my own in reference

to Irish Administrative Reform, for we had no difficulty in agreeing on a common basis of action.

12. In this Paper I am in no way concerned with defending the Programme (though I cannot help wondering why Financial Decentralisation, which is laudable in connection with the Army, should be rank blasphemy in connection with Ireland). I am here concerned only with explaining my own part in its preparation and showing that I had reasons for my action. The Programme presents two main features : (a) Financial Control in Ireland ; (b) Devolution of certain legislative functions. Clearly I had grounds for thinking that on (a) Mr. Wyndham would not be hostile to discussion, while I knew that the Lord-Lieutenant would be sympathetic. On (b) successive Chief Secretaries had approved of the principle of Devolution as it concerned Private Bill Legislation, while the further extension proposed in the detailed scheme was altogether a matter for the House of Commons. I may add that the whole business was no more than a project of Reform put forward by a body of Unionist gentlemen for public discussion, and pretended to no official inspiration.

13. When the programme had been before the public for a few days, demands for a more detailed statement of policy were made on the Association, and I agreed to prepare the draft of such a statement. While engaged in preparing it I wrote to Mr. Wyndham telling him what I was doing. I did not keep a copy of my letter ; it was not my practice to keep copies of my correspondence with the Chief Secretary. But the letter dealt with the condition of the country, and the working of the Land Purchase Act, and ended with a paragraph to the effect that I was helping Lord Dunraven on the lines of the Local Control of Irish Finance, which I had so often urged on Mr. Wyndham himself. I made sure that, having before him the Programme of August 31, to which I think, but am not sure, that my letter drew his attention, Mr. Wyndham could have no doubt as to the main features of the help I was giving. I reminded Mr. Wyndham of that letter at the first interview I had with him after the publication of his letter in the *Times*. He remarked, in reply, that he could not have attached to it the importance that I did.

14. The Lord - Lieutenant happened to be in Dublin during the period to which I am referring, and I was therefore able, in conversation with His Excellency, to explain to him fully what I was doing in communication with Lord Dunraven. I did this more than once, going into the details of the Scheme; and this fact of itself must relieve me of all suspicion of having concealed the business from my official superiors.

15. Had Mr. Wyndham been in Ireland, I should have been equally full with him, as was my practice in the other negotiations I have referred to.

16. I was much surprised and disappointed when I saw Mr. Wyndham's letter to the *Times* condemning the "Devolution Scheme." It had not occurred to me that official notice would be taken of what, at that stage, was only a project of Reform put forward for public discussion by a body of private gentlemen. But Mr. Wyndham's letter made it impossible for me to assist the Irish Reform Association any further, and I therefore at once withdrew from connection with it.

17. I am now told that Lord Dunraven's Scheme appeared inopportunately from the Party point of view. But in helping Lord Dunraven I was not concerned with Party Politics. My concern lay in the improvement of the Irish Administration, and in the reconciliation of the Irish people to it. These were the objects which brought me to Dublin Castle, and while I was permitted to work them out I was not concerned with distinctions between Liberal and Unionist. The Devolution Scheme was not a Party move. My share in it was inspired by my perception of the administrative needs of the country, and it is idle to suggest that, in helping Lord Dunraven to prepare it, I was influenced by improper motives, or concealed matters, or failed in my duty to my official superiors.

A. P. MACDONNELL.

February 8, 1905.

APPENDIX IV

(Letter of New Year's Day, 1921, to the *Times*.¹)

I

RESTORATION OF A KINGDOM

A FRUITLESS DUALITY

To the Editor of the "Times"

SIR,—After a final effort in the Lords to maintain the supremacy of Parliament, the Government of Ireland Bill passed, and the New Year's gift to Ireland is that for three and a half years the fate of three-fourths of the population lies in the hollow of the hands of His Majesty's Government. The prospect is not alluring.

The failure of the Government to deal with the situation is very hard to understand. Confronted, as they are, with all the terrible difficulties arising out of a madly fermenting world, the necessity of dealing with one problem ripe for solution was surely evident; and yet His Majesty's Government have lost, or are in imminent danger of losing, a golden opportunity of laying firm the foundations of a settlement in Ireland. A solution of that question has never been difficult, and is not impossible now if only Ministers responsible would take pains to place themselves in the position of those with whom they have to treat, would get down to the roots of sentimental and material grievances, and would deal with causes rather than effects. That is a troublesome process, and it is far easier to describe the Irish as irresponsible, impossible people quite unfit for self-government; but until that

¹ The Letter was published on January 5 and January 6 in two portions, and is reprinted by the kind permission of the proprietors of the *Times*.

customary course is abandoned and the Irish are treated as reasonable people entitled to receive reasonable consideration of their reasonable claims, a settlement in amity between the two countries cannot be attained.

The problem confronting the Government was, owing to the attitude of Ulster, admittedly very difficult. Ulster delegates had refused to look at proposals offered at the Convention securing them practically independence in an Irish Parliament, and a statutory right to come out and set up for themselves if they so desired ; and Ulster was to have her own way. In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government adopted the wisest course in deciding upon two Parliaments, with an open door leading to unity. The principle was sound ; so also was the consequential decision that, in the event of the people of Southern Ireland refusing to return members to Parliament, some system of nomination should be substituted for election and the Act administered under it. The idea of duality leading to unity was sound ; but its validity depended upon two conditions : first, that both Parliaments should have an equal chance of success—fully administering the Act, and secondly, that effective means for arriving at unity should be provided in the Council. As the Bill came up to the House of Lords both of these conditions had been nullified by confining the Northern area to the six counties, and by financial clauses unsatisfactory to the Southern area. The financial proposals could never satisfy the majority, and the composition of the Council made the minority masters of the situation, capable of making duality perpetual, of throwing the machinery of the Council out of gear, and of dooming the majority to Crown Colony Government under the sanction of martial law. The theory of the Bill was sound ; but the construction was faulty.

To justify their predilection for a dual system, the Government accepted the theory of a complete cleavage between the people in the North-East corner and in the rest of Ireland. That is, of course, to a large extent fiction, though, as politics and religion have too often synchronised, religious differences are apt to become acute. Nevertheless, if the people were only left alone, and if a reasonable settlement of the political question were effected, Catholic and Protestant would live amicably together, for, when all is said

and done, Irishmen are all Irish under their creeds. That need not now be discussed. The extraordinary fact is that, founding their Bill upon the theory of distinct cleavage, the Government should have proceeded to make it suitable only to the minority, and express astonishment, and even indignation, that it does not suit a majority which is, according to their belief, alien to that minority in race, religion, ideals, character, modes of thought, and everything else. The Lord Chancellor could not see why people who would accept the Act of 1914 should not accept the present Act. Much has happened during the last six years; but perhaps it is sufficient to mention the fact that the Act of 1914 stated that if during any three successive years after the passing of the Act the revenue exceeded the expenditure, the question of a revision of the financial arrangements would be gone into with a view to "securing a proper contribution from Irish revenues towards the common expenditure of the United Kingdom, and extending the powers of the Irish Parliament and the Irish Government with respect to the imposition and collection of taxes." It is quite possible that, if the present Act had contained a clause to the effect that, as Irish revenue exceeded expenditure, the time had come for a revision of financial arrangements, with the view of giving Ireland control over expenditure and the imposition and collection of taxes, and that such revision would be immediately undertaken, the Bill might have been accepted as the basis of a firm settlement. The obvious course to pursue was to draft a Bill acceptable, so far as was possible, to the majority, and then to satisfy the objections of the minority. To satisfy the minority the dual system was adopted; but, having decided upon two Parliaments—one for the majority in the South and one for the minority in the North—surely the necessity of granting to Ireland the self-governing powers required by the majority in the South became obvious, provided those powers did not detract from the independence of the Northern Parliament, did not imperil the solidarity of the Empire and the security of the United Kingdom. Unfortunately, the constructive process was reversed, with the result of a measure meeting the wishes of the North, but falling fatally short of satisfying the South.

I have endeavoured in the *Times*, and in Parliament, to impress upon the public certain facts which, as it seems to me, govern the situation—(1) that Ireland is not a colony, but a kingdom, and that the “status” of a dominion is inconsistent with her position and unnecessary for her needs; (2) that for the dual system to lead to unity it is necessary that both Legislatures should be satisfied with the powers conferred upon them; (3) that the powers to be conferred should be limited only by the conditions laid down by the Government for securing effective union between the two peoples, the ultimate supremacy of the Imperial Parliament, the security of both countries, and the integrity of the Empire. I have failed, but may I finally recapitulate? To bring about a lasting settlement one thing is most desirable and another necessary. It is desirable to restore to Ireland her position as a kingdom. Sentiment? Partly; but sentiment must not be ignored. From Henry VIII. to the Act of Union Ireland was a kingdom; the King of England, or of Great Britain, was King of Ireland. In 1782 the King and Parliament of Great Britain declared that “the right claimed by the people of Ireland to be bound only by laws enacted by His Majesty and the Parliament of that Kingdom in all cases whatsoever . . . was established and ascertained for ever.” For ever! And eighteen years later Ireland was deprived of her position as a kingdom, of her Parliament, and of her Constitution. She lost all recognition of nationality, and became part of, and merged in, a United Kingdom. Ever since then Ireland has bitterly protested against the Act of Union. That Act is dead, and it is difficult to say how Ireland is, other than geographically, to be now described. The Act of Union should be given decent burial by repeal, and Ireland should be restored to her individuality as a kingdom. Add one letter to the title of the Crown, and let the Union be between the United Kingdoms, and the path will be cleared of many difficulties. An “atmosphere” favourable to a settlement would be created.—Your obedient servant,

DUNRAVEN.

II

FISCAL AND FINANCIAL CONTROL

THE TEST OF SINCERITY

SIR,—To continue my letter and to turn to finance. It is, above all, essential that Ireland should control and be responsible for her own expenditure and income. That demand is eminently practical. Up to 1782 Ireland was a separate entity, with no control over her finances. From 1782 to 1800 she was a separate entity, and had complete control over her taxation and revenue. From 1801 to 1817 she was still a distinct financial unit, but all control over her finances had been taken from her and transferred to the United Parliament. The financial terms of the Act of Union speedily made Ireland bankrupt. In the fifteen years before the Union the expenditure of Ireland amounted to £41,000,000 ; in the fifteen years following the Union it amounted to £148,000,000, of which Ireland raised £78,000,000 by taxation, or £47,000,000 more than she had raised by taxation in the former period of equal length. The relative strength in resources of the two countries is well exemplified by the fact that whereas Ireland could only provide 52 per cent of her expenditure out of revenue, though taxation had been doubled and had been screwed up to the highest possible pitch, Great Britain, during the same period, provided 71 per cent of her enormous expenditure out of revenue, and taxation was not forced up to the limit of productibility. Under the weight of the share allotted to the weaker country she collapsed, and was saved from bankruptcy by amalgamating the Exchequers. Since amalgamation the methods of finance in respect of Ireland have been “in-and-out.” Sometimes Ireland has been looked upon as an integral part of the United Kingdom, at other times as a separate entity—which-ever happened to be most convenient to the Exchequer. Ireland, as part of a far wealthier community, was forced into a mode of living involving expense far in excess of her means and of her necessities.

Ireland has always been in an anomalous position. She has been viewed as consisting of so many counties of one

entity—the United Kingdom—as regards expenditure, but in respect of revenue she has been treated as a separate entity, and loans have been debited to her account. It is not strange that Ireland demands relief from financial conditions repugnant to a self-respecting people, and desires to be responsible for her own expenditure and for providing for it. She wants freedom to cut her coat according to her cloth, and to decide for herself how much cloth she requires. The whole question of the financial relations between Great Britain and Ireland and their relative financial capacity was reported upon by a Royal Commission—the Childers Commission—in 1896; and in 1911 the Primrose Commission on Irish Finance reported. The only great change that has occurred since those days is that, whereas the balance of revenue and expenditure was then against Ireland, it is now largely in favour of Ireland. A Royal Commission on Financial Relations would not take long to report.

Is a grant of fiscal and financial control inconsistent with the security of the United Kingdom and of the Empire? Certainly not, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government. Financial control has never been ruled out. On the contrary, the grant has over and over again been admitted, subject to certain fundamental conditions laid down by the Prime Minister, as: Separate treatment for the six counties of North-East Ulster; no secession of Ireland, or any part of Ireland, from the United Kingdom; no detraction from the security of these islands and their safety in days of war. The grant of full fiscal and financial autonomy is not included in those limiting conditions. Would a grant of full financial control be inconsistent with the independence of the Northern Parliament? Assuredly not. That Parliament would be master in its own house, to use or not to use the powers entrusted to it as it thought best. Once the possibility of the grant is conceded, no logical ground for refusal can be found, unless exceptional circumstances interfere. What are the circumstances? Peace and a settlement are desired. The law will assert itself, and peace, in the sense of cessation from crime, will follow; but it will be a false peace. The forces of disorder driven under will await another opportunity of breaking out. It is possible even that a ruined and dis-

tracted people might, for the sake of relief, give outward acceptance to the Act. But for real peace—permanent peace—the law must rely upon the good will of the people and not merely upon physical force, and the good will of the people depends upon the terms of a settlement.

The psychology of the Government is inscrutable. They seem unable to realise that the mental attitude of the Irish people is one of profound suspicion of them, and of despair of securing redress by peaceful means. They do not see that the essential preliminary is to bring about a better understanding between the two peoples, to convince Ireland of even-handed justice and of good will. All, except extremists, will accept the view of the Prime Minister that it is "essential to convince the whole of the people in Ireland that the authority of the law, and the authority of the Empire, is paramount," and will agree that martial law is necessary, if desirable, for that purpose. But martial law should have been applied all over Ireland, and disarmament should have been universal. The people in the South do not forget that, while they were disarmed, potential rebels in the North were allowed to arm and threatened to march an army from Belfast to Cork. The people of the South are suspicious, and not without reason. Above all things it is necessary to convince them of fair dealing. The Prime Minister hopes that "the policy of those who seek to attain their political ends by violence and intimidation will be finally abandoned, and the people of Ireland will be free to return to those constitutional methods by which alone their rightful aspirations can be attained." I acquit the Prime Minister of a desire to gratify his sense of humour; but to tell the people of Ireland that their rightful aspirations can be attained by constitutional methods when, as every one knows, the Nationalist Party was annihilated in 1918, by a people in utter despair at the failure of constitutional methods, will be looked upon in Ireland as an ironical jest. They are told that the British House of Commons and the British nation are willing to "parley" with the people of Ireland with a view of establishing peace and good will and friendship, and that avenues are open. Parley with whom? It is impossible to parley with the imaginary President of a non-existent Republic. Equally futile to parley with Sinn Féin. An

avenue to be of any use must be open at both ends. One end is open in Downing Street, and that avenue leads not towards individuals, but towards the people of Ireland. If it is to be opened at that end, if the British House of Commons is to parley with the people of Ireland, they must be given something tangible and definite to consider and parley about.

Is an amending Act in contemplation? If so, why not say so? Vague phrases will not restore faith in constitutionalism as a means of redress. The fact must be demonstrated. The goods must be produced. All these ambiguous speeches and possibilities and probabilities, and secret diplomacy, are simply bewildering the Irish people, and confusing the issue; and what is it all for?

It would be an insult to suppose the Government unable to discriminate between Bolshevism and Sinn Fein, and to accuse them of a mean desire to secure an easy triumph and make Sinn Fein pass under the Claudine forks. Insulting also to assume that refusal to make concessions is disguised under insistence to treat only with accredited agents of the people. Do the Government desire a settlement? In all human probability they can have it, not perhaps immediately, if only they will speak straight, if only they will make a firm offer of the most that they can do. And if the offer is refused? The position will, at any rate, be far better than it is now, for a fair offer will have been made. If it is accepted, and the Southern Parliament fails to "make good," the people would have had a fair chance and could blame no one but themselves. —Your obedient servant,

DUNRAVEN.

ADARE MANOR, CO. LIMERICK.

APPENDIX V

(Speech in the House of Lords, June 21, 1921.¹)

I HAVE had a long experience, I suppose a longer experience by far than any other noble Lord connected with Ireland, of that country and the troubles that have afflicted it. I think it must now be about sixty years ago that I was at home and alone in the county of Limerick at the breaking out of the Fenian Insurrection. I was then a Cornet of Horse in Her Majesty's First Regiment of Life Guards, and I was instructed to inspect all the police barracks and to report upon their defensible capacity. My qualification was a very common one in appointments—that I knew absolutely nothing whatever about the matter. Of course, I did the best I could, and at any rate I saw a very great deal of the Fenian Rising, and I have been more or less concerned with the troubles, agrarian and other, that have afflicted Ireland from that time to this. I mention that experience only because I wish to emphasise that, in all my experience of so many troubles, I have never seen anything in the least approaching the conditions under which Ireland is labouring to-day.

The House knows all about the ambushes and conflicts, amounting to little battles, the murders and burnings and all the horrible consequences which have resulted from vendetta created by the system of reprisals and counter-reprisals. But what the House in general does not know, and what nobody realises except those among your Lordships who are intimately acquainted with Ireland, is the absolute confusion and chaos that exists, the extent to which the ordinary life of the country is dislocated. Bridges are blown

¹ Reprinted by the kind permission of the Editor of the Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords.

up, and roads obstructed. There are districts in Ireland as isolated as if they were in the middle of South Africa. Outrages and murders are committed, not for any political motives, but purely from personal motives of malice and revenge, hate and spite. Houses are broken into for the purpose of theft, highway robberies are committed, ordinary crime is absolutely undetected and unpunished. I am bound, I think, in justice, to say that at the time when the Sinn Fein courts operated ordinary crime was promptly and very justly dealt with. Those abnormal courts had the sanction of force behind them; ordinary Courts of Law have no sanction of force. The police are absolutely powerless to protect, and crime, as I have said, is undetected and unpunished. There is in Ireland to-day absolutely no protection whatever for life or property. Honest, decent citizens have no protection, and can get no protection from the police, and are not allowed to protect themselves.

That is a condition which to my mind is absolutely shocking, and where are we to look for deliverance from it? To my mind, deliverance can only come by legislation, by remedial legislation, by legislation amending the Act in the direction in which what I might term moderate opinion has, ever since the Bill was introduced, been urging His Majesty's Government to amend it. The Bill was, if I remember aright, introduced early in the spring of last year. From that day to this, everybody who could voice or dared to voice public opinion in Ireland, has denounced the measure as unsatisfactory and as absolutely incapable of forming the basis of a lasting settlement. Chiefly, the financial clauses have been objected to. Amendment after Amendment was moved in the other Branch of the Legislature, and by members supporting His Majesty's Government. In this House Amendments could not be moved, of course, on questions of finance.

As your Lordships may remember, last November I moved that the Bill should not be proceeded with, and my noble friend, Lord Midleton, moved to adjourn the debate for a fortnight, in order to give an opportunity for negotiations to take place. What notice was taken of that? Absolutely none. What notice has ever been taken of any effort that has been made to get the Bill amended into a

reasonable Act ? Action has not been confined to Parliament. Action has been taken over and over again by responsible men in Ireland, and by associations in Ireland. The whole case was put before His Majesty's Government by a Resolution moved by my noble friend, Lord MacDonnell, I think, last August, at the Peace Conference in Dublin, and what happened ? Nothing. What notice was taken ? None. Every effort in Parliament and out of Parliament has been made to induce the Government to amend this Bill, but the door is simply slammed and banged and bolted in our faces, and nothing is done. What is the result ? The present *impasse*—the present predicament in which we find ourselves.

I think the fatal mistake that throughout the Government has made has been in not appealing straight to the people of Ireland. They have talked of exploring avenues, and opening negotiations, and having conversations, but always with somebody who could guarantee acceptance, and who had authority to speak for the people of Ireland. Nobody had authority to speak for the people of Ireland. You do not recognise the Irish Republic or its president, and nobody had authority to speak for the people of Ireland. You ought to have spoken to the people themselves. You ought to have put before the people a Bill which reasonable and moderate men would have accepted as an alternative to separation. Of this I am perfectly confident—that the Irish people are not republican at heart. The Irish people at heart do not desire the separation to be a complete severance between them and their best customer. If a measure had been put before them—a liberal measure as regards fiscal and financial autonomy—the noble Marquess asks whether anybody can say that it would be accepted. Nobody can say it would be accepted now, but I am absolutely certain that it would have been accepted as recently as six months ago.

Whether it will be accepted now, who can say ? But at any rate it is possible, and if it is a possibility, is it not worth while putting it to the test ? We know what the Lord-Lieutenant said the other day in Belfast and what the Chief Secretary said in another place. If there is any real meaning to be attached to those words, if amendments really are contemplated, why in Heaven's name cannot the Govern-

ment give us the scope of those amendments now ? Why not introduce the amending Bill now, before it becomes too late ? I have said that I believe the only way of inducing peace and eventual settlement, in Ireland, is by legislation. What is the alternative ? It is keeping Ireland down by force. I was driven almost to despair by the speech of the noble Marquess, which, in its whole tenour and gist, seemed to me to be a counsel of absolute despair. Nothing to do but carry on as we are. And what does carrying on as we are mean ? It means the subjection of twenty-six counties in Ireland to military rule.

Of course, disorder can be driven under the surface in Ireland by the pressure of sufficient force, but it cannot be kept under without continuing the pressure of sufficient force. The moment force is taken away, it will crop up again, because at the bottom of all the trouble in Ireland is the fact that the people are convinced that they never will get, by constitutional and peaceful means, their reasonable demands. Force is justifiable in many cases. I believe force—and any extent of force—would be justified in the eyes of the people of Great Britain, and I believe would be justified in the hearts of the people of Ireland, to put down secession. But I do not see how any justification can be found for putting twenty-six counties of Ireland under a military dictatorship—for that is what it really amounts to—until every means has been tried of satisfying them—every means within the limits that have been laid down over and over again by the Prime Minister, the limits of security for the United Kingdom and the integrity of the Empire. Until every such means has been tried I see no justification in force. And up to the present nothing has been tried.

Moderate opinion exists in Ireland ; it does not assert itself, as the noble Marquess has said. What has it got to assert itself for ? There is nothing before it, except an Act which it has over and over again said it will not accept. Give moderate opinion something that can satisfy it, upon which it can concentrate itself and create moderate opinion, and I think you would see a very different state of things. I entreat His Majesty's Government to accept the Motion before the House and to act upon it. It is the only way, to my mind—I do not know whether it matters to them—

by which they can save themselves from a charge of bankruptcy in statesmanship. I am certain it is the only way in which Ireland can be relieved of the horrible circumstances under which she labours now, and can be preserved from perhaps greater evils to come.

APPENDIX VI

(Letter to the *Times*, June 24, 1921.¹)

THE IRISH TRAGEDY: A GRIM DILEMMA

FORCE OR THE ACT

To the Editor of the "Times"

SIR,—May I once more appeal to your courtesy to allow me to sing my swan-song, so far as the Irish problem is concerned, in the columns of the *Times*?

The tragedy of Ireland increases daily in intensity, and the faint hope that even at the eleventh hour wiser counsels would prevail was killed by the Lord Chancellor in his speech in the House of Lords on Tuesday last. The Government are determined to continue their career of ignorance and divided counsels.

Both in administration and in legislation a complete failure has been made. Though warned by those who knew, the Government refused to recognise the gravity of the situation in 1916. When it became necessary to employ military force, they neglected to put the Forces of the Crown, including the Police, under one command. They appointed a great soldier as Lord-Lieutenant and General Governor; they appointed a Commander-in-Chief acting independently of the Lord-Lieutenant; they appointed a general officer in command of the Police, acting independently both of the Lord-Lieutenant and the Commander-in-Chief; and a Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant, independent of everybody, responsible only to the Cabinet, and of necessity residing principally in London. Such divided command was doomed to failure; and it has failed.

¹ Reprinted by the kind permission of the proprietors of the *Times*.

The position in Ireland has never been defined. It appears from the latest utterances of the Prime Minister and the Lord Chancellor now to have dawned upon the Government for the first time that there is a war. If a state of war has existed, why have not the Government acknowledged it long ago? A clear distinction could then have been drawn between acts of war and assassination; no complaint of the consequences incidental to a state of war would have been made, and all the bitter hatred engendered by an abominable system of reprisals would have been avoided.

In legislation the failure has been equally complete, and the Government appear to have been determined to wreck their own Bill. To the dual policy upon which the Bill was founded I did not object. Under the conditions existing in Ulster it seemed to me the best policy that could be adopted, and I felt certain that for mutual convenience the two Parliaments would come together to the great advantage of both. The carving-up of Ulster was a great mistake; but let that pass. But, for unity to be achieved, it was necessary that both Parliaments should function, and long before the Bill had passed through the House of Commons it became evident that the financial clauses of the Bill were of such a character as to preclude all possibility of the people of Southern Ireland accepting the Bill, and that the Southern Parliament could not function. The Bill was framed to suit a minority in the North-East—a minority which the Prime Minister described as “alien in race, alien in sympathy, alien in religion, alien in tradition, alien in outlook.” I demur to the proposition; but it was the contention of the Government, and, because a Bill thus framed was accepted by the minority, the Government have persisted in asserting that it must be acceptable also to a majority, which, according to their own view, differs absolutely and essentially from the minority. Can anything be more unstatesmanlike and illogical? The Government could never have had the slightest doubt as to the failure of the Act in Southern Ireland. Its rejection was plainly stated by the Sinn Féin Party and Constitutional Nationalists: Unionist opinion expressed itself as clearly as, under the appalling condition of Ireland, was possible, through many members in the House of Commons, who otherwise support the Government,

by the almost unanimous voice of peers connected with Ireland in the House of Lords, and by all the more solid element of society in many public meetings held in Dublin and elsewhere. That the Act would not be accepted by Southern Ireland was made perfectly plain, and the Government could have had no illusions about that. And yet they have insisted, and persist in insisting, that Southern Ireland ought to accept, and must accept, the Act, and that the only alternative is military rule. It is obviously useless any longer to attempt to persuade the Government to endeavour to find a solution of the problem through legislation, and the only hope remaining lies in appealing to the British people and endeavouring to get them to understand the underlying causes of all the trouble.

Some of the difficulties cumbering the ground have been cleared away. Ireland's nationality is no longer denied. That the Act of Union was a failure is admitted; and it no longer exists. The issue as between the people of Great Britain and the people of Ireland has become simplified. Ireland claims the right of self-determination, and strengthens her claim by the fact, which cannot be denied, that to maintain the rights of small nations was at any rate one of the objects of the late war. Great Britain claims the equal, or superior, right of self-preservation. If these propositions are accepted, the dispute is brought within practicable limits. The principles, though conflicting, are not irreconcilable. They are susceptible of adjustment.

The real issue before the Irish people in the 1918 election was self-determination for Ireland, and it is safe to assume that the election the other day was really fought on the same grounds. It is true that the claim to self-determination took the concrete form of complete separation and the setting-up of a republican form of government. But the obvious reason for that extreme definition is that no attempt to grant self-determination "within the Empire" has been made. The extent to which the Prime Minister accepted Ireland's claim to self-determination in the letter in which he gave a "reference" to the Convention is, I think, forgotten. In that letter he asked the Convention "to submit to the British Government a Constitution for the future government of Ireland within the Empire." He thus acknowledged Ireland's

right to determine her own form of government within a certain limit; and that limit recognised Great Britain's right to self-preservation. Ireland could form any Constitution she liked for internal government, provided she remained "within the Empire" and that her Constitution was consequently subject to conditions as regards the Crown and ultimate supremacy of Parliament which govern the Constitution of the other component parts of the Empire.

With the failure of the Convention it became obvious that the next move must come from His Majesty's Government, and that it was their duty to make proposals that could possibly be accepted by the Irish people in satisfaction of their claim to self-determination, and would at the same time satisfy Great Britain in respect to her security and the integrity of the Empire. No attempt, however, has been made by the Government to reconcile the two conflicting principles, or to make any definite firm offer that could be accepted by the majority of the Irish people. They have contented themselves by insisting, with supreme obstinacy, that their Act ought to be, and must be, accepted.

Ireland demands recognition of her individuality and control of her internal affairs as the outward and visible sign of such recognition. It is useless arguing whether fiscal and financial control would be convenient or inconvenient. The solid fact must be faced that, if any alternative to military rule is to be found, it can only be by a grant of full fiscal and financial control to both Parliaments. It is useless also to discuss why it is required in one case and not in the other. The Parliament of the six counties does not require it; they are satisfied with the financial clauses of the Act. Well and good, that is their own affair. The people of Southern Ireland have emphatically stated that they are not satisfied with the financial clauses of the Act; that a Parliament should have control over taxation and expenditure; and that a Parliament subject to the financial restrictions in the Act must break down.

Would a grant of fiscal and financial autonomy be accepted by Southern Ireland? That is a question impossible to answer. It certainly would have been accepted not many months ago, and it may not be too late now. If embodied in an Act, and given a little time, it might be accepted,

and, if so, all difficulties about contributions and so on would melt away. If refused, justification would be found for some form of provisional government taking charge on the rejected terms. It was the plain duty of the Government to put before the people the broadest and most comprehensive offer within the limits laid down by the Prime Minister for the security of Great Britain. That would have created, and would have consolidated, moderate opinion. Moderate opinion can only protest. It cannot propose a constructive policy. That is for the Government ; and men do not risk their lives for political negation. Moderate opinion has nothing before it except an Act which it has consistently repudiated. Give it something that it can fasten upon, and it may have the courage to pronounce itself. It is only fair also to the leaders of extreme opinion in Ireland that they should be given some definite proposition to consider. All the talk about “ exploring avenues ” and opening negotiations with people who could guarantee acceptance of terms the Government might offer was futile, for no such person or authority existed. There is no getting over the fact that the only chance of success lay in the Government making the firm offer which moderate opinion, so far it was able to express itself, has urged upon them during the last eighteen months, and that to their failure deplorable conditions are due.

Ireland can, of course, be hammered into a semblance of order by means which are repugnant to every honest man ; but it can only be temporarily crushed. The most that force can accomplish is to bring about an appearance of peace upon a population nourishing hatred in a ruined land. Force is, of course, justifiable in many cases, and I believe force would be justified in the eyes of the people of Great Britain and in the hearts of the people of Ireland to put down secession ; but there can be no justification for putting twenty-six counties of Ireland under a military dictatorship—that is what it really comes to—until every possible step within the limits laid down by the Prime Minister for the security of the United Kingdom and of the Empire has been taken to satisfy them.

The decision to employ force before every possible alternative has been exhausted is, indeed (to use the words of the Lord Chancellor), “ a melancholy conclusion.” Of all the

difficulties confronting us—foreign commitments and domestic industrial troubles—the condition of Ireland is the most formidable. It reacts upon all the States of the Empire, and further. Those States are watching Ireland at this critical moment; and watching much more closely the Government's attitude towards Ireland. If it is to be long prolonged military rule, I doubt whether the people of Great Britain will approve; and it may be that Lord Midleton's prediction, made in the House of Lords on Tuesday last, that "the time will not be very far distant when there will be a feeling that a Government which is incapable of governing Ireland is also incapable of being responsible for the interests of the British Empire," may prove to be true.

But there is still a ray of hope. All our entreaties to postpone the summoning of the Irish Parliament have been rejected; but it is not too late to do so. The Northern Parliament has been opened, but has adjourned to September 20. The Southern Parliament has been elected, but will not meet. It remains, however, a representative body, and if the date for which it is summoned were postponed till September 20, much might be accomplished by an interchange of views, and the "new spirit of forbearance and accommodation" for which the Prime Minister hopes might find evidence in an Amending Act which would enable both Parliaments to function.—Your obedient servant,

DUNRAVEN.

22 NORFOLK STREET,
PARK LANE, W.1,
June 24.

The *Times* was good enough to devote to the foregoing letter the following leading article:

"LORD DUNRAVEN ON IRELAND.—Those of our readers who have shared our appreciation of the letters which Lord Dunraven has from time to time contributed to this journal will read with regret that he regards the powerful statement which we print to-day as his 'swan song,' in so far as the Irish problem is concerned. A few days ago he reminded the

House of Lords that, as a Cornet of Horse, he was at home and alone in Limerick at the outbreak of the Fenian insurrection some sixty years ago ; nevertheless, his outlook is as fresh and as clear as that of any living Irishman. He has long preserved an individual and independent view in Irish politics, though it has taken time to prove him, as time has proved him, to have been mainly in the right. Such men can ill be spared, and we sincerely hope that he will yet ' sing ' many a ' song.' Certainly his letter is not that of a man whose usefulness age or time has impaired. It is a plain, terse statement of irrefutable facts. Lord Dunraven has lived to construct a political philosophy upon an intimate and long experience of his country. The Government have also had, and may still have, their philosophy ; but, in comparison, it has been a thing of expediency, and mainly unrelated to the realities of the Irish situation. As the printed record of our views attests, we have long agreed with Lord Dunraven's line of argument. No one dare say now, though some few months ago it could be said with assurance, that the grant of fiscal and financial autonomy to Ireland would bring a speedy solution of the Irish problem ; yet the fact remains that this concession is, and will continue to be, an essential preliminary to a lasting settlement. This fact the Government seek persistently to ignore, even if they have not already ceased to seek a settlement. The failure of their Irish Administration to secure the acceptance of their Irish Act seems to have plunged them into dire confusion."—*Times*, June 25, 1921.

APPENDIX VII

(Articles of Agreement for a Treaty between Great Britain
and Ireland)

1. IRELAND shall have the same constitutional status in the Community of Nations known as the British Empire as the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa, with a Parliament having powers to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of Ireland, and an Executive responsible to that Parliament, and shall be styled and known as the Irish Free State.

2. Subject to the provisions hereinafter set out, the position of the Irish Free State in relation to the Imperial Parliament and Government and otherwise shall be that of the Dominion of Canada, and the law, practice and constitutional usage governing the relationship of the Crown or the representative of the Crown and of the Imperial Parliament to the Dominion of Canada shall govern their relationship to the Irish Free State.

3. The representative of the Crown in Ireland shall be appointed in like manner as the Governor-General of Canada, and in accordance with the practice observed in the making of such appointments.

4. The oath to be taken by Members of the Parliament of the Irish Free State shall be in the following form :

I . . . do solemnly swear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the Irish Free State as by law established and that I will be faithful to H.M. King George V., his heirs and successors by law, in virtue of

the common citizenship of Ireland with Great Britain and her adherence to and membership of the group of nations forming the British Commonwealth of Nations.

5. The Irish Free State shall assume liability for the service of the Public Debt of the United Kingdom as existing at the date hereof and towards the payment of war pensions as existing at that date in such proportion as may be fair and equitable, having regard to any just claims on the part of Ireland by way of set off or counterclaim, the amount of such sums being determined in default of agreement by the arbitration of one or more independent persons being citizens of the British Empire.

6. Until an arrangement has been made between the British and Irish Governments whereby the Irish Free State undertakes her own coastal defence, the defence by sea of Great Britain and Ireland shall be undertaken by His Majesty's Imperial Forces, but this shall not prevent the construction or maintenance by the Government of the Irish Free State of such vessels as are necessary for the protection of the Revenue or the Fisheries.

The foregoing provisions of this article shall be reviewed at a conference of Representatives of the British and Irish Governments to be held at the expiration of five years from the date hereof with a view to the undertaking by Ireland of a share in her own coastal defence.

7. The Government of the Irish Free State shall afford to His Majesty's Imperial Forces :

(a) In time of peace such harbour and other facilities as are indicated in the Annex hereto, or such other facilities as may from time to time be agreed between the British Government and the Government of the Irish Free State ; and

(b) In time of war or of strained relations with a Foreign Power such harbour and other facilities as the British Government may require for the purposes of such defence as aforesaid.

8. With a view to securing the observance of the principle of international limitation of armaments, if the Government

of the Irish Free State establishes and maintains a military defence force, the establishments thereof shall not exceed in size such proportion of the military establishments maintained in Great Britain as that which the population of Ireland bears to the population of Great Britain.

9. The ports of Great Britain and the Irish Free State shall be freely open to the ships of the other country on payment of the customary port and other dues.

10. The Government of the Irish Free State agrees to pay fair compensation on terms not less favourable than those accorded by the Act of 1920 to judges, officials, members of police forces, and other public servants, who are discharged by it or who retire in consequence of the change of government effected in pursuance hereof :

Provided that this agreement shall not apply to members of the Auxiliary Police Force or to persons recruited in Great Britain for the Royal Irish Constabulary during the two years next preceding the date hereof. The British Government will assume responsibility for such compensation or pensions as may be payable to any of these excepted persons.

11. Until the expiration of one month from the passing of the Act of Parliament for the ratification of this instrument, the powers of the Parliament and the Government of the Irish Free State shall not be exercisable as respects Northern Ireland, and the provisions of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, shall, so far as they relate to Northern Ireland, remain of full force and effect, and no election shall be held for the return of members to serve in the Parliament of the Irish Free State for constituencies in Northern Ireland, unless a resolution is passed by both houses of the Parliament of Northern Ireland in favour of the holding of such elections before the end of the said month.

12. If, before the expiration of the said month, an address is presented to His Majesty by both Houses of Parliament of Northern Ireland to that effect, the powers of the Parliament and the Government of the Irish Free State shall no longer extend to Northern Ireland, and the provisions of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920 (including those relating to the

Council of Ireland), shall, so far as they relate to Northern Ireland, continue to be of full force and effect, and this instrument shall have effect subject to the necessary modifications :

Provided that if such an address is so presented a Commission consisting of three persons, one to be appointed by the Government of the Irish Free State, one to be appointed by the Government of Northern Ireland, and one, who shall be Chairman, to be appointed by the British Government, shall determine, in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, so far as may be compatible with economic and geographic conditions, the boundaries between Northern Ireland and the rest of Ireland, and for the purposes of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, and of this instrument, the boundary of Northern Ireland shall be such as may be determined by such Commission.

13. For the purpose of the last foregoing Article, the powers of the Parliament of Southern Ireland under the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, to elect members of the Council of Ireland, shall, after the Parliament of the Irish Free State is constituted, be exercised by that Parliament.

14. After the expiration of the said month, if no such address as is mentioned in Article 12 hereof is presented, the Parliament and Government of Northern Ireland shall continue to exercise as respects Northern Ireland the powers conferred on them by the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, but the Parliament and Government of the Irish Free State shall in Northern Ireland have in relation to matters in respect of which the Parliament of Northern Ireland has not power to make laws under that Act (including matters which under the said Act are within the jurisdiction of the Council of Ireland) the same powers as in the rest of Ireland subject to such other provisions as may be agreed in manner hereinafter appearing.

15. At any time after the date hereof the Government of Northern Ireland and the provisional Government of Southern Ireland hereinafter constituted may meet for the purpose of discussing the provisions subject to which the last foregoing Article is to operate in the event of no such address as is

therein mentioned being presented, and those provisions may include :

- (a) safeguards with regard to patronage in Northern Ireland,
- (b) safeguards with regard to the collection of revenue in Northern Ireland,
- (c) safeguards with regard to import and export duties affecting the trade or industry of Northern Ireland,
- (d) safeguards for minorities in Northern Ireland,
- (e) the settlement of the financial relations between Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State,
- (f) the establishment and powers of a local militia in Northern Ireland and the relation of the Defence Forces of the Irish Free State and of Northern Ireland respectively ;

and if at any such meeting provisions are agreed to, the same shall have effect as if they were included amongst the provisions subject to which the powers of the Parliament and Government of the Irish Free State are to be exercisable in Northern Ireland under Article 14 hereof.

16. Neither the Parliament of the Irish Free State nor the Parliament of Northern Ireland shall make any law so as either directly or indirectly to endow any religion or prohibit or restrict the free exercise thereof, or give any preference or impose any disability on account of religious belief or religious status, or affect prejudicially the right of any child to attend a school receiving public money without attending the religious instruction at the school, or make any discrimination as respects State aid between schools under the management of different religious denominations or divert from any religious denomination or any educational institution any of its property except for public utility purposes and on payment of compensation.

17. By way of provisional arrangement for the administration of Southern Ireland during the interval which must elapse between the date hereof and the constitution of a Parliament and Government of the Irish Free State in accordance therewith, steps shall be taken forthwith for summoning a meeting of members of Parliament elected for

constituencies in Southern Ireland since the passing of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, and for constituting a provisional Government, and the British Government shall take the steps necessary to transfer to such provisional Government the powers and machinery requisite for the discharge of its duties, provided that every member of such provisional Government shall have signified in writing his or her acceptance of this instrument. But this arrangement shall not continue in force beyond the expiration of twelve months from the date hereof.

18. This instrument shall be submitted forthwith by His Majesty's Government for the approval of Parliament and by the Irish signatories to a meeting summoned for the purpose of the members elected to sit in the House of Commons of Southern Ireland, and, if approved, shall be ratified by the necessary legislation.

(Signed)

On behalf of the British
Delegation,

D. LLOYD GEORGE.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.
BIRKENHEAD.
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL.
L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS.
HAMAR GREENWOOD.
GORDON HEWART.

On behalf of the Irish
Delegation,

ART Ó GRIOBHTHA.
MICHÁL Ó COILEAIN.
RÍOBÁRD BARTUN.
E. S. Ó DUGAIN.
SEORSA GHABHÁIN ÚI
DHUBHTHAIGH.

6th December 1921.

ANNEX

1. The following are the specific facilities required :

DOCKYARD PORT AT BEREHAVEN

(a) Admiralty property and rights to be retained as at the date hereof. Harbour defences to remain in charge of British care and maintenance parties.

QUEENSTOWN

(b) Harbour defences to remain in charge of British care and maintenance parties. Certain mooring buoys to be retained for use of His Majesty's ships.

BELFAST LOUGH

(c) Harbour defences to remain in charge of British care and maintenance parties.

LOUGH SWILLY

(d) Harbour defences to remain in charge of British care and maintenance parties.

AVIATION

(e) Facilities in the neighbourhood of the above ports for coastal defence by air.

OIL FUEL STORAGE

| | | |
|-------------------|---|---|
| (f) Haulbowline . | { | To be offered for sale to commercial companies under guarantee that purchasers shall maintain a certain minimum stock for Admiralty purposes. |
| Rathmullen . | | |

2. A convention shall be made between the British Government and the Government of the Irish Free State to give effect to the following conditions :

(a) That submarine cables shall not be landed or wireless stations for communication with places outside Ireland be established except by agreement with the British Government ; that the existing cable landing rights and wireless concessions shall not be withdrawn except by agreement with the British Government ; and that the British Government shall be entitled to land additional submarine cables or establish additional wireless stations for communication with places outside Ireland :

- (b) That lighthouses, buoys, beacons, and any navigational marks or navigational aids shall be maintained by the Government of the Irish Free State as at the date hereof, and shall not be removed or added to except by agreement with the British Government :
- (c) The war signal stations shall be closed down and left in charge of care and maintenance parties, the Government of the Irish Free State being offered the option of taking them over and working them for commercial purposes subject to Admiralty inspection and guaranteeing the upkeep of existing telegraphic communication therewith.

3. A Convention shall be made between the same Governments for the regulation of Civil Communication by Air.

APPENDIX VIII

(Summary of Recommendations of the Conference of
1917-18 upon Reform of the Second Chamber)

THE Second Chamber to consist of two sections. One section to consist of 246 persons elected by panels of members of the House of Commons distributed in geographical groups. Nominations of persons by a group may be made by any members of that group. The proceedings of members constituting the group to be private for the purposes of the election (by ballot, and by proportional representation by the method of the single transferable vote). Another section to be chosen by a Joint Standing Committee of both Houses (5 members each) in the first instance, and thereafter of the House of Commons and the new Second Chamber. The number of this section to be about one-third of the whole Second Chamber (excluding *ex officio* members, *i.e.* Law Lords). In the first instance the persons chosen for this section to be selected from holders of hereditary peerages (including Scottish and Irish) and the Bishops holding diocesan sees so that not less than five such bishops are included in the number chosen at the first election: at the second and third elections by the Joint Standing Committee not less than half the vacancies to be filled on each occasion to be filled by the selection of holders of hereditary peerages or Bishops, and the remainder from whatever source the Joint Standing Committee may think best, whether within or without the peerage. The term of office of members of both sections to be twelve years; one-third of the members to retire every fourth year. Clergymen of any existing religious community to be eligible for election. The Second Chamber not to have power to amend or reject a Financial Bill. When a Bill passed by one House has been rejected

by the other House, or passed by it with amendments to which the first House has refused to agree, either House may, by resolution, demand a reference of the Bill to a Free Conference. This Free Conference to consist of (a) 20 members of each House appointed at the beginning of each Parliament by the Committee of Selection in each House in such a manner as to enable expression to be given to the various sections of opinion in that House. This body to be entitled the "Joint Standing Committee of Conferences"; (b) 10 members of each House added by the Committee of Selection to the Joint Standing Committee on the occasion of the reference of any particular Bill, to form with the Joint Standing Committee the "Free Conference" on the Bill. The report of the Free Conference to be made to both Houses simultaneously, and to contain the recommendations of the Free Conference with regard to a suggested basis of agreement between the two Houses in the form of a Bill. After a Bill has been referred to the Free Conference, and the Free Conference has reported it with or without amendment to the two Houses, neither House may amend the Bill. If both Houses agree to the Bill as reported from the Conference, the Bill shall be presented for the Royal Assent. If the Bill as reported be accepted by one House, but rejected by the other, it shall be referred back to the Conference in the Session next following that in which the Bill originated; and if the Conference then reports that it has accepted the Bill in the same form by a majority of not less than three of those present and voting, the Bill, if then approved by both Houses or by the House of Commons alone, shall be presented to the Sovereign for the Royal assent. If the Free Conference fail to pass the Bill again in the same form, or passes it by a majority of less than three, the Bill shall lapse, unless both Houses accept the Bill as reported by the Free Conference.

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